On Sets: Definitions

"[a set is] an embodiment of the idea or concept which we conceive when we regard the arrangement of its parts as a matter of indifference." (Bernard Bolzano, 1847)

"By a manifold or a set I understand in general every Many that can be thought of as One, i.e., every collection of determinate elements which can be bound up into a whole through a law, and with this I believe to define something that is akin to the Platonic εἷδος [form] or ἷδεα [idea]." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883)

"A set is formed by the grouping together of single objects into a whole. A set is a plurality thought of as a unit. If these or similar statements were set down as definitions, then it could be objected with good reason that they define idem per idemi or even obscurum per obscurius. However, we can consider them as expository, as references to a primitive concept, familiar to us all, whose resolution into more fundamental concepts would perhaps be neither competent nor necessary." (Felix Hausdorff, "Set Theory", 1962)

"Set theory is concerned with abstract objects and their relation to various collections which contain them. We do not define what a set is but accept it as a primitive notion. We gain an intuitive feeling for the meaning of sets and, consequently, an idea of their usage from merely listing some of the synonyms: class, collection, conglomeration, bunch, aggregate. Similarly, the notion of an object is primitive, with synonyms element and point. Finally, the relation between elements and sets, the idea of an element being in a set, is primitive." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"Unfortunately, we are not in a position to give a rigorous definition of the fundamental concept of the theory : the concept of set. Of course, we could say that a set is a collection, a union, an ensemble, a family, a system, a class, etc. But this would not be a mathematical definition, but rather a misuse of the multitude of words available in the English language." (Naum Ya. Vilenkin, "Stories about Sets", 1968)

"Set theory is unusual in that it deals with remarkably simple but apparently ineffable objects. A set is a collection, a class, an ensemble, a batch, a bunch, a lot, a troop, a tribe. To anyone incapable of grasping the concept of a set, these verbal digressions are apt to be of little help. […] A set may contain finitely many or infinitely many members. For that matter, a set such as {} may contain no members whatsoever, its parentheses vibrating around a mathematical black hole. To the empty set is reserved the symbol Ø, the figure now in use in daily life to signify access denied or don’t go, symbolic spillovers, I suppose, from its original suggestion of a canceled eye." (David Berlinski, "Infinite Ascent: A short history of mathematics", 2005)

"Unlike the classic set theory where a set is represented as an indicator function to specify if an object belongs or not to it, a fuzzy set is an extension of a classic set where a subset is represented as a membership function to characterize the degree that an object belongs to it. The indicator function of a classic set takes value of 1 or 0, whereas the membership function of a fuzzy set takes value between 1 and 0." (Jianchao Han & Nick Cerone, Principles and Perspectives of Granular Computing, 2009) 

"The invariance principle states that the result of counting a set does not depend on the order imposed on its elements during the counting process. Indeed, a mathematical set is just a collection without any implied ordering. A set is the collection of its elements - nothing more." (Alfred S Posamentier & Bernd Thaller, "Numbers: Their tales, types, and treasures", 2015)

"A set is a unity of which its elements are the constituents. It is a fundamental property of the mind to comprehend multitudes into unities. Sets are multitudes which are also unities. A multitude is the opposite of a unity. How can anything be both a multitude and a unity? Yet a set is just that. It is a seemingly contradictory fact that sets exist. It is surprising that the fact that multitudes are also unities leads to no contradictions: this is the main fact of mathematics. Thinking a plurality together seems like a triviality: and this appears to explain why we have no contradiction. But 'many things for one' is far from trivial." (Kurt Gödel)

"A set is a Many that allows itself to be thought of as a One." (Georg Cantor)

Set Theory III

"One very important genus of complex ideas that we encounter everywhere are those in which the idea of collection (Inbegriff ) appears. There are many types of the latter [...] I must first determine with more precision the concept I associate with the word collection. I use this word in the same sense as it is used in the common usage and thus understand by a collection of certain things exactly the same as what one would express by the words: a combination (Verbindung) or association (Vereinigung) of these things, a gathering (Zusammensein) of the latter, a whole (Ganzes) in which they occur as parts (Teile). Hence the mere idea of a collection does not allow us to determine in which order and sequence the things that are put together appear or, indeed, whether there is or can be such an order. [...] A collection, it seems to me, is nothing other than something complex (das Zusammengesetztheit hat)." (Bernard Bolzano, "Wissenschaftslehre" ["Theory of Science"], 1837)

"The old and oft-repeated proposition 'Totum est majus sua parte' [the whole is larger than the part] may be applied without proof only in the case of entities that are based upon whole and part; then and only then is it an undeniable consequence of the concepts 'totum' and 'pars'. Unfortunately, however, this 'axiom' is used innumerably often without any basis and in neglect of the necessary distinction between 'reality' and 'quantity' , on the one hand, and 'number' and 'set', on the other, precisely in the sense in which it is generally false." (Georg Cantor, "Über unendliche, lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten", Mathematische Annalen 20, 1882)

"The foregoing account of my researches in the theory of manifolds has reached a point where further progress depends on extending the concept of true integral number beyond the previous boundaries; this extension lies in a direction which, to my knowledge, no one has yet attempted to explore.
My dependence on this extension of number concept is so great, that without it I should be unable to take freely the smallest step further in the theory of sets." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883) 

"To the thought of considering the infinitely great not merely in the form of what grows without limits - and in the closely related form of the convergent infinite series first introduced in the seventeenth century-, but also fixing it mathematically by numbers in the determinate form of the completed-infinite, I have been logically compelled in the course of scientific exertions and attempts which have lasted many years, almost against my will, for it contradicts traditions which had become precious to me; and therefore I believe that no arguments can be made good against it which I would not know how to meet." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883)

"Every mathematician agrees that every mathematician must know some set theory; the disagreement begins in trying to decide how much is some. [...] The student's task in learning set theory is to steep himself in unfamiliar but essentially shallow generalities till they become so familiar that they can be used with almost no conscious effort. In other words, general set theory is pretty trivial stuff really, but, if you want to be a mathematician, you need some, and here it is; read it, absorb it, and forget it [...] the language and notation are those of ordinary informal mathematics. A more important way in which the naive point of view predominates is that set theory is regarded as a body of facts, of which the axioms are a brief and convenient summary; in the orthodox axiomatic view the logical relations among various axioms are the central objects of study." (Paul R Halmos, "Naive Set Theory", 1960)

"A manifold, roughly, is a topological space in which some neighborhood of each point admits a coordinate system, consisting of real coordinate functions on the points of the neighborhood, which determine the position of points and the topology of that neighborhood; that is, the space is locally cartesian. Moreover, the passage from one coordinate system to another is smooth in the overlapping region, so that the meaning of 'differentiable' curve, function, or map is consistent when referred to either system." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"Set theory is concerned with abstract objects and their relation to various collections which contain them. We do not define what a set is but accept it as a primitive notion. We gain an intuitive feeling for the meaning of sets and, consequently, an idea of their usage from merely listing some of the synonyms: class, collection, conglomeration, bunch, aggregate. Similarly, the notion of an object is primitive, with synonyms element and point. Finally, the relation between elements and sets, the idea of an element being in a set, is primitive." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"The mathematical models for many physical systems have manifolds as the basic objects of study, upon which further structure may be defined to obtain whatever system is in question. The concept generalizes and includes the special cases of the cartesian line, plane, space, and the surfaces which are studied in advanced calculus. The theory of these spaces which generalizes to manifolds includes the ideas of differentiable functions, smooth curves, tangent vectors, and vector fields. However, the notions of distance between points and straight lines (or shortest paths) are not part of the idea of a manifold but arise as consequences of additional structure, which may or may not be assumed and in any case is not unique." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"Does set theory, once we get beyond the integers, refer to an existing reality, or must it be regarded, as formalists would regard it, as an interesting formal game? [...] A typical argument for the objective reality of set theory is that it is obtained by extrapolation from our intuitions of finite objects, and people see no reason why this has less validity. Moreover, set theory has been studied for a long time with no hint of a contradiction. It is suggested that this cannot be an accident, and thus set theory reflects an existing reality. In particular, the Continuum Hypothesis and related statements are true or false, and our task is to resolve them." (Paul Cohen, "Skolem and pessimism about proof in mathematics", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 363 (1835), 2005)

