On Rigor (-1799)

"Thus, joining the rigor of demonstrations in mathematics with the uncertainty of chance, and conciliating these apparently contradictory matters, it can, taking its name from both of them, with justice arrogate the stupefying name: The Mathematics of Chance." (Blaise Pascal, [Address to the Academie Parisienne de Mathematiques] 1654)

 "[…] even if someone refuses to admit infinite and infinitesimal lines in a rigorous metaphysical sense and as real things, he can still use them with confidence as ideal concepts (notions ideales) which shorten his reasoning, similar to what we call imaginary roots in the ordinary algebra, for example, √-2." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [letter to Varignon], 1702)

"It may be observed of mathematicians that they only meddle with such things as are certain, passing by those that are doubtful and unknown. They profess not to know all things, neither do they affect to speak of all things. What they know to be true, and can make good by invincible arguments, that they publish and insert among their theorems. Of other things they are silent and pass no judgment at all, chusing [choosing] rather to acknowledge their ignorance, than affirm anything rashly. They affirm nothing among their arguments or assertions which is not most manifestly known and examined with utmost rigour, rejecting all probable conjectures and little witticisms. They submit nothing to authority, indulge no affection, detest subterfuges of words, and declare their sentiments, as in a Court of Judicature [Justice], without passion, without apology; knowing that their reasons, as Seneca testifies of them, are not brought to persuade, but to compel." (Isaac Barrow, "Mathematical Lectures", 1734)

"Especially when we investigate the general laws of Nature, induction has very great power; & there is scarcely any other method beside it for the discovery of these laws. By its assistance, even the ancient philosophers attributed to all bodies extension, figurability, mobility, & impenetrability; & to these properties, by the use of the same method of reasoning, most of the later philosophers add inertia & universal gravitation. Now, induction should take account of every single case that can possibly happen, before it can have the force of demonstration; such induction as this has no place in establishing the laws of Nature. But use is made of an induction of a less rigorous type ; in order that this kind of induction may be employed, it must be of such a nature that in all those cases particularly, which can be examined in a manner that is bound to lead to a definite conclusion as to whether or no the law in question is followed, in all of them the same result is arrived at; & that these cases are not merely a few. Moreover, in the other cases, if those which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, on further & more accurate investigation, can all of them be made to agree with the law; although, whether they can be made to agree in this way better than in any Other whatever, it is impossible to know directly anyhow. If such conditions obtain, then it must be considered that the induction is adapted to establishing the law." (Roger J Boscovich, "De Lege Continuitatis" ["On the law of continuity"], 1754)

"He who has not made the experiment, or who is not accustomed to require rigorous accuracy from himself, will scarcely believe how much a few hours take from certainty of knowledge, and distinctness of imagery; how the succession of objects will be broken, how separate parts will be confused, and how many particular features and discriminations will be compressed and conglobated into one gross and general idea." (Samuel Johnson, "A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland", 1775)

"[…] the way in which I have proceeded does not lead to the desired goal, the goal that you declare you have reached, but instead to a doubt of the validity of [Euclidean] geometry. I have certainly achieved results which most people would look upon as proof, but which in my eyes prove almost nothing; if, for example, one can prove that there exists a right triangle whose area is greater than any given number, then I am able to establish the entire system of [Euclidean] geometry with complete rigor. Most people would certainly set forth this theorem as an axiom; I do not do so, though certainly it may be possible that, no matter how far apart one chooses the vertices of a triangle, the triangle's area still stays within a finite bound. I am in possession of several theorems of this sort, but none of them satisfy me." (Carl F Gauss, 1799) [answer to a letter from Farkas Bolyai in which Bolyai claimed to have proved Euclid's fifth postulate]