On Consistence (1980-1989)

"Since we have no systematic way to avoid all the inconsistencies of commonsense logic, each person must find his own way by building a private collection of 'cognitive censors' to suppress the kinds of mistakes he has discovered in the past." (Marvin Minsky, "Jokes and their Relation to the Cognitive Unconscious", 1980)

"A proof in science does more than eliminate doubt. It eliminates inconsistencies and provides the underlying logical basis of the statement." (Edward Teller, "The Pursuit of Simplicity", 1981)

"The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines - in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found." (John Haugeland, "Semantic Engines: An introduction to mind design", 1981)

"A Universal Turing Machine is an ideal mathematical object; it represents a formal manipulation of symbols and owes allegiance to criteria of logical consistency but not to physical laws and constraints. Thus, for example, physical variables play no essential role in the concept of algorithm. In reality, however, every logical operation occurs at a minimum cost of KT of energy dissipation (where K is Boltzman's constant and T is temperature) and, in fact, occurs at a much higher cost to insure reliability." (Claudia Carello et al, "The Inadequacies of the Computer Metaphor", 1982)

"The phenomena of the subatomic world are so complex that it is by no means certain whether a complete, self-consistent theory will ever be constructed, but one can envisage a series of partly successful models of smaller scope. Each of them would be intended to cover only a part of the observed phenomena and would contain some unexplained aspects, or parameters, but the parameters of one model might be explained by another. Thus more and more phenomena could gradually be covered with ever increasing accuracy by a mosaic of interlocking models whose net number of unexplained parameters keeps decreasing." (Fritjof Capra, "The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Turning Culture", 1982)

"In the consideration of mental models we need really consider four different things: the target system, the conceputal model of that target system, the user’s mental model of the target system, and the scientist's conceptualization of that mental model. The system that the person is learning or using is, by definition, the target system. A conceptual model is invented to provide an appropriate representation of the target system, appropriate in the sense of being accurate, consistent, and complete." (Donald A Norman, "Some Observations on Mental Models" [in "Mental Models", Ed(s). Dedre Gentner & Albert L Stevens], 1983)

"The basic idea is that schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions. Roughly, schemata are like models of the outside world. To process information with the use of a schema is to determine which model best fits the incoming information. Ultimately, consistent configurations of schemata are discovered which, in concert, offer the best account for the input. This configuration of schemata together constitutes the interpretation of the input." (David E Rumelhart, Paul Smolensky, James L McClelland & Geoffrey E Hinton, "Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models", 1986)

"But the answers provided by the theory of games are sometimes very puzzling and ambiguous. In many situations, no single course of action dominates all the others; instead, a whole set of possible solutions are all equally consistent with the postulates of rationality." (Herbert A Simon et al, "Decision Making and Problem Solving", Interfaces Vol. 17 (5), 1987)

"When evaluating a model, at least two broad standards are relevant. One is whether the model is consistent with the data. The other is whether the model is consistent with the ‘real world’." (Kenneth A Bollen,"Structural Equations with Latent Variables", 1989)