"In each branch of mathematics it is essential to recognize when two structures are equivalent. For example two sets are equivalent, as far as set theory is concerned, if there exists a bijective function which maps one set onto the other. Two groups are equivalent, known as isomorphic, if there exists a a homomorphism of one to the other which is one-to-one and onto. Two topological spaces are equivalent, known as homeomorphic, if there exists a homeomorphism of one onto the other." (Sydney A Morris, "Topology without Tears", 2011)

Set Theory II

"[...] from that circumstance alone we are not allowed to conclude that both sets, if they are infinite, are equal to each other with respect to the multiplicity of their parts (that is, if we abstract from all differences between them); [...] Equality of those multiplicities can only be inferred when some other reason is added, for instance that both sets have absolutely equal grounds of determination, i.e., that their mode of formation is absolutely equal." (Bernard Bolzano, "Paradoxien des Unedlichen", 1851)

"If two well-defined manifolds M and N can be coordinated with each other univocally and completely, element by element (which, if possible in one way, can always happen in many others), we shall employ in the sequel the expression, that those manifolds have the same power or, also, that they are equivalent." (Georg Cantor, "Ein Beitrag zur Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1878)

"I say that a manifold (a collection, a set) of elements that belong to any conceptual sphere is well-defined, when on the basis of its definition and as a consequence of the logical principle of excluded middle it must be regarded as internally determined, both whether an object pertaining to the same conceptual sphere belongs or not as an element to the manifold, and whether two objects belonging to the set are equal to each other or not, despite formal differences in the ways of determination." (Georg Cantor, "Ober unendliche, lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten", 1879)

"By a manifold or a set I understand in general every Many that can be thought of as One, i.e., every collection of determinate elements which can be bound up into a whole through a law, and with this I believe to define something that is akin to the Platonic εἷδος [form] or ἷδεα [idea]." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883) 

"If we now notice that all of the numbers previously obtained and their next successors fulfill a certain condition, [that the set of their predecessors is denumerable,] then this condition offers itself, if it is imposed as a requirement on all numbers to be formed next, as a new third principle [...] which I shall call principle of restriction or limitation and which, as I shall show, yields the result that the second number-class (II) defined with its assistance not only has a higher power than [the first number-class] (I), but precisely the next higher, that is, the second power." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883) 

"In calling arithmetic (algebra, analysis) just a part of logic, I declare already that I take the number-concept to be completely independent of the ideas or intuitions of space and time, that I see it as an immediate product of the pure laws of thought." (Richard Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?", 1888)

"A set is formed by the grouping together of single objects into a whole. A set is a plurality thought of as a unit. If these or similar statements were set down as definitions, then it could be objected with good reason that they define idem per idemi or even obscurum per obscurius. However, we can consider them as expository, as references to a primitive concept, familiar to us all, whose resolution into more fundamental concepts would perhaps be neither competent nor necessary." (Felix Hausdorff, "Set Theory", 1962)

"The axiom of choice has many important consequences in set theory. It is used in the proof that every infinite set has a denumerable subset, and in the proof that every set has at least one well-ordering. From the latter, it follows that the power of every set is an aleph. Since any two alephs are comparable, so are any two transfinite powers of sets. The axiom of choice is also essential in the arithmetic of transfinite numbers." (R Bunn, "Developments in the Foundations of Mathematics, 1870-1910", 1980)

"A set is a Many that allows itself to be thought of as a One." (Georg Cantor)

"An infinite set is one that can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset of itself." (Georg Cantor)

