Out of Context: On Thought (Definitions)

"It is probable that what we call thought is not an actual being, but no more than the relation between certain parts of that infinitely varied mass, of which the rest of the universe is composed, and which ceases to exist as soon as those parts change their position with regard to each other." (Percy B Shelley, "On a Future State", 1815)

"Thought is symbolical of Sensation as Algebra is of Arithmetic, and because it is symbolical, is very unlike what it symbolises." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"[...] thought is the representative or cognitive apprehension of relations among notions; imagination is the affective or felt apprehension of relations among images." (James M Baldwin,"Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect", 1890)

"Thought is existence. More than that, so far as we are concerned, existence is thought, all our conceptions of existence being some kind or other of thought." (Thomas H Huxley, "Method and Results", 1893)

"Consequently, all truly strict and exact thought is sustained by the symbolic and semiotics on which it is based." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"Thought is prior to language and consists in the simultaneous presentation to the mind of two different images." (Thomas E Hulme, "Notes on Language and Style", 1929)

"Analytic thought is based on detailed defined relations between two elements at a time. Intuitive thought is based on an emotional state associated with all the elements in the field of knowledge (overall impression). " (Tony Bastick, "Intuition: How we think and act", 1982) 

On Continuity XV (Thought)

"As infinite kinds of almost identical images arise continually from the innumerable atoms and flow out to us from the gods, so we should take the keenest pleasure in turning and bending our mind and reason to grasp these images, in order to understand the nature of these blessed and eternal beings." (Marcus TulliusCicero, "De Natura Deorum" ["On the Nature of the Gods"], 45 BC)

"But mathematics, certainly, does not play the smallest part in the charm and movement of the mind produced by music. Rather is it only the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) of that proportion of the combining as well as changing impressions which makes it possible to grasp them all in one and prevent them from destroying one another, and to let them, rather, conspire towards the production of a continuous movement and quickening of the mind by affections that are in unison with it, and thus towards a serene self-enjoyment." (Immanuel Kant, "The Critique of Judgment", 1790)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"But how can we avoid the use of human language? The [....] symbol. Only by using a symbolic language not yet usurped by those vague ideas of space, time, continuity which have their origin in intuition and tend to obscure pure reason - only thus may we hope to build mathematics on the solid foundation of logic." (Tobias Dantzig, "Number: The Language of Science", 1930)

"In this way things, external objects, are assimilated to more or less ordered motor schemas, and in this continuous assimilation of objects the child's own activity is the starting point of play. Not only this, but when to pure movement are added language and imagination, the assimilation is strengthened, and wherever the mind feels no actual need for accommodating itself to reality, its natural tendency will be to distort the objects that surround it in accordance with its desires or its fantasy, in short to use them for its satisfaction. Such is the intellectual egocentrism that characterizes the earliest form of child thought." (Jean Piaget, "The Moral Judgment of the Child", 1932)

"Although we can never devise a pictorial representation which shall be both true to nature and intelligible to our minds, we may still be able to make partial aspects of the truth comprehensible through pictorial representations or parables. As the whole truth does not admit of intelligible representation, every such pictorial representation or parable must fail somewhere. The physicist of the last generation was continually making pictorial representations and parables, and also making the mistake of treating the half-truths of pictorial representations and parables as literal truths." (James H Jeans, "Physics and Philosophy" 3rd Ed., 1943)

On Knowledge (1940-1949)

"It is by abstraction that one can separate movements, knowledge, and affectivity. And the analysis is, here, so far from being a real dismemberment that it is given only as probable. One can never effectively reduce an [mental] image to its elements, for the reason that an image, like all other psychic syntheses, is something more and different from the sum of its elements. […] We will always go from image to image. Comprehension is a movement which is never-ending, it is the reaction of the mind to an image by another image, to this one by another image and so on, in principle to infinity. "(Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination", 1940)

"In perception, a knowledge forms itself slowly; in the [mental] image the knowledge is immediate. We see now that the image is a synthetic act which unites a concrete, nonimagined, knowledge to elements which are more actually representative. The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance." (Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Psychology of Imagination", 1940)

"Science, in the broadest sense, is the entire body of the most accurately tested, critically established, systematized knowledge available about that part of the universe which has come under human observation. For the most part this knowledge concerns the forces impinging upon human beings in the serious business of living and thus affecting man’s adjustment to and of the physical and the social world. […] Pure science is more interested in understanding, and applied science is more interested in control […]" (Austin L Porterfield, "Creative Factors in Scientific Research", 1941)

“A metaphor holds a truth and an untruth, felt as inextricably bound up with each other. If one takes it as it is and gives it some sensual form, in the shape of reality, one gets dreams and art; but between these two and real, full-scale life there is a glass partition. If one analyzes it for its rational content and separates the unverifiable from the verifiable, one gets truth and knowledge but kills the feeling.” (Robert Musil, “Man Without Qualities”, 1943)

"It is hard to have a good idea if we have little knowledge of the subject, and impossible to have it if we have no knowledge. Good ideas are based on past experience and formerly acquired knowledge."  (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"The first rule of teaching is to know what you are supposed to teach. The second rule of teaching is to know a little more than what you are supposed to teach." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945) 

"Our theory has some bleaker consequences. [...] What is knowledge, if we are but a part of the mechanical system of the world we seek to know? What becomes of our ceaseless effort to explain the universe we live in, if explanation is but a part of the mechanical process?" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Whenever a man increases the content of his mind he gains new knowledge, and this occurs each time a new relation is established between the worlds on the two sides of the sense-organs - the world of ideas in an individual mind, and the world of objects existing outside individual minds which is common to us all." (James H Jeans, "Physics and Philosophy" 3rd Ed., 1943)

