On Plausibility II

"From the outset it was clear that the two kinds of reasoning have different tasks. From the outset. they appeared very different: demonstrative reasoning as definite, final, 'machinelike'; and plausible reasoning as vague, provisional, specifically 'human'. Now we may see the difference a little more distinctly. In opposition to demonstrative inference, plausible inference leaves indeterminate a highly relevant point: the 'strength' or the 'weight' of the conclusion. This weight may depend not only on clarified grounds such as those expressed in the premises, hut also on unclarified unexpressed grounds somewhere on the background of the person who draws the conclusion. A person has a background, a machine has not. Indeed, you can build a machine to draw demonstrative conclusions for you, but I think you can never build a machine that will draw plausible inferences." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning", 1954)

"One feature [...] which requires much more justification than is usually given, is the setting up of unplausible null hypotheses. For example, a statistician may set out a test to see whether two drugs have exactly the same effect, or whether a regression line is exactly straight. These hypotheses can scarcely be taken literally." (Cedric A B Smith, "Book review of Norman T. J. Bailey: Statistical Methods in Biology", Applied Statistics 9, 1960)

"[…] the social scientist who lacks a mathematical mind and regards a mathematical formula as a magic recipe, rather than as the formulation of a supposition, does not hold forth much promise. A mathematical formula is never more than a precise statement. It must not be made into a Procrustean bed - and that is what one is driven to by the desire to quantify at any cost. It is utterly implausible that a mathematical formula should make the future known to us, and those who think it can, would once have believed in witchcraft. The chief merit of mathematicization is that it compels us to become conscious of what we are assuming." (Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Art of Conjecture", 1967)

"Demonstrative reasoning differs from plausible reasoning just as the fact differs from the supposition, just as actual existence differs from the possibility of existence. Demonstrative reasoning is reliable, incontrovertible and final. Plausible reasoning is conditional, arguable and oft-times risky." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"Philosophical objections may be raised by the logical implications of building a mathematical structure on the premise of fuzziness, since it seems (at least superficially) necessary to require that an object be or not be an element of a given set. From an aesthetic viewpoint, this may be the most satisfactory state of affairs, but to the extent that mathematical structures are used to model physical actualities, it is often an unrealistic requirement. [...] Fuzzy sets have an intuitively plausible philosophical basis. Once this is accepted, analytical and practical considerations concerning fuzzy sets are in most respects quite orthodox." (James Bezdek, 1981)

"In all scientific fields, theory is frequently more important than experimental data. Scientists are generally reluctant to accept the existence of a phenomenon when they do not know how to explain it. On the other hand, they will often accept a theory that is especially plausible before there exists any data to support it." (Richard Morris, 1983)

"The systems' basic components are treated as sets of rules. The systems rely on three key mechanisms: parallelism, competition, and recombination. Parallelism permits the system to use individual rules as building blocks, activating sets of rules to describe and act upon the changing situations. Competition allows the system to marshal its rules as the situation demands, providing flexibility and transfer of experience. This is vital in realistic environments, where the agent receives a torrent of information, most of it irrelevant to current decisions. The procedures for adaptation - credit assignment and rule discovery - extract useful, repeatable events from this torrent, incorporating them as new building blocks. Recombination plays a key role in the discovery process, generating plausible new rules from parts of tested rules. It implements the heuristic that building blocks useful in the past will prove useful in new, similar contexts." (John H Holland, "Complex Adaptive Systems", Daedalus Vol. 121 (1), 1992)

"Therefore, mathematical ecology does not deal directly with natural objects. Instead, it deals with the mathematical objects and operations we offer as analogs of nature and natural processes. These mathematical models do not contain all information about nature that we may know, but only what we think are the most pertinent for the problem at hand. In mathematical modeling, we have abstracted nature into simpler form so that we have some chance of understanding it. Mathematical ecology helps us understand the logic of our thinking about nature to help us avoid making plausible arguments that may not be true or only true under certain restrictions. It helps us avoid wishful thinking about how we would like nature to be in favor of rigorous thinking about how nature might actually work." (John Pastor, "Mathematical Ecology of Populations and Ecosystems", 2008)

"Don’t just do the calculations. Use common sense to see whether you are answering the correct question, the assumptions are reasonable, and the results are plausible. If a statistical argument doesn’t make sense, think about it carefully - you may discover that the argument is nonsense." (Gary Smith, "Standard Deviations", 2014)

"The fundamental problem with MRA, as with all correlational methods, is self-selection. The investigator doesn’t choose the value for the independent variable for each subject (or case). This means that any number of variables correlated with the independent variable of interest have been dragged along with it. In most cases, we will fail to identify all these variables. In the case of behavioral research, it’s normally certain that we can’t be confident that we’ve identified all the plausibly relevant variables." (Richard E Nisbett, "Mindware: Tools for Smart Thinking", 2015)