Saunders Mac Lane - Collected Quotes

"In a metamathematical sense our theory provides general concepts applicable to all branches of abstract mathematics, and so contributes to the current trend towards uniform treatment of different mathematical disciplines. In particular, it provides opportunities for the comparison of constructions and of the isomorphisms occurring in different branches of mathematics; in this way it may occasionally suggest new results by analogy." (Samuel Eilenberg & Saunders Mac Lane, "A general theory of natural equivalences", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 58, 1945)

"It should be observed first that the whole concept of a category is essentially an auxiliary one; our basic concepts are essentially those of a functor and of a natural transformation […]. The idea of a category is required only by the precept that every function should have a definite class as domain and a definite class as range, for the categories are provided as the domains and ranges of functors. Thus one could drop the category concept altogether […]" (Samuel Eilenberg & Saunders Mac Lane, "A general theory of natural equivalences", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 58, 1945)

"The invariant character of a mathematical discipline can be formulated in these terms. Thus, in group theory all the basic constructions can be regarded as the definitions of co- or contravariant functors, so we may formulate the dictum: The subject of group theory is essentially the study of those constructions of groups which behave in a covariant or contravariant manner under induced homomorphisms." (Samuel Eilenberg & Saunders Mac Lane, "A general theory of natural equivalences", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 58, 1945)

"The subject of group theory is essentially the study of those constructions of groups which behave in a covariant or contravariant manner under induced homomorphisms. More precisely, group theory studies functors defined on well specified categories of groups, with values in another such category." (Samuel Eilenberg & Saunders Mac Lane, "A general theory of natural equivalences", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 58, 1945)

"The theory [of categories] also emphasizes that, whenever new abstract objects are constructed in a specified way out of given ones, it is advisable to regard the construction of the corresponding induced mappings on these new objects as an integral part of their definition. The pursuit of this program entails a simultaneous consideration of objects and their mappings (in our terminology, this means the consideration not of individual objects but of categories). This emphasis on the specification of the type of mappings employed gives more insight onto the degree of invariance of the various concepts involved." (Samuel Eilenberg & Saunders Mac Lane, "A general theory of natural equivalences", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 58, 1945)

"Mathematics, springing from the soil of basic human experience with numbers and data and space and motion, builds up a far-flung architectural structure composed of theorems which reveal insights into the reasons behind appearances and of concepts which relate totally disparate concrete ideas.” (Saunders MacLane, "Of Course and Courses", The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 61, No. 3, March, 1954)

"Categorical algebra has developed in recent years as an effective method of organizing parts of mathematics. Typically, this sort of organization uses notions such as that of the category G of all groups. [...] This raises the problem of finding some axiomatization of set theory - or of some foundational discipline like set theory - which will be adequate and appropriate to realizing this intent. This problem may turn out to have revolutionary implications vis-`a-vis the accepted views of the role of set theory." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categorical algebra and set-theoretic foundations", 1967)

"Just as each generation of historians must analyse the past again, so in the exact sciences we must in each period take up the renewed struggle to present as clearly as we can the underlying ideas of mathematics." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Hamiltonian Mechanics and Geometry", The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 77 (6), 1970)

"Many cumbersome developments in the standard treatments of mechanics can be simplified and better understood when formulated with modern conceptual tools, as in the well-known case of the use of the 'universal' definition of tensor products of vector spaces to simplify some of the notational excesses of tensor analysis as traditionally used in relativity theory" (Saunders Mac Lane, "Hamiltonian Mechanics and Geometry", The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 77 (6), 1970)

"Category theory starts with the observation that many properties of mathematical systems can be unified and simplified by a presentation with diagrams of arrows." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categories for the Working Mathematician", 1971)

"The sequence for the understanding of mathematics may be: intuition, trial, error, speculation, conjecture, proof. The mixture and the sequence of these events differ widely in different domains, but there is general agreement that the end product is rigorous proof – which we know and can recognize, without the formal advice of the logicians. […] Intuition is glorious, but the heaven of mathematics requires much more. Physics has provided mathematics with many fine suggestions and new initiatives, but mathematics does not need to copy the style of experimental physics. Mathematics rests on proof - and proof is eternal." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Reponses to …", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 30 (2), 1994)