"If in a discussion of many matters […] we are not able to give perfectly exact and self-consistent accounts, do not be surprised: rather we would be content if we provide accounts that are second to none in probability." (Plato,"Timaeus", cca. 360 BC)
"Truth is always consistent with itself, and needs nothing to help it out; it is always near at hand, and sits upon our lips, and is ready to drop out before we are aware; whereas a lie is troublesome, and sets a man’s invention upon the rack, and one trick needs a great many more to make it good." (John Tillotson,"Sermons", 1682)
"All that can be said upon the number and nature of elements is, in my opinion, confined to discussions entirely of a metaphysical nature. The subject only furnishes us with indefinite problems, which may be solved in a thousand different ways, not one of which, in all probability, is consistent with nature." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier,"Elements of Chemistry", 1790)
"There are, undoubtedly, the most ample reasons for stating both the principles and theorems [of geometry] in their general form […] But, that an unpractised learner, even in making use of one theorem to demonstrate another, reasons rather from particular to particular than from the general proposition, is manifest from the difficulty he finds in applying a theorem to a case in which the configuration of the diagram is extremely unlike that of the diagram by which the original theorem was demonstrated. A difficulty which, except in cases of unusual mental powers, long practice can alone remove, and removes chiefly by rendering us familiar with all the configurations consistent with the general conditions of the theorem." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic", 1843)
"The framing of hypotheses is, for the enquirer after truth, not the end, but the beginning of his work. Each of his systems is invented, not that he may admire it and follow it into all its consistent consequences, but that he may make it the occasion of a course of active experiment and observation. And if the results of this process contradict his fundamental assumptions, however ingenious, however symmetrical, however elegant his system may be, he rejects it without hesitation. He allows no natural yearning for the offspring of his own mind to draw him aside from the higher duty of loyalty to his sovereign, Truth, to her he not only gives his affections and his wishes, but strenuous labour and scrupulous minuteness of attention." (William Whewell, "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences" Vol. 2, 1847)
"Few will deny that even in the first scientific instruction in mathematics the most rigorous method is to be given preference over all others. Especially will every teacher prefer a consistent proof to one which is based on fallacies or proceeds in a vicious circle, indeed it will be morally impossible for the teacher to present a proof of the latter kind consciously and thus in a sense deceive his pupils. Notwithstanding these objectionable so-called proofs, so far as the foundation and the development of the system is concerned, predominate in our textbooks to the present time. Perhaps it will be answered, that rigorous proof is found too difficult for the pupil’s power of comprehension. Should this be anywhere the case, - which would only indicate some defect in the plan or treatment of the whole, - the only remedy would be to merely state the theorem in a historic way, and forego a proof with the frank confession that no proof has been found which could be comprehended by the pupil; a remedy which is ever doubtful and should only be applied in the case of extreme necessity. But this remedy is to be preferred to a proof which is no proof, and is therefore either wholly unintelligible to the pupil, or deceives him with an appearance of knowledge which opens the door to all superficiality and lack of scientific method." (Hermann G Grassmann, "Stücke aus dem Lehrbuche der Arithmetik", 1861)
"Perfect readiness to reject a theory inconsistent with fact is a primary requisite of the philosophic mind. But it, would be a mistake to suppose that this candour has anything akin to fickleness; on the contrary, readiness to reject a false theory may be combined with a peculiar pertinacity and courage in maintaining an hypothesis as long as its falsity is not actually apparent. (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science", 1874)
As long as the training of a naturalist enables him to trace the action only of a particular material system, without giving him the power of dealing with the general properties of all such systems, he must proceed by the method so often described in histories of science - he must imagine model after model of hypothetical apparatus, till he finds one which will do the required work. If this apparatus should afterwards be found capable of accounting for many of the known phenomena, and not demonstrably inconsistent with any of them, he is strongly tempted to conclude that his hypothesis is a fact, at least until an equally good rival hypothesis has been invented. (James C Maxwell, "Tait’s Thermodynamics", Nature Vol. XVII (431), 1878)
"Without a theory all our knowledge of nature would be reduced to a mere inventory of the results of observation. Every scientific theory must be regarded as an effort of the human mind to grasp the truth, and as long as it is consistent with the facts, it forms a chain by which they are linked together and woven into harmony." (Thomas Preston, "The Theory of Heat", 1894)
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