"For imagination sets the goal picture which our automatic mechanism works on. We act, or fail to act, not because of will, as is so commonly believed, but because of imagination." (Maxwell Maltz, "Psycho-Cybernetics", 1960)
"[Science fiction is] that class of prose narrative treating of a situation that could not arise in the world we know, but which is hypothesised on the basis of some innovation in science or technology, or pseudo-science or pseudo-technology, whether human or extra-terrestrial in origin. It is distinguished from pure fantasy by its need to achieve verisimilitude and win the 'willing suspension of disbelief' through scientific plausibility." (Kingsley Amis, "New Maps of Hell", 1960)
"The null-hypothesis significance test treats ‘acceptance’ or ‘rejection’ of a hypothesis as though these were decisions one makes. But a hypothesis is not something, like a piece of pie offered for dessert, which can be accepted or rejected by a voluntary physical action. Acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis is a cognitive process, a degree of believing or disbelieving which, if rational, is not a matter of choice but determined solely by how likely it is, given the evidence, that the hypothesis is true. (William W Rozeboom, "The fallacy of the null–hypothesis significance test", Psychological Bulletin 57, 1960)
"Freedom can be manifested only in the void of beliefs, in the absence of axioms, and only where the laws have no more authority than a hypothesis." (Emil Cioran, "History and Utopia", 1960)
"A world view is not merely a philosophical by-product of each culture, like a shadow, but the very skeleton of concrete cognitive assumptions on which the flesh of customary behavior is hung. World view, accordingly, may be expressed, more or less systematically in cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religious ritual, scientific belief, and so on, but it is implicit in almost every act. In Parsonian terms, it constitutes the set of cognitive orientations of the members of a society." (Anthony F C Wallace, "Culture and Personality", 1961)
"All our language is composed of brief little dreams; and the wonderful thing is that we sometimes make of them strangely accurate and marvelously reasonable thoughts. […] What should we be without the help of that which does not exist? Very little. And our unoccupied minds would languish if fables, mistaken notions, abstractions, beliefs, and monsters, hypotheses, and the so-called problems of metaphysics did not people with beings and objectless images our natural depths and darkness. Myths are the souls of our actions and our loves. We cannot act without moving towards a phantom. We can love only what we create." (Paul Valéry,"The Outlook for Intelligence", 1962)
"The important distinction between science and those other systematizations [i.e., art, philosophy, and theology] is that science is self-testing and self-correcting. Here the essential point of science is respect for objective fact. What is correctly observed must be believed [...] the competent scientist does quite the opposite of the popular stereotype of setting out to prove a theory; he seeks to disprove it. (George G Simpson, "Notes on the Nature of Science", 1962)
"Science, indeed, tells us a very great deal less about the universe than we have been accustomed to suppose, and there is no reason to believe that all we can ever know must be couched in terms of its thin and largely arbitrary abstractions." (John W N Sullivan, "Art and Reality", 1964)
"There are metaphysical problems, which cannot be disposed of by declaring them meaningless. For, as I have repeatedly said, they are ‘beyond physics’ indeed and demand an act of faith. We have to accept this fact to be honest. There are two objectionable types of believers: those who believe the incredible and those who believe that ‘belief’ must be discarded and replaced by 'the scientific method'." (Max Born, "Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance", 1964)
"The belief that there is only one truth and that oneself is in possession of it, seems to me the deepest root of all that is evil in the world." (Max Born, "Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance", 1964)
"There are metaphysical problems, which cannot be disposed of by declaring them meaningless. For, as I have repeatedly said, they are ‘beyond physics’ indeed and demand an act of faith. We have to accept this fact to be honest. There are two objectionable types of believers: those who believe the incredible and those who believe that ‘belief’ must be discarded and replaced by 'the scientific method'." (Max Born, "Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance", 1964)
"The fact that theories are not subject to absolute and final proof has led to a serious vulgar misapprehension. Theory is contrasted with fact as if the two had no relationship or were antitheses: 'Evolution is only a theory, not a fact'. Of course, theories are not facts. They are generalizations about facts and explanations of facts, based on and tested by facts. As such they may be just as certain - merit just as much confidence - as what are popularly termed 'facts'. Belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is the confident application of a generalization. The theory that life has evolved is founded on much more evidence than supports the generalization that the sun rises every day. In the vernacular, we are justified in calling both 'facts'." (George G Simpson, Life: An Introduction to Biology, 1965)
"The most natural way to give an independence proof is to establish a model with the required properties. This is not the only way to proceed since one can attempt to deal directly and analyze the structure of proofs. However, such an approach to set theoretic questions is unnatural since all our intuition come from our belief in the natural, almost physical model of the mathematical universe." (Paul J Cohen, "Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis", 1966)
"Up until now most economists have concerned themselves with linear systems, not because of any belief that the facts were so simple, but rather because of the mathematical difficulties involved in nonlinear systems [... Linear systems are] mathematically simple, and exact solutions are known. But a high price is paid for this simplicity in terms of special assumptions which must be made." (Paul A Samuelson, "Foundations of Economic Analysis", 1966)
"It is now natural for us to try to derive the laws of nature and to test their validity by means of the laws of invariance, rather than to derive the laws of invariance from what we believe to be the laws of nature." (Eugene P Wigner, "Symmetries and Reflections", 1967)
"Most of our beliefs about complex organizations follow from one or the other of two distinct strategies. The closed-system strategy seeks certainty by incorporating only those variables positively associated with goal achievement and subjecting them to a monolithic control network. The open-system strategy shifts attention from goal achievement to survival and incorporates uncertainty by recognizing organizational interdependence with environment. A newer tradition enables us to conceive of the organization as an open system, indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing certainty." (James D Thompson, "Organizations in Action", 1967)
"[…] the social scientist who lacks a mathematical mind and regards a mathematical formula as a magic recipe, rather than as the formulation of a supposition, does not hold forth much promise. A mathematical formula is never more than a precise statement. It must not be made into a Procrustean bed - and that is what one is driven to by the desire to quantify at any cost. It is utterly implausible that a mathematical formula should make the future known to us, and those who think it can, would once have believed in witchcraft. The chief merit of mathematicization is that it compels us to become conscious of what we are assuming." (Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Art of Conjecture", 1967)
"The higher we climb the ladder of epistemic abstraction the less we ourselves appear in our picture of the world and the better we are at explaining our own experiences. On the other hand, by remaining close to the senses we will not transcend superficial, anthropocentric world views. In short, although experience is a test of our theories it is not the stuff our theories are made of or even the referent of physical theories: human experience proper is the subject of nonphysical sciences like psychology. These platitudes had to be stated on account of the widespread belief that in physics only observational predicates matter - a belief inherited from philosophies at variance with science." (Mario Bunge, "Foundations of Physics", 1967)
"An algorithm must be seen to be believed, and the best way to learn what an algorithm is all about is to try it." (Donald E Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming Vol. I, 1968)
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