"Science usually advances by a succession of small steps, through a fog in which even the most keen-sighted explorer can seldom see more than a few paces ahead. Occasionally the fog lifts, an eminence is gained, and a wider stretch of territory can be surveyed - sometimes with startling results. A whole science may then seem to undergo a kaleidoscopic ‘rearrangement’, fragments of knowledge being found to fit together in a hitherto unsuspected manner. Sometimes the shock of readjustment may spread to other sciences; sometimes it may divert the whole current of human thought." (James H Jeans, "Physics and Philosophy" 3rd Ed., 1943)

"The former distrust of specialization has been supplanted by its opposite, a distrust of generalization. Not only has man become a specialist in practice, he is being taught that special facts represent the highest form of knowledge." (Richard Weaver, "Ideas have Consequences", 1948)

"We all inherit a great deal of useless knowledge, and a great deal of misinformation and error (maps that were formerly thought to be accurate), so that there is always a portion of what we have been told that must be discarded. But the cultural heritage of our civilization that is transmitted to us - our socially pooled knowledge, both scientific and humane - has been valued principally because we have believed that it gives us accurate maps of experience. The analogy of verbal words to maps is an important one [...]. It should be noticed at this point, however, that there are two ways of getting false maps of the world into our heads: first, by having them given to us; second, by creating them ourselves when we misread the true maps given to us." (Samuel I Hayakawa, "Language in Thought and Action", 1949)

On Knowledge (1775-1799)

"Cultivate that kind of knowledge which enables us to discover for ourselves in case of need that which others have to read or be told of." (Georg C Lichtenberg, Notebook D, 1773-1775)

"Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information upon it." (Samuel Johnson, 1775)

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts)." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"The word ‘chance’ then expresses only our ignorance of the causes of the phenomena that we observe to occur and to succeed one another in no apparent order. Probability is relative in part to this ignorance, and in part to our knowledge." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Mémoire sur les Approximations des Formules qui sont Fonctions de Très Grands Nombres", 1783)

"The mathematician pays not the least regard either to testimony or conjecture, but deduces everything by demonstrative reasoning, from his definitions and axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge." (Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man", 1785)

"On completing one discovery we never fail to get an imperfect knowledge of others of which you could have no idea before […]" (Joseph Priestley, 1786)

"As there is no study which may be so advantageously entered upon with a less stock of preparatory knowledge than mathematics, so there is none in which a greater number of uneducated men have raised themselves, by their own exertions, to distinction and eminence. […] Many of the intellectual defects which, in such cases, are commonly placed to the account of mathematical studies, ought to be ascribed to the want of a liberal education in early youth." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"The power of Reason […] is unquestionably the most important by far of those which are comprehended under the general title of Intellectual. It is on the right use of this power that our success in the pursuit of both knowledge and of  happiness depends; and it is by the exclusive possession of it that man is distinguished, in the most essential respects, from the lower animals. It is, indeed, from their subserviency to its operations, that the other faculties […] derive their chief value." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"Conjecture may lead you to form opinions, but it cannot produce knowledge. Natural philosophy must be built upon the phenomena of nature discovered by observation and experiment." (George Adams, "Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy" Vol. 1, 1794)

On Continuity XI (Thought II)

"The function of man’s highest faculty, his reason, consists precisely of the continuous limitation of infinity, the breaking up of infinity into convenient, easily digestible portions - differentials. This is precisely what lends my field, mathematics, its divine beauty." (Yevgeny Zamiatin, "We", 1924)

"Rationality consists [of] the continuous adaptation of our language to our continually expanding world, and metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is accomplished." (Mary B Hesse, "Models and Analogies in Science", 1966)

"Truth is a totality, the sum of many overlapping partial images. History, on the other hand, sacrifices totality in the interest of continuity." (Edmund Leach, "Brain-Twister", 1967)

"[…] the distinction between rigorous thinking and more vague ‘imaginings’; even in mathematics itself, all is not a question of rigor, but rather, at the start, of reasoned intuition and imagination, and, also, repeated guessing. After all, most thinking is a synthesis or juxtaposition of advances along a line of syllogisms - perhaps in a continuous and persistent 'forward' movement, with searching, so to speak ‘sideways’, in directions which are not necessarily present from the very beginning and which I describe as ‘sending out exploratory patrols’ and trying alternative routes." (Stanislaw M Ulam, "Adventures of a Mathematician", 1976)

"I shall here present the view that numbers, even whole numbers, are words, parts of speech, and that mathematics is their grammar. Numbers were therefore invented by people in the same sense that language, both written and spoken, was invented. Grammar is also an invention. Words and numbers have no existence separate from the people who use them. Knowledge of mathematics is transmitted from one generation to another, and it changes in the same slow way that language changes. Continuity is provided by the process of oral or written transmission." (Carl Eckart, "Our Modern Idol: Mathematical Science", 1984)

"To form a mental picture of the event, the knowledge developer attempts to integrate his or her perception of the situation with the expert’s perception. That mental picture is then recorded. What happens is a continuous shuttle process; the knowledge developer mentally moves back and forth from the initial impression of the event to the later evaluation of the event. What is finally recorded is the evaluation made during this retrospective period. Because a time lapse can make details of a situation less clear, the information is not always valid." (Elias M Awad, "Knowledge Management", 2003)

"It is from this continuousness of thought and perception that the scientist, like the writer, receives the crucial flash of insight out of which a piece of work is conceived and executed. And the scientist (again like the writer) is grateful when the insight comes, because insight is the necessary catalyst through which the abstract is made concrete, intuition be given language, language provides specificity, and real work can go forward." (Vivian Gornick, "Women in Science: