On Series XIV: Knowledge

"Analysis is a method where one assumes that which is sought, and from this, through a series of implications, arrives at something which is agreed upon on the basis of synthesis; because in analysis, one assumes that which is sought to be known, proved, or constructed, and examines what this is a consequence of and from what this latter follows, so that by backtracking we end up with something that is already known or is part of the starting points of the theory; we call such a method analysis; it is, in a sense, a solution in reversed direction. In synthesis we work in the opposite direction: we assume the last result of the analysis to be true. Then we put the causes from analysis in their natural order, as consequences, and by putting these together we obtain the proof or the construction of that which is sought. We call this synthesis." (Pappus of Alexandria, cca. 4th century BC)

"In the series of things those which follow are always aptly fitted to those which have gone before; for this series is not like a mere enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship." (Marcus Aurelius, "Meditations", cca. 180 AD)

"With the synthesis of every new concept in the aggregation of coordinate characteristics the extensive or complex distinctness is increased; with the further analysis of concepts in the series of subordinate characteristics the intensive or deep distinctness is increased. The latter kind of distinctness, as it necessarily serves the thoroughness and conclusiveness of cognition, is therefore mainly the business of philosophy and is carried farthest especially in metaphysical investigations." (Immanuel Kant, "Logic", 1800)

"Isolated facts and experiments have in themselves no value, however great their number may be. They only become valuable in a theoretical or practical point of view when they make us acquainted with the law of a series of uniformly recurring phenomena, or, it may be, only give a negative result showing an incompleteness in our knowledge of such a law, till then held to be perfect." (Hermann von Helmholtz, "The Aim and Progress of Physical Science", 1869)

"The steps to scientific as well as other knowledge consist in a series of logical fictions which are as legitimate as they are indispensable in the operations of thought, but whose relations to the phenomena whereof they are the partial and not unfrequently merely symbolical representations must never be lost sight of." (John Stallo, "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics", 1884) 

"Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line [...]" (Vladimir I Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", 1915)

"Knowledge is not a series of self-consistent theories that converges toward an ideal view; it is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our consciousness." (Paul K Feyerabend, "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge", 1975)