Peter Borwein - Collected Quotes

"Arguments for the Riemann hypothesis often include its widespread ramifications and appeals to mathematical beauty; however, we also have a large corpus of hard facts. With the advent of powerful computational tools over the last century, mathematicians have increasingly turned to computational evidence to support conjectures, and the Riemann hypothesis is no exception." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"In one of the largest calculations done to date, it was checked that the first ten trillion of these zeros lie on the correct line. So there are ten trillion pieces of evidence indicating that the Riemann hypothesis is true and not a single piece of evidence indicating that it is false. A physicist might be overwhelmingly pleased with this much evidence in favour of the hypothesis, but to some mathematicians this is hardly evidence at all. However, it is interesting ancillary information." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"Number-theoretic equivalences of the Riemann hypothesis provide a natural method of explaining the hypothesis to nonmathematicians without appealing to complex analysis. While it is unlikely that any of these equivalences will lead directly to a solution, they provide a sense of how intricately the Riemann zeta function is tied to the primes"  (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"One of the current ideas regarding the Riemann hypothesis is that the zeros of the zeta function can be interpreted as eigenvalues of certain matrices. This line of thinking is attractive and is potentially a good way to attack the hypothesis, since it gives a possible connection to physical phenomena. [...] Empirical results indicate that the zeros of the Riemann zeta function are indeed distributed like the eigenvalues of certain matrix ensembles, in particular the Gaussian unitary ensemble. This suggests that random matrix theory might provide an avenue for the proof of the Riemann hypothesis." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"So the prime number theorem is a relatively weak statement of the fact that an integer has equal probability of having an odd number or an even number of distinct prime factors." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"Solving any of the great unsolved problems in mathematics is akin to the first ascent of Everest. It is a formidable achievement, but after the conquest there is sometimes nowhere to go but down. Some of the great problems have proven to be isolated mountain peaks, disconnected from their neighbors. The Riemann hypothesis is quite different in this regard. There is a large body of mathematical speculation that becomes fact if the Riemann hypothesis is solved. We know many statements of the form “if the Riemann hypothesis, then the following interesting mathematical statement”, and this is rather different from the solution of problems such as the Fermat problem." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"The first and easies tproofs [of the prime number theorem] are analytic and exploit the rich connections between number theory and complex analysis. It has resisted trivialization, and no really easy proof is known. This is especially true for the so-called elementary proofs, which use little or no complex analysis, just considerable ingenuity and dexterity. The primes arise sporadically and, apparently, relatively randomly, at least in thes ense that there is no easy way to find a large prime number with no obvious congruences. So even the amount of structure implied by the prime number theorem is initially surprising." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

"Why is the Riemann hypothesis so important? Why is it the problem that many mathematicians would sell their souls to solve? There are a number of great old unsolved problems in mathematics, but none of them has quite the stature of the Riemann hypothesis. This stature can be attributed to a variety of causes ranging from mathematical to cultural. As with the other old great unsolved problems, the Riemann hypothesis is clearly very difficult. It has resisted solution for 150 years and has been attempted by many of the greatest minds in mathematics." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007)

On Hypothesis Testing III

 "A little thought reveals a fact widely understood among statisticians: The null hypothesis, taken literally (and that’s the only way you can take it in formal hypothesis testing), is always false in the real world. [...] If it is false, even to a tiny degree, it must be the case that a large enough sample will produce a significant result and lead to its rejection. So if the null hypothesis is always false, what’s the big deal about rejecting it?" (Jacob Cohen, "Things I Have Learned (So Far)", American Psychologist, 1990)

"I believe [...] that hypothesis testing has been greatly overemphasized in psychology and in the other disciplines that use it. It has diverted our attention from crucial issues. Mesmerized by a single all-purpose, mechanized, ‘objective’ ritual in which we convert numbers into other numbers and get a yes-no answer, we have come to neglect close scrutiny of where the numbers come from." (Jacob Cohen, "Things I have learned (so far)", American Psychologist 45, 1990)

"Despite the stranglehold that hypothesis testing has on experimental psychology, I find it difficult to imagine a less insightful means of transitting from data to conclusions." (Geoffrey R Loftus, "On the tyranny of hypothesis testing in the social sciences", Contemporary Psychology 36, 1991)

"How has the virtually barren technique of hypothesis testing come to assume such importance in the process by which we arrive at our conclusions from our data?" (Geoffrey R Loftus, "On the tyranny of hypothesis testing in the social sciences", Contemporary Psychology 36, 1991)

"This remarkable state of affairs [overuse of significance testing] is analogous to engineers’ teaching (and believing) that light consists only of waves while ignoring its particle characteristics - and losing in the process, of course, any motivation to pursue the most interesting puzzles and paradoxes in the field." (Geoffrey R Loftus, "On the tyranny of hypothesis testing in the social sciences", Contemporary Psychology 36, 1991)

"Whereas hypothesis testing emphasizes a very narrow question (‘Do the population means fail to conform to a specific pattern?’), the use of confidence intervals emphasizes a much broader question (‘What are the population means?’). Knowing what the means are, of course, implies knowing whether they fail to conform to a specific pattern, although the reverse is not true. In this sense, use of confidence intervals subsumes the process of hypothesis testing." (Geoffrey R Loftus, "On the tyranny of hypothesis testing in the social sciences", Contemporary Psychology 36, 1991)

"After four decades of severe criticism, the ritual of null hypothesis significance testing - mechanical dichotomous decisions around a sacred .05 criterion - still persist. This article reviews the problems with this practice [...] What’s wrong with [null hypothesis significance testing]? Well, among many other things, it does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does!" (Jacob Cohen, "The earth is round (p<.05)", American Psychologist 49, 1994)

"I argued that hypothesis testing is fundamentally inappropriate for ecological risk assessment, that its use has undesirable consequences for environmental protection, and that preferable alternatives exist for statistical analysis of data in ecological risk assessment. The conclusion of this paper is that ecological risk assessors should estimate risks rather than test hypothesis" (Glenn W Suter, "Abuse of hypothesis testing statistics in ecological risk assessment", Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 2, 1996)

"I contend that the general acceptance of statistical hypothesis testing is one of the most unfortunate aspects of 20th century applied science. Tests for the identity of population distributions, for equality of treatment means, for presence of interactions, for the nullity of a correlation coefficient, and so on, have been responsible for much bad science, much lazy science, and much silly science. A good scientist can manage with, and will not be misled by, parameter estimates and their associated standard errors or confidence limits." (Marks Nester, "A Myopic View and History of Hypothesis Testing", 1996)

"Statistical hypothesis testing is commonly used inappropriately to analyze data, determine causality, and make decisions about significance in ecological risk assessment,[...] It discourages good toxicity testing and field studies, it provides less protection to ecosystems or their components that are difficult to sample or replicate, and it provides less protection when more treatments or responses are used. It provides a poor basis for decision-making because it does not generate a conclusion of no effect, it does not indicate the nature or magnitude of effects, it does address effects at untested exposure levels, and it confounds effects and uncertainty[...]. Risk assessors should focus on analyzing the relationship between exposure and effects[...]."  (Glenn W Suter, "Abuse of hypothesis testing statistics in ecological risk assessment", Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 2, 1996)

On Hypothesis Testing II

"Small wonder that students have trouble [with statistical hypothesis testing]. They may be trying to think." (W Edwards Deming, "On probability as a basis for action", American Statistician 29, 1975)

"Tests appear to many users to be a simple way to discharge the obligation to provide some statistical treatment of the data." (H V Roberts, "For what use are tests of hypotheses and tests of significance",  Communications in Statistics [Series A], 1976)

"In practice, of course, tests of significance are not taken seriously." (Louis Guttman, "The illogic of statistical inference for cumulative science", Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 1985)

"Most readers of The American Statistician will recognize the limited value of hypothesis testing in the science of statistics. I am not sure that they all realize the extent to which it has become the primary tool in the religion of Statistics." (David Salsburg, The Religion of Statistics as Practiced in Medical Journals, "The American Statistician" 39, 1985)

"Since a point hypothesis is not to be expected in practice to be exactly true, but only approximate, a proper test of significance should almost always show significance for large enough samples. So the whole game of testing point hypotheses, power analysis notwithstanding, is but a mathematical game without empirical importance." (Louis Guttman, "The illogic of statistical inference for cumulative science", Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 1985

"We shall marshal arguments against [significance] testing, leading to the conclusion that it be abandoned by all substantive science and not just by educational research and other social sciences which have begun to raise voices against the virtual tyranny of this branch of inference in the academic world." (Louis Guttman, "The illogic of statistical inference for cumulative science", Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 1985)

"Analysis of variance [...] stems from a hypothesis-testing formulation that is difficult to take seriously and would be of limited value for making final conclusions." (Herman Chernoff, Comment,  The American Statistician 40(1), 1986)

"We are better off abandoning the use of hypothesis tests entirely and concentrating on developing continuous measures of toxicity which can be used for estimation." (David Salsburg, "Statistics for Toxicologists", 1986)

"Beware of the problem of testing too many hypotheses; the more you torture the data, the more likely they are to confess, but confessions obtained under duress may not be admissible in the court of scientific opinion." (Stephen M Stigler, "Neutral Models in Biology", 1987)

On Hypothesis Testing I

"Statistics is the fundamental and most important part of inductive logic. It is both an art and a science, and it deals with the collection, the tabulation, the analysis and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative measurements. It is concerned with the classifying and determining of actual attributes as well as the making of estimates and the testing of various hypotheses by which probable, or expected, values are obtained. It is one of the means of carrying on scientific research in order to ascertain the laws of behavior of things - be they animate or inanimate. Statistics is the technique of the Scientific Method." (Bruce D Greenschields & Frank M Weida, "Statistics with Applications to Highway Traffic Analyses", 1952)

"The peculiarity of [...] statistical hypotheses is that they are not conclusively refutable by any experience." (Richard B Braithwaite, "Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science", 1953)

"Tests of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between certain treatments are often made in the analysis of agricultural or industrial experiments in which alternative methods or processes are compared. Such tests are [...] totally irrelevant. What are needed are estimates of magnitudes of effects, with standard errors." (Francis J Anscombe, "Discussion on Dr. David’s and Dr. Johnson’s Paper", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 18, 1956)

"[...] the tests of null hypotheses of zero differences, of no relationships, are frequently weak, perhaps trivial statements of the researcher’s aims [...] in many cases, instead of the tests of significance it would be more to the point to measure the magnitudes of the relationships, attaching proper statements of their sampling variation. The magnitudes of relationships cannot be measured in terms of levels of significance." (Leslie Kish, "Some statistical problems in research design", American Sociological Review 24, 1959)

"In view of our long-term strategy of improving our theories, our statistical tactics can be greatly improved by shifting emphasis away from over-all hypothesis testing in the direction of statistical estimation. This always holds true when we are concerned with the actual size of one or more differences rather than simply in the existence of differences." (David A Grant, "Testing the null hypothesis and the strategy and tactics of investigating theoretical models", Psychological Review 69, 1962)

"[...] we need to get on with the business of generating [...] hypotheses and proceed to do investigations and make inferences which bear on them, instead of [...] testing the statistical null hypothesis in any number of contexts in which we have every reason to suppose that it is false in the first place." (David Bakan, "The test of significance in psychological research", Psychological Bulletin 66, 1966)

"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "On Certainty", 1969)

"Science consists simply of the formulation and testing of hypotheses based on observational evidence; experiments are important where applicable, but their function is merely to simplify observation by imposing controlled conditions." (Henry L Batten, "Evolution of the Earth", 1971)

"[...] the statistical power of many psychological studies is ridiculously low. This is a self-defeating practice: it makes for frustrated scientists and inefficient research. The investigator who tests a valid hypothesis but fails to obtain significant results cannot help but regard nature as untrustworthy or even hostile." (Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, "Belief in the law of small numbers", Psychological Bulletin 76(2), 1971) 

"Decision-making problems (hypothesis testing) involve situations where it is desired to make a choice among various alternative decisions (hypotheses). Such problems can be viewed as generalized state estimation problems where the definition of state has simply been expanded." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"Hypothesis testing can introduce the need for multiple models for the multiple hypotheses and,' if appropriate, a priori probabilities. The one modeling aspect of hypothesis testing that has no estimation counterpart is the problem of specifying the hypotheses to be considered. Often this is a critical step which influences both performance arid the difficulty of implementation." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"Pattern recognition can be viewed as a special case of hypothesis testing. In pattern recognition, an observation z is to be used to decide what pattern caused it. Each possible pattern can be viewed as one hypothesis. The main problem in pattern recognition is the development of models for the z corresponding to each pattern (hypothesis)." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

"The term hypothesis testing arises because the choice as to which process is observed is based on hypothesized models. Thus hypothesis testing could also be called model testing. Hypothesis testing is sometimes called decision theory. The detection theory of communication theory is a special case." (Fred C Scweppe, "Uncertain dynamic systems", 1973)

On Hypotheses: The Riemann Hypothesis

"Whoever proves or disproves [the Riemann Hypothesis] will cover himself in glory..." (Eric T Bell, 1937)

"[...] the Riemann hypothesis remains one of the outstanding challenges of mathematics, a prize which has tantalized and eluded some of the most brilliant mathematicians of this century...Hilbert is reputed to have said that the first comment he would make after waking at the end of a thousand year sleep would be, 'Is the Riemann hypothesis established yet?'" (Richard E  Bellman, A Brief Introduction of Theta Functions, 1961)

"At this point, it is not possible to remain silent on what is probably the most intriguing unsolved problem in the theory of the zeta function and actually in all of number theory - and most likely even one of the most important unsolved problems in contemporary mathematics, namely the famous Riemann hypothesis. [...] Still, the problem is open and fascinates and teases the best contemporary minds." (Emil Grosswald, "Topics in the Theory of Numbers", 1966)

"The failure of the Riemann hypothesis would create havoc in the distribution of prime numbers. This fact alone singles out the Riemann hypothesis as the main open question of prime number theory." (Enrico Bombieri,  "Prime Territory", The Sciences,  1992)

"The Riemann hypothesis [...] is still widely considered to be one of the greatest unsolved problems in mathematics, sure to wreath its conqueror with glory." (Bruce Schechter, "143-year-old problem still has mathematicians guessing", 2002)

"The dependence of so many results on Riemann's challenge is why mathematicians refer to it as a hypothesis rather than a conjecture. The word 'hypothesis' has the much stronger connotation of a necessary assumption that a mathematician makes in order to build a theory. 'Conjecture', in contrast, represents simply a prediction of how mathematicians believe their world behaves. Many have had to accept their inability to solve Riemann's riddle and have simply adopted his prediction as a working hypothesis. If someone can turn the hypothesis into a theorem, all those unproven results would be validated." (Marcus du Sautoy, "The Music of the Primes", 2003)

"Solving any of the great unsolved problems in mathematics is akin to the first ascent of Everest. It is a formidable achievement, but after the conquest there is sometimes nowhere to go but down. Some of the great problems have proven to be isolated mountain peaks, disconnected from their neighbors. The Riemann hypothesis is quite different in this regard. There is a large body of mathematical speculation that becomes fact if the Riemann hypothesis is solved. We know many statements of the form “if the Riemann hypothesis, then the following interesting mathematical statement”, and this is rather different from the solution of problems such as the Fermat problem."  (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007) 

"Why is the Riemann hypothesis so important? Why is it the problem that many mathematicians would sell their souls to solve? There are a number of great old unsolved problems in mathematics, but none of them has quite the stature of the Riemann hypothesis. This stature can be attributed to a variety of causes ranging from mathematical to cultural. As with the other old great unsolved problems, the Riemann hypothesis is clearly very difficult. It has resisted solution for 150 years and has been attempted by many of the greatest minds in mathematics." (Peter Borwein et al, "The Riemann Hypothesis: A Resource for the Afficionado and Virtuoso Alike", 2007) 

"The result has caught the imagination of most mathematicians because it is so unexpected, connecting two seemingly unrelated areas in mathematics; namely, number theory, which is the study of the discrete, and complex analysis, which deals with continuous processes." (David M Burton, "Elementary Number Theory", 2006)

"Just as music is not about reaching the final chord, mathematics is about more than just the result. It is the journey that excites the mathematician. I read and reread proofs in much the same way as I listen to a piece of music: understanding how themes are established, mutated, interwoven and transformed. What people don't realise about mathematics is that it involves a lot of choice: not about what is true or false (I can't make the Riemann hypothesis false if it's true), but from deciding what piece of mathematics is worth ‘listening to’." (Marcus du Sautoy, "Listen by numbers: music and maths", 2011)

"If [the Riemann Hypothesis is] not true, then the world is a very different place. The whole structure of integers and prime numbers would be very different to what we could imagine. In a way, it would be more interesting if it were false, but it would be a disaster because we've built so much round assuming its truth." (P  Sarnak)

"The Riemann Hypothesis is a precise statement, and in one sense what it means is clear, but what it's connected with, what it implies, where it comes from, can be very unobvious." (M Huxley)

"[...] the Riemann Hypothesis will be settled without any fundamental changes in our mathematical thoughts, namely, all tools are ready to attack it but just a penetrating idea is missing." (Y Motohashi)

"The consequences [of the Riemann Hypothesis] are fantastic: the distribution of primes, these elementary objects of arithmetic. And to have tools to study the distribution of these of objects." (H Iwaniec)

On Hypotheses (From Fiction to Science-Fiction)

"Phenomena may well be suspected of anything, are capable of anything. Hypothesis proclaims the infinite; that is what gives hypothesis its greatness. Beneath the surface fact it seeks the real fact. It asks creation for her thoughts, and then for her second thoughts. The great scientific discoverers are those who hold nature suspect." (Victor Hugo, "The Toilers of the Sea", 1866)

"An hypothesis is only a habit - a habit of looking through a glass of one peculiar colour, which imparts its hue to all around it." (Frederick Marryat, "The King's Own", 1873) 

"If the fresh facts which come to our knowledge all fit themselves into the scheme, then our hypothesis may gradually become a solution." (Arthur C Doyle, "The Adventure of Wisteria Lodge", 1908)

"More often than not, nothingness is reluctantly and despairingly taken to be the only hypothesis possible when all the others have failed, since by definition it cannot be disproven and is beyond the scope of reason." (Georges Bernanos, "L'imposture" ["The Impostor"], 1927)

"Science fiction is that class of prose narrative treating of a situation that could not arise in the world we know, but which is hypothesised on the basis of some innovation in science or technology, or pseudo-science or pseudo-technology, whether human or extra-terrestrial in origin." (Kingsley Amis, "New Maps of Hell: A Survey of Science Fiction", 1960) 

"To the paranoid, nothing is a surprise; everything happens exactly as he expected, and sometimes even more so. It all fits into his system. For us, though, there can be no system; maybe all systems - that is, any theoretical, verbal, symbolic, semantic, etc. formulation that attempts to act as an all-encompassing, all-explaining hypothesis of what the universe is about - are manifestations of paranoia. We should be content with the mysterious, the meaningless, the contradictory, the hostile, and most of all the unexplainably warm and giving." (Philip K Dick, "The Android and the Human", [speech] 1972) 

"It does take great maturity to understand that the opinion we are arguing for is merely the hypothesis we favor, necessarily imperfect, probably transitory, which only very limited minds can declare to be a certainty or a truth." (Milan Kundera, "Encounter", 2009)

On Hypotheses (2010-2019)

"Nature is capable of building complex structures by processes of self-organization; simplicity begets complexity." (Victor J Stenger, "God: The Failed Hypothesis", 2010)

"[…] a conceptual model is a diagram connecting variables and constructs based on theory and logic that displays the hypotheses to be tested." (Mary W Celsi et al, "Essentials of Business Research Methods", 2011)

"The justification for naturalism is that it works: we have never understood anything about the universe by assuming the supernatural, while assuming naturalism as a working hypothesis has moved our understanding ever forward." (Jerry Coyne, "Is atheism irrational? A philosopher says yes", 2014)

"Observation and experiment, without a rational hypothesis, is like a man groping at objects at random with his eyes shut." (Henry P Tappan, "Elements of Logic", 2015)

"Various scientific methodologies are themselves mental models through which scientists discover, predict, and hypothesize about what we then call reality. In the social constructionist paradigm such mental models frame all our experiences. They schematize, and otherwise facilitate and guide the ways in which we recognize, react, and organize the world. How we define the world is dependent on such schema and thus all realities are socially structured. In the socially constructed paradigm, the multivariate mental models or conceptual schema are the means and mode through which we constitute our experiences." (Patricia H Werhane et al, "Obstacles to Ethical: Decision-Making Mental Models, Milgram and the Problem of Obedience", 2013)

"Science, at its core, is simply a method of practical logic that tests hypotheses against experience. Scientism, by contrast, is the worldview and value system that insists that the questions the scientific method can answer are the most important questions human beings can ask, and that the picture of the world yielded by science is a better approximation to reality than any other." (John M Greer, "After Progress: Reason and Religion at the End of the Industrial Age", 2015)

"We are superb causal-hypothesis generators. Given an effect, we are rarely at a loss for an explanation. Seeing a difference in observations over time, we readily come up with a causal interpretation. Much of the time, no causality at all is going on—just random variation. The compulsion to explain is particularly strong when we habitually see that one event typically occurs in conjunction with another event. Seeing such a correlation almost automatically provokes a causal explanation. It’s tremendously useful to be on our toes looking for causal relationships that explain our world. But there are two problems: (1) The explanations come too easily. If we recognized how facile our causal hypotheses were, we’d place less confidence in them. (2) Much of the time, no causal interpretation at all is appropriate and wouldn’t even be made if we had a better understanding of randomness." (Richard E Nisbett, "Mindware: Tools for Smart Thinking", 2015)

"We don’t recognize how easy it is to generate hypotheses about the world. If we did, we’d generate fewer of them, or at least hold them more tentatively. We sprout causal theories in abundance when we learn of a correlation, and we readily find causal explanations for the failure of the world to confirm our hypotheses. We don’t realize how easy it is for us to explain away evidence that would seem on the surface to contradict our hypotheses. And we fail to generate tests of a hypothesis that could falsify the hypothesis if in fact the hypothesis is wrong. This is one type of confirmation bias." (Richard E Nisbett, "Mindware: Tools for Smart Thinking", 2015)

"In terms of characteristics, a data scientist has an inquisitive mind and is prepared to explore and ask questions, examine assumptions and analyse processes, test hypotheses and try out solutions and, based on evidence, communicate informed conclusions, recommendations and caveats to stakeholders and decision makers." (Jesús Rogel-Salazar, "Data Science and Analytics with Python", 2017)

"It is in fact mathematics itself that is simplest in hypothesis and also richest in phenomena (i.e. the simple source of all complexity). In ontological mathematics, all of existence comprises sinusoidal waves arranged into autonomous units called monads, and these are all that are required to explain everything." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

Out of Context: Hypothesis is... (Definitions)

"[...] an hypothesis is a work of fancy, useless in science, and fit only for the amusement of a vacant hour." (Henry Brougham, Edinburgh Review 1, 1803)

"The hypothesis is like the captain, and the observations like the soldiers of an army: while he appears to command them, and in this way to work his own will, he does in fact derive all his power of conquest from their obedience, and becomes helpless and useless if they mutiny." (William Whewell, "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1840)

"An anticipative idea or an hypothesis is, then, the necessary starting point for all experimental reasoning." (Claude Bernard, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine", 1865)

"An hypothesis is only a habit - a habit of looking through a glass of one peculiar colour, which imparts its hue to all around it." (Frederick Marryat, "The King's Own", 1873)

"For the truly scientific man, the hypothesis is destined solely to enable him to get the facts of nature in some definite order, an order which shall make apparent their connection with the great order and harmony which is believed to be present in the universe." (James M Baldwin, "The Processes of Life Revealed by the Microscope: A Plea for Physiological Histology", Science N.S. Vol. 2 (34), 1895)

"A successful hypothesis is not necessarily a permanent hypothesis, but it is one which stimulates additional research, opens up new fields, or explains and coordinates previously unrelated facts." (Farrington Daniels, "Outlines of Physical Chemistry", 1948) 

"Hypothesis is a tool which can cause trouble if not used properly. We must be ready to abandon out hypothesis as soon as it is shown to be inconsistent with the facts." (William I B Beveridge, "The Art of Scientific Investigation", 1950)

"The hypothesis is the principal intellectual instrument in research." (William I B Beveridge, "The Art of Scientific Investigation", 1950)

"A hypothesis is empirical or scientific only if it can be tested by experience." (Francisco J Ayala, "Biological Evolution: Natural Selection or Random Walk", American Scientist, 1974)

"In a modern professional vocabulary a hypothesis is an imaginative preconception of what might be true in the form of a declaration with verifiable deductive consequences." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"A hypothesis is a novel suggestion that no one wants to believe. It is guilty, until found effective." (Edward Teller, "Conversations on the Dark Secrets of Physics", 1991)

"A hypothesis may be simply defined as a guess. A scientific hypothesis is an intelligent guess." (Isaac Asimov)

Thermodynamics IV

"It is impossible by means of inanimate material agency, to derive mechanical effect from any portion of matter by cooling it below the temperature of the coldest of the surrounding objects. [Footnote: ] If this axiom be denied for all temperatures, it would have to be admitted that a self-acting machine might be set to work and produce mechanical effect by cooling the sea or earth, with no limit but the total loss of heat from the earth and sea, or in reality, from the whole material world." (William Thomson, "On the Dynamical Theory of Heat with Numerical Results Deduced from Mr Joule's Equivalent of a Thermal Unit and M. Regnault's Observations on Steam", Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1851)

"Though the ultimate state of the universe may be its vital and psychical extinction, there is nothing in physics to interfere with the hypothesis that the penultimate state might be the millennium - in other words a state in which a minimum of difference of energy - level might have its exchanges so skillfully canalises that a maximum of happy and virtuous consciousness would be the only result." (William James, [Letter to Henry Adams] 1910)" (William James, [Letter to Henry Adams] 1910)

"Organic evolution has its physical analogue in the universal law that the world tends, in all its parts and particles, to pass from certain less probable to certain more probable configurations or states. This is the second law of thermodynamics." (D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, "On Growth and Form", 1917)

"In classical physics, most of the fundamental laws of nature were concerned either with the stability of certain configurations of bodies, e.g. the solar system, or else with the conservation of certain properties of matter, e.g. mass, energy, angular momentum or spin. The outstanding exception was the famous Second Law of Thermodynamics, discovered by Clausius in 1850. This law, as usually stated, refers to an abstract concept called entropy, which for any enclosed or thermally isolated system tends to increase continually with lapse of time. In practice, the most familiar example of this law occurs when two bodies are in contact: in general, heat tends to flow from the hotter body to the cooler. Thus, while the First Law of Thermodynamics, viz. the conservation of energy, is concerned only with time as mere duration, the Second Law involves the idea of trend." (Gerald J Whitrow, "The Structure of the Universe: An Introduction to Cosmology", 1949)

"The second law of thermodynamics provides a more modem (and a more discouraging) example of the maximum principle: the entropy (disorder) of the universe tends toward a maximum." (James R Newman, "The World of Mathematics" Vol. II, 1956)

"[...] thermodynamics knows of no such notion as the 'entropy of a physical system'. Thermodynamics does have the concept of the entropy of a thermodynamic system; but a given physical system corresponds to many different thermodynamic systems." (Edwin T Jaynes, "Gibbs vs Boltzmann Entropies", 1964)

"'You cannot base a general mathematical theory on imprecisely defined concepts. You can make some progress that way; but sooner or later the theory is bound to dissolve in ambiguities which prevent you from extending it further.' Failure to recognize this fact has another unfortunate consequence which is, in a practical sense, even more disastrous: 'Unless the conceptual problems of a field have been clearly resolved, you cannot say which mathematical problems are the relevant ones worth working on; and your efforts are more than likely to be wasted.'" (Edwin T Jaynes, "Foundations of Probability Theory and Statistical Mechanics", 1967)

"There is no end to this search for the ultimate ‘true’ entropy until we have reached the point where we control the location of each atom independently. But just at that point the notion of entropy collapses, and we are no longer talking thermodynamics." (Edwin T Jaynes, "Papers on Probability, Statistics, and Statistical Physics", 1983)

"No one has yet succeeded in deriving the second law from any other law of nature. It stands on its own feet. It is the only law in our everyday world that gives a direction to time, which tells us that the universe is moving toward equilibrium and which gives us a criteria for that state, namely, the point of maximum entropy, of maximum probability. The second law involves no new forces. On the contrary, it says nothing about forces whatsoever." (Brian L Silver, "The Ascent of Science", 1998)

On Hypotheses (1900-1909)

"Every generalisation is a hypothesis. Hypothesis therefore plays a necessary rôle, which no one has ever contested. Only, it should always be as soon as possible submitted to verification." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"To undertake the calculation of any probability, and even for that calculation to have any meaning at all, we must admit, as a point of departure, an hypothesis or convention which has always something arbitrary about it. In the choice of this convention we can be guided only by the principle of sufficient reason. Unfortunately, this principle is very vague and very elastic, and in the cursory examination we have just made we have seen it assume different forms. The form under which we meet it most often is the belief in continuity, a belief which it would be difficult to justify by apodeictic reasoning, but without which all science would be impossible. Finally, the problems to which the calculus of probabilities may be applied with profit are those in which the result is independent of the hypothesis made at the outset, provided only that this hypothesis satisfies the condition of continuity." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Treatises on mechanics do not clearly distinguish between what is experiment, what is mathematical reasoning, what is convention, and what is hypothesis." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. That is to say; before you try a complicated hypothesis, you should make quite sure that no simplification of it will explain the facts equally well." (Charles S Peirce," Pragmatism and Pragmaticism", [lecture] 1903)

"Chemistry and physics are experimental sciences; and those who are engaged in attempting to enlarge the boundaries of science by experiment are generally unwilling to publish speculations; for they have learned, by long experience, that it is unsafe to anticipate events. It is true, they must make certain theories and hypotheses. They must form some kind of mental picture of the relations between the phenomena which they are trying to investigate, else their experiments would be made at random, and without connection." (William Ramsay, "Radium and Its Products", Harper’s Magazine, 1904)

"A symbolical representation of a method of calculation has the same significance for a mathematician as a model or a visualisable working hypothesis has for a physicist. The symbol, the model, the hypothesis runs parallel with the thing to be represented. But the parallelism may extend farther, or be extended farther, than was originally intended on the adoption of the symbol. Since the thing represented and the device representing are after all different, what would be concealed in the one is apparent in the other." (Ernst Mach, "Space and Geometry: In the Light of physiological, phycological and physical inquiry", 1906) 

"The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses." (Pierre Duhem, "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", 1906)

"A mind exclusively bent upon the idea of utility necessarily narrows the range of the imagination. For it is the imagination which pictures to the inner eye of the investigator the indefinitely extending sphere of the possible, - that region of hypothesis and explanation, of underlying cause and controlling law. The area of suggestion and experiment is thus pushed beyond the actual field of vision." (John G Hibben, "The Paradox of Research", The North American Review 188 (634), 1908)

On Syllogism I

"The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction." (Francis Bacon, The New Organon, 1620)

"[…] mathematics is not, never was, and never will be, anything more than a particular kind of language, a sort of shorthand of thought and reasoning. The purpose of it is to cut across the complicated meanderings of long trains of reasoning with a bold rapidity that is unknown to the mediaeval slowness of the syllogisms expressed in our words." (Charles Nordmann, "Einstein and the Universe", 1922)

"Knowledge is ours only if, at the moment of need, it offers itself to the mind without syllogisms or demonstrations for which there is no time." (André Maurois, "Un Art de Vivre" ["The Art of Living"], 1939)

"A serious threat to the very life of science is implied in the assertion that mathematics is nothing but a system of conclusions drawn from definitions and postulates that must be consistent but otherwise may be created by the free will of the mathematician. If this description were accurate, mathematics could not attract any intelligent person. It would be a game with definitions, rules and syllogisms, without motivation or goal." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?", 1941)

"The construction of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intuition, invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar material. The process must be discussed in psychological, not logical, categories; studied in autobiographies and biographies, not treatises on scientific method; and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or theorem." (Milton Friedman, "Essays in Positive Economics", 1953)

"[…] the distinction between rigorous thinking and more vague ‘imaginings’; even in mathematics itself, all is not a question of rigor, but rather, at the start, of reasoned intuition and imagination, and, also, repeated guessing. After all, most thinking is a synthesis or juxtaposition of advances along a line of syllogisms - perhaps in a continuous and persistent ‘forward'’ movement, with searching, so to speak ‘sideways’, in directions which are not necessarily present from the very beginning and which I describe as ‘sending out exploratory patrols’ and trying alternative routes." (Stanislaw M Ulam, "Adventures of a Mathematician", 1976)

"Since mental models can take many forms and serve many purposes, their contents are very varied. They can contain nothing but tokens that represent individuals and identities between them, as in the sorts of models that are required for syllogistic reasoning. They can represent spatial relations between entities, and the temporal or causal relations between events. A rich imaginary model of the world can be used to compute the projective relations required for an image. Models have a content and form that fits them to their purpose, whether it be to explain, to predict, or to control." (Philip Johnson-Laird, "Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness", 1983)

"Whenever I have talked about mental models, audiences have readily grasped that a layout of concrete objects can be represented by an internal spatial array, that a syllogism can be represented by a model of individuals and identities between them, and that a physical process can be represented by a three-dimensional dynamic model. Many people, however, have been puzzled by the representation of abstract discourse; they cannot understand how terms denoting abstract entities, properties or relations can be similarly encoded, and therefore they argue that these terms can have only 'verbal' or propositional representations." (Philip Johnson-Laird, "Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness", 1983)

"Formal logic and the logical syllogism encapsulate connectedness in reasoning." (Marshall McLuhan & Eric McLuhan, "Laws of Media: The New Science", 1988)

"Metaphorizing is a manner of thinking, not a property of thinking. It is a capacity of thought, not its quality. It represents a mental operation by which a previously existing entity is described in the characteristics of another one on the basis of some similarity or by reasoning. When we say that something is (like) something else, we have already performed a mental operation. This operation includes elements such as comparison, paralleling and shaping of the new image by ignoring its less satisfactory traits in order that this image obtains an aesthetic value. By this process, for an instant we invent a device, which serves as the pole vault for the comparison’s jump. Once the jump is made the pole vault is removed. This device could be a lightning-speed logical syllogism, or a momentary created term, which successfully merges the traits of the compared objects." (Ivan Mladenov, "Conceptualizing Metaphors: On Charles Peirce’s marginalia", 2006)

On Conjecture (Unsourced)

"In the study of Nature conjecture must be entirely put aside, and vague hypothesis carefully guarded against. The study of Nature begins with facts, ascends to laws, and raises itself, as far as the limits of man’s intellect will permit, to the knowledge of causes, by the threefold means of observation, experiment and logical deduction." (Jean Baptiste-Andre Dumas)

"Indeed, when in the course of a mathematical investigation we encounter a problem or conjecture a theorem, our minds will not rest until the problem is exhaustively solved and the theorem rigorously proved; or else, until we have found the reasons which made success impossible and, hence, failure unavoidable. Thus, the proofs of the impossibility of certain solutions plays a predominant role in modern mathematics; the search for an answer to such questions has often led to the discovery of newer and more fruitful fields of endeavour." (David Hilbert)

"The conjectures of the scientific intelligence are genuine creative novelties, inherently unpredictable and not determined by the character of the scientist’s physical environment. The thinking mind is not a causal mechanism." (Anthony M Quinton)

"The only use of an hypothesis is, that it should lead to experiments; that it should be a guide to facts. In this application, conjectures are always of use. The destruction of an error hardly ever takes place without the discovery of truth. [...] Hypothesis should be considered merely an intellectual instrument of discovery, which at any time may be relinquished for a better instrument. It should never be spoken of as truth; its highest praise is verisimility. Knowledge can only be acquired by the senses; nature has an archetype in the human imagination; her empire is given only to industry and action, guided and governed by experience." (Sir Humphry Davy) 

"The purpose of life is to conjecture and prove." (Paul Erdős)

"The theory of numbers, more than any other branch of mathematics, began by being an experimental science. Its most famous theorems have all been conjectured, sometimes a hundred years or more before they were proved; and they have been suggested by the evidence of a mass of computations." (Godfrey H Hardy)

"What certainty can there be in a Philosophy which consists in as many Hypotheses as there are Phaenomena to be explained. To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a little with certainty, & leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things by conjecture without making sure of any thing." (Sir Isaac Newton)

On Conjecture (1975-1999)

"All knowledge, the sociologist could say, is conjectural and theoretical. Nothing is absolute and final. Therefore all knowledge is relative to the local situation of the thinkers who produce it: the ideas and conjectures that they are capable of producing: the problems that bother them; the interplay of assumptions and criticism in their milieu; their purposes and aims; the experiences they have and the standards and meanings they apply." (David Bloor, "Knowledge and Social Imagery", 1976)

"The essential function of a hypothesis consists in the guidance it affords to new observations and experiments, by which our conjecture is either confirmed or refuted." (Ernst Mach, "Knowledge and Error: Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry", 1976)

"The verb 'to theorize' is now conjugated as follows: 'I built a model; you formulated a hypothesis; he made a conjecture.'" (John M Ziman, "Reliable Knowledge", 1978)

"All advances of scientific understanding, at every level, begin with a speculative adventure, an imaginative preconception of what might be true - a preconception that always, and necessarily, goes a little way (sometimes a long way) beyond anything which we have logical or factual authority to believe in. It is the invention of a possible world, or of a tiny fraction of that world. The conjecture is then exposed to criticism to find out whether or not that imagined world is anything like the real one. Scientific reasoning is therefore at all levels an interaction between two episodes of thought - a dialogue between two voices, the one imaginative and the other critical; a dialogue, as I have put it, between the possible and the actual, between proposal and disposal, conjecture and criticism, between what might be true and what is in fact the case." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"So-called scientific knowledge is not knowledge, for it consists only of conjectures or hypotheses - even if some have gone through the crossfire of ingenious tests." (Karl R Popper, "Epistemology and the Problem of Peace", [lecture in "All Life is Problem Solving", 1999] 1985)

"Three shifts can be detected over time in the understanding of mathematics itself. One is a shift from completeness to incompleteness, another from certainty to conjecture, and a third from absolutism to relativity." (Leone Burton, "Femmes et Mathematiques: Y a–t–il une?",  Association for Women in Mathematics Newsletter, Intersection 18, 1988)

"A mathematical proof is a chain of logical deductions, all stemming from a small number of initial assumptions ('axioms') and subject to the strict rules of mathematical logic. Only such a chain of deductions can establish the validity of a mathematical law, a theorem. And unless this process has been satisfactorily carried out, no relation - regardless of how often it may have been confirmed by observation - is allowed to become a law. It may be given the status of a hypothesis or a conjecture, and all kinds of tentative results may be drawn from it, but no mathematician would ever base definitive conclusions on it. (Eli Maor, "e: The Story of a Number", 1994)

"The sequence for the understanding of mathematics may be: intuition, trial, error, speculation, conjecture, proof. The mixture and the sequence of these events differ widely in different domains, but there is general agreement that the end product is rigorous proof - which we know and can recognize, without the formal advice of the logicians. […] Intuition is glorious, but the heaven of mathematics requires much more. Physics has provided mathematics with many fine suggestions and new initiatives, but mathematics does not need to copy the style of experimental physics. Mathematics rests on proof - and proof is eternal." (Saunders Mac Lan, "Reponses to …", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 30 (2), 1994)

"The methods of science include controlled experiments, classification, pattern recognition, analysis, and deduction. In the humanities we apply analogy, metaphor, criticism, and (e)valuation. In design we devise alternatives, form patterns, synthesize, use conjecture, and model solutions." (Béla H Bánáthy, "Designing Social Systems in a Changing World", 1996)

"A proof of a mathematical theorem is a sequence of steps which leads to the desired conclusion. The rules to be followed [...] were made explicit when logic was formalized early in the this century [...] These rules can be used to disprove a putative proof by spotting logical errors; they cannot, however, be used to find the missing proof of a [...] conjecture. [...] Heuristic arguments are a common occurrence in the practice of mathematics. However... The role of heuristic arguments has not been acknowledged in the philosophy of mathematics despite the crucial role they play in mathematical discovery. [...] Our purpose is to bring out some of the features of mathematical thinking which are concealed beneath the apparent mechanics of proof." (Gian-Carlo Rota, "Indiscrete Thoughts", 1997)

"Architectural conjectures are mathematically precise assertions, as well milled as minted coins, provisionally usable in the commerce of logical arguments; less than ‘coins’ and more aptly, promissory notes to be paid in full by some future demonstration, or to be contradicted. These conjectures are expected to turn out to be true, as, of course, are all conjectures; their formulation is often away of "formally" packaging, or at least acknowledging, an otherwise shapeless body of mathematical experience that points to their truth." (Barry Mazur, "Conjecture", Synthese 111, 1997)

"The everyday usage of 'theory' is for an idea whose outcome is as yet undetermined, a conjecture, or for an idea contrary to evidence. But scientists use the word in exactly the opposite sense. [In science] 'theory' [...] refers only to a collection of hypotheses and predictions that is amenable to experimental test, preferably one that has been successfully tested. It has everything to do with the facts." (Tony Rothman & George Sudarshan, "Doubt and Certainty: The Celebrated Academy: Debates on Science, Mysticism, Reality, in General on the Knowable and Unknowable", 1998)

"A mathematician experiments, amasses information, makes a conjecture, finds out that it does not work, gets confused and then tries to recover. A good mathematician eventually does so - and proves a theorem." (Steven Krantz, "Conformal Mappings", American Scientist, 1999)

On Conjecture (1800-1899)

"In order to supply the defects of experience, we will have recourse to the probable conjectures of analogy, conclusions which we will bequeath to our posterity to be ascertained by new observations, which, if we augur rightly, will serve to establish our theory and to carry it gradually nearer to absolute certainty." (Johann H Lambert, "The System of the World", 1800)

"In all speculations on the origin, or agents that have produced the changes on this globe, it is probable that we ought to keep within the boundaries of the probable effects resulting from the regular operations of the great laws of nature which our experience and observation have brought within the sphere of our knowledge. When we overleap those limits, and suppose a total change in nature's laws, we embark on the sea of uncertainty, where one conjecture is perhaps as probable as another; for none of them can have any support, or derive any authority from the practical facts wherewith our experience has brought us acquainted." (William Maclure, "Observations on the Geology of the United States of America", 1817)

"The science of the mathematics performs more than it promises, but the science of metaphysics promises more than it performs. The study of the mathematics, like the Nile, begins in minuteness but ends in magnificence; but the study of metaphysics begins with a torrent of tropes, and a copious current of words, yet loses itself at last in obscurity and conjecture, like the Niger in his barren deserts of sand." (Charles C Colton, "Lacon", 1820)

"We know the effects of many things, but the causes of few; experience, therefore, is a surer guide than imagination, and inquiry than conjecture." (Charles C Colton, "Lacon", 1820)

"Let me be permitted to recall that the object of mathematics is not to investigate the causes that one can assign to natural phenomena. This science would lose both its character and credit if, renouncing the support of general well-confirmed facts, it sought within the realm of nebulous conjectures, a realm which has always been a fertile source of error for ways of satisfying the thirst fo rexplanation." (Sophie Germain, "Examen des principes qui peuvent conduire a la connaissance des lois de requilibre et du mouvement des solides elastiques", Annales de Chimie 38, 1828)

"Life is not the object of Science: we see a little, very little; And what is beyond we can only conjecture." (Samuel Johnson, "Causes Which Produce Diversity of Opinion", 1840)

"The entire annals of Observation probably do not elsewhere exhibit so extraordinary a verification of any theoretical conjecture adventured on by the human spirit!" (John P Nichol, "The Planet Neptune: An Exposition and History", 1848)

"The philosophical study of nature rises above the requirements of mere delineation, and does not consist in the sterile accumulation of isolated facts. The active and inquiring spirit of man may therefore be occasionally permitted to escape from the present into the domain of the past, to conjecture that which cannot yet be clearly determined, and thus to revel amid the ancient and ever-recurring myths of geology." (Alexander von Humboldt, "Views of Nature: Or Contemplation of the Sublime Phenomena of Creation", 1850)

"The rules of scientific investigation always require us, when we enter the domains of conjecture, to adopt that hypothesis by which the greatest number of known facts and phenomena may be reconciled." (Matthew F Maury, "The Physical Geography of the Sea", 1855)

"There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact." (Samuel L Clemens [Mark Twain], "Life on the Mississippi", 1883)

"I have been able to solve a few problems of mathematical physics on which the greatest mathematicians since Euler have struggled in vain. [...] But the pride I might have held in my conclusions was perceptibly lessened by the fact that I knew that the solution of these problems had almost always come to me as the gradual generalization of favorable examples, by a series of fortunate conjectures, after many errors." (Hermann von Helmholtz, 1891)

On Conjecture (1750-1799)

"One of the most intimate of all associations in the human mind is that of cause and effect. They suggest one another with the utmost readiness upon all occasions; so that it is almost impossible to contemplate the one, without having some idea of, or forming some conjecture about the other." (Joseph Priestley, "The History and Present State of Electricity", 1767)

"It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic." (Immanuel Kant, "The Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"[...] the lofty aspirations of humanity and not delusions; they are realities. They link us to a purer order of existence, which makes us heirs of immortality. We repose order a confident and unwavering assurance that, in God’s own time, these earth-mists will be dispersed, and the dim twilight of conjecture will yield to the glorious, unclouded noonday of knowledge." (John LeConte, "The Nebular Hypothesis", The Popular Science Monthly Vol. 2, 1873)

"On the other hand, if we add observation to observation, without attempting to draw no only certain conclusions, but also conjectural views from them, we offend against the very end for which only observations ought to be made." (Friedrich W Herschel, "On the Construction of the Heavens", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Vol. LXXV, 1785)

"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"Conjecture may lead you to form opinions, but it cannot produce knowledge. Natural philosophy must be built upon the phenomena of nature discovered by observation and experiment." (George Adams, "Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy" Vol. 1, 1794)

"Conjectures in philosophy are termed hypotheses or theories; and the investigation of an hypothesis founded on some slight probability, which accounts for many appearances in nature, has too often been considered as the highest attainment of a philosopher. If the hypothesis (sic) hangs well together, is embellished with a lively imagination, and serves to account for common appearances - it is considered by many, as having all the qualities that should recommend it to our belief, and all that ought to be required in a philosophical system." (George Adams, "Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy" Vol. 1, 1794)

On Heuristics I

"The materialistic point of view in psychology can claim, at best, only the value of an heuristic hypothesis." (Wilhelm Wundt, "Principles of Physiological Psychology", 1874)

"Heuristic reasoning is good in itself. What is bad is to mix up heuristic reasoning with rigorous proof. What is worse is to sell heuristic reasoning for rigorous proof." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic, or heuretic, or 'ars inveniendi' was the name of a certain branch of study, not very clearly circumscribed, belonging to logic, or to philosophy, or to psychology, often outlined, seldom presented in detail, and as good as forgotten today. The aim of heuristic is to study the methods and rules of discovery and invention. [...] Heuristic, as an adjective, means 'serving to discover'." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We are often obliged to use heuristic reasoning. We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"The attempt to characterize exactly models of an empirical theory almost inevitably yields a more precise and clearer understanding of the exact character of a theory. The emptiness and shallowness of many classical theories in the social sciences is well brought out by the attempt to formulate in any exact fashion what constitutes a model of the theory. The kind of theory which mainly consists of insightful remarks and heuristic slogans will not be amenable to this treatment. The effort to make it exact will at the same time reveal the weakness of the theory." (Patrick Suppes," A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences", Synthese  Vol. 12 (2/3), 1960)

"Factoring big numbers is a strange kind of mathematics that closely resembles the experimental sciences, where nature has the last and definitive word. […] as with the experimental sciences, both rigorous and heuristic analyses can be valuable in understanding the subject and moving it forward. And, as with the experimental sciences, there is sometimes a tension between pure and applied practitioners." (Carl B Pomerance, "A Tale of Two Sieves", The Notices of the American Mathematical Society 43, 1996)

"[…] mathematics does not come to us written indelibly on Nature’s Tablets, but rather is the product of a controlled search governed by metaphorical considerations, the premier instance being the heuristics of the conservation principles." (Philip Mirowski, "More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature’s Economics", 1989)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"You can often hear from non-mathematicians, especially from philosophers, that mathematics consists exclusively in drawing conclusions from clearly stated premises; and that in this process, it makes no difference what these premises signify, whether they are true or fa1se, provided only that they do not contradict one another. But a per. son who has done productive mathematical work will talk quite differently. In fact these people [the non-mathematicians] are thinking only of the crystallized form into which finished mathematica1 theories are finally cast. However, the investigator himself, in mathematics as in every other science, does not work in this rigorous deductive fashion. On the contrary, he makes essential use of his imagination and proceeds inductively aided by heuristic expedients. One can give numerous examples of mathematicians who have discovered theorems of the greatest importance which they were unable to prove. Should one then refuse to recognize this as a great accomplishment and in deference to the above definition insist that this is not mathematics? After all it is an arbitrary thing how the word is to be used, but no judgment of value can deny that the inductive work of the person who first announces the theorem is at least as valuable as the deductive work. of the one who proves it. For both are equally necessary and the discovery is the presupposition of the later conclusion." (Felix Klein)

On Facts (1800-1824)

"Isolated facts, those that can only be obtained by rough estimate and that require development, can only be presented in memoires; but those that can be presented in a body, with details, and on whose accuracy one can rely, may be expounded in tables." (Emmanuel Duvillard, "Memoire sur le travail du Bureau de statistique", 1806)

"The foundations of chemical philosophy are observation, experiment, and analogy. By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, lends to experiment, and analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Elements of Chemical Philosophy" Vol. 4, 1812)

"The theory of which we have just given an overview may be considered from a point of view apt to set aside the obscure in what it presents, and which seems to be the primary aim, namely: to establish new notions on imaginary quantities. Indeed, putting to one side the question of whether these notions are true or false, we may restrict ourselves to viewing this theory as a means of research, to adopt the lines in direction only as signs of the real or imaginary quantities, and to see, in the usage to which we have put them, only the simple employment of a particular notation. For that, it suffices to start by demonstrating, through the first theorems of trigonometry, the rules of multiplication and addition given above; the applications will follow, and all that will remain is to examine the question of didactics. And if the employment of this notation were to be advantageous? And if it were to open up shorter and easier paths to demonstrate certain truths? That is what fact alone can decide." (Jean-Robert Argand, "Essai sur une manière de représenter les quantités imaginaires, dans les constructions géométriques", Annales Tome IV, 1813)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"The substitution of analogy for fact is the bane of chemical philosophy; the legitimate use of analogy is to connect facts together and to guide to new experiments." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Journal of Science and the Arts", 1816)

"Force is not a fact at all, but an idea embodying what is approximately the fact." (William K Clifford, "The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences", 1823)

On Facts (1870-1879)

"As in the experimental sciences, truth cannot be distinguished from error as long as firm principles have not been established through the rigorous observation of facts." (Louis Pasteur, "Étude sur la maladie des vers à soie", 1870)

"Therefore, the great business of the scientific teacher is, to imprint the fundamental, irrefragable facts of his science, not only by words upon the mind, but by sensible impressions upon the eye, and ear, and touch of the student, in so complete a manner, that every term used, or law enunciated, should afterwards call up vivid images of the particular structural, or other, facts which furnished the demonstration of the law, or the illustration of the term." (Thomas H Huxley, "Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews", 1870)

"Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an hypothesis, which means a supposition, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if their ulterior results are found in Nature." (Augustus de Morgan, "A Budget of Paradoxes", 1872)

"A law of nature, however, is not a mere logical conception that we have adopted as a kind of memoria technical to enable us to more readily remember facts. We of the present day have already sufficient insight to know that the laws of nature are not things which we can evolve by any speculative method. On the contrary, we have to discover them in the facts; we have to test them by repeated observation or experiment, in constantly new cases, under ever-varying circumstances; and in proportion only as they hold good under a constantly increasing change of conditions, in a constantly increasing number of cases with greater delicacy in the means of observation, does our confidence in their trustworthiness rise." (Hermann von Helmholtz, "Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects", 1873)

"Summing up, then, it would seem as if the mind of the great discoverer must combine contradictory attributes. He must be fertile in theories and hypotheses, and yet full of facts and precise results of experience. He must entertain the feeblest analogies, and the merest guesses at truth, and yet he must hold them as worthless till they are verified in experiment. When there are any grounds of probability he must hold tenaciously to an old opinion, and yet he must be prepared at any moment to relinquish it when a clearly contradictory fact is encountered." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"In every physical science we have carefully to distinguish between the facts which form its subject-matter and the theories by which we attempt to explain these facts, and group them in our scientific systems." (Josiah P Cooke, "The New Chemistry", 1876)

"As long as the training of a naturalist enables him to trace the action only of a particular material system, without giving him the power of dealing with the general properties of all such systems, he must proceed by the method so often described in histories of science - he must imagine model after model of hypothetical apparatus, till he finds one which will do the required work. If this apparatus should afterwards be found capable of accounting for many of the known phenomena, and not demonstrably inconsistent with any of them, he is strongly tempted to conclude that his hypothesis is a fact, at least until an equally good rival hypothesis has been invented." (James C Maxwell, "Tait’s Thermodynamics", Nature Vol. XVII (431), 1878)

On Facts (1890-1899)

"The study of theory must go hand in hand with that of facts: and for dealing with most modern problems it is modern facts that are of the greatest use." (Alfred Marshall, "Principles of Economics", 1890)

"The graphical method has considerable superiority for the exposition of statistical facts over the tabular. A heavy bank of figures is grievously wearisome to the eye, and the popular mind is as incapable of drawing any useful lessons from it as of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers." (Arthur B Farquhar & Henry Farquhar, "Economic and Industrial Delusions", 1891)

"All great scientists have, in a certain sense, been great artists; the man with no imagination may collect facts, but he cannot make great discoveries." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts." (Sir Arthur C Doyle, "The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes", 1892)

"The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"The true aim of the teacher must be to impart an appreciation of method and not a knowledge of facts." (Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science", 1892)

"Facts are not much use, considered as facts. They bewilder by their number and their apparent incoherency. Let them be digested into theory, however, and brought into mutual harmony, and it is another matter. Theory is of the essence of facts. Without theory scientific knowledge would be only worthy of the mad house." (Oliver Heaviside, "Electromagnetic Theory", 1893)

"Scientific facts accumulate rapidly, and give rise to theories with almost equal rapidity. These theories are often wonderfully enticing, and one is apt to pass from one to another, from theory to theory, without taking care to establish each before passing on to the next, without assuring oneself that the foundation on which one is building is secure. Then comes the crash; the last theory breaks down utterly, and on attempting to retrace our steps to firm ground and start anew, we may find too late that one of the cards, possibly at the very foundation of the pagoda, is either faultily placed or in itself defective, and that this blemish easily remedied if detected in time has, neglected, caused the collapse of the whole structure on whose erection so much skill and perseverance have been spent." (Arthur M Marshall, 1894)

"Without a theory all our knowledge of nature would be reduced to a mere inventory of the results of observation. Every scientific theory must be regarded as an effort of the human mind to grasp the truth, and as long as it is consistent with the facts, it forms a chain by which they are linked together and woven into harmony." (Thomas Preston, "The Theory of Heat", 1894)

"The first step, whenever a practical problem is set before a mathematician, is to form the mathematical hypothesis. It is neither needful nor practical that we should take account of the details of the structure as it will exist. We have to reason about a skeleton diagram in which bearings are reduced to points, pieces to lines, etc. and [in] which it is supposed that certain relations between motions are absolutely constrained, irrespective of forces. Some writers call such a hypothesis a fiction, and say that the mathematician does not solve the real problem, but only a fictitious one. That is one way of looking at the matter, to which I have no objection to make: only, I notice, that in precisely the same sense in which the mathematical hypothesis is 'false', so also is this statement 'false', that it is false. Namely, both representations are false in the sense that they omit subsidiary elements of the fact, provided that element of the case can be said to be subsidiary which those writers overlook, namely, that the skeleton diagram is true in the only sense in which from the nature of things any mental representation, or understanding, of the brute existent can be true. For every possible conception, by the very nature of thought, involves generalization; now generalization omits, means to omit, and professes to omit, the differences between the facts generalized." (Charles S Peirce, "Report on Live Loads", cca. 1895)

"The world is chiefly a mental fact. From mind it receives the forms of time and space, the principle of causality, color, warmth, and beauty. Were there no mind, there would be no world." (John L Spalding, "Means and Ends of Education", 1895)

"In scientific investigations, it is permitted to invent any hypothesis and, if it explains various large and independent classes of facts, it rises to the ranks of a well-grounded theory." (Charles Darwin, "The Variations of Animals and Plants Under Domestication" Vol. 1, 1896)

"Mathematics is the most abstract of all the sciences. For it makes no external observations, nor asserts anything as a real fact. When the mathematician deals with facts, they become for him mere ‘hypotheses’; for with their truth he refuses to concern himself. The whole science of mathematics is a science of hypotheses; so that nothing could be more completely abstracted from concrete reality." (Charles S Peirce, "The Regenerated Logic", The Monist Vol. 7 (1), 1896)

"Round about the accredited and orderly facts of every science there ever fl oats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences minute and irregular and seldom met with, which it always proves more easy to ignore than to attend to […]" (William James, "The Will to Believe", 1896)

"Science like life feeds on its own decay. New facts burst old rules; then newly developed concepts bind old and new together into a reconciling law." (William James, "The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy", 1896)

"The scientific value of truth is not, however, ultimate or absolute. It rests partly on practical, partly on aesthetic interests. As our ideas are gradually brought into conformity with the facts by the painful process of selection, - for intuition runs equally into truth and into error, and can settle nothing if not controlled by experience, - we gain vastly in our command over our environment. This is the fundamental value of natural science" (George Santayana, "The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory", 1896)

"To use an old analogy - and here we can hardly go except upon analogy - while the building of Nature is growing spontaneously from within, the model of it, which we seek to construct in our descriptive science, can only be constructed by means of scaffolding from without, a scaffolding of hypotheses. While in the real building all is continuous, in our model there are detached parts which must be connected with the rest by temporary ladders and passages, or which must be supported till we can see how to fill in the understructure. To give the hypotheses equal validity with facts is to confuse the temporary scaffolding with the building itself." (John H Poynting, 1899)

On Generalization (Unsourced)

"Facts are facts and it is from facts that we make our generalizations, from the little to the great, and it is wrong for a stranger to the facts he handles to generalize from them to other generalizations." (Charles Schuchert)

"Generalization is necessary to the advancement of knowledge; but particularity is indispensable to the creations of the imagination." (Thomas B Macaulay)

"Generalizations would be excellent things if we could be persuaded to part with them as easily as we formed them. They might then be used like the shifting hypotheses in certain operations of exact science, by help of which we may gradually approximate nearer and nearer to the truth." (Henry De la Beche)

"In these days of rapid scientific progress there is a tendency to accept the facts of nature, as at present known, without glancing back at the slow and difficult stages by which the knowledge of these facts has been arrived at. Yet such a retrospect is by no means unprofitable, since it warns us that hasty generalizations upon insufficient data retard rather than advance the progress of knowledge, and that the theories of the day must not be accepted as necessarily expressing absolute truths." (Archibald Garrod)

"Men are more apt to be mistaken in their generalizations than in their particular observations." (Niccolo Machiavelli)

"No one sees further into a generalization than his own knowledge of detail extends." (William James)

"Once we learn to expect theories to collapse and to be supplanted by more useful generalizations, the collapsing theory becomes not the gray remnant of a broken today, but the herald of a new and brighter tomorrow." (Isaac Asimov)

"Philosophy is more often the systematization of the prejudices of philosophers than the systematization of nature. Distrust all generalizations: stick to the concrete." (Epifanio de los Santos)

"So far as a theory is formed in the generalization of natural appearances, that theory must be just, although it may not be perfect, as having comprehended every appearance; that is to say, a theory is not perfect until it be founded upon every natural appearance; in which case, those appearances will be explained by the theory." (William Huggins)