On Plausibility I

"Time is that wherein there is opportunity, and opportunity is that wherein there is no great time. Healing is a matter of time, but it is sometimes also a matter of opportunity. However, knowing this, one must attend to medical practice not primarily to plausible theories, but to experience combined with reason. For a theory is a composite memory of things apprehended with sense perception." (Hippocrates of Kos, "Precepts", cca. 4th century)

"Reasoning from analogy is often most plausible and most deceptive." (Charles Simmons, "A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker", 1852)

"I may as well say at once that I do not distinguish between inference and deduction. What is called induction appears to me to be either disguised deduction or a mere method of making plausible guesses." (Bertrand Russell, "Principles of Mathematics", 1903)

"However successful a theory or law may have been in the past, directly it fails to interpret new discoveries its work is finished, and it must be discarded or modified. However plausible the hypothesis, it must be ever ready for sacrifice on the altar of observation." (Joseph W Mellor, "A Comprehensive Treatise on Inorganic and Theoretical Chemistry", 1922) 

"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We are often obliged to use heuristic reasoning. We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"It has been said, often enough and certainly with good reason, that teaching mathematics affords a unique opportunity to teach demonstrative reasoning. I wish to add that teaching mathematics also affords an excellent opportunity to teach plausible reasoning. A student of mathematics should learn, of course, demonstrative reasoning; it is his profession and the distinctive mark of his science. Yet he should also learn plausible reasoning; this is the kind of reasoning on which his creative work will mainly depend, The general student should get a taste of demonstrative reasoning; he may have little opportunity to use it directly, but he should acquire a standard with which he can compare alleged evidence of all sorts aimed at him in modern life. He needs, however, in all his endeavors plausible reasoning. At any rate, an ambitious teacher of mathematics should teach both kinds of reasoning to both kinds of students." (George Pólya, "On Plausible Reasoning", Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematics, 1950)

"The scientist who discovers a theory is usually guided to his discovery by guesses; he cannot name a method by means of which he found the theory and can only say that it appeared plausible to him, that he had the right hunch or that he saw intuitively which assumption would fit the facts." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy", 1951)

"Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as mathematics does, but it is in itself (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us. Anything new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning, which is the only kind of reasoning for which we care in everyday affairs." (George Pólya, "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics", 1954)

"In plausible reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish... a more reasonable guess from a less reasonable guess." (George Pólya, "Mathematics and plausible reasoning" Vol. 1, 1954)

"The result of the mathematician's creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. If the learning of mathematics reflects to any degree the invention of mathematics, it must have a place for guessing, for plausible inference." (George Pólya, "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics", 1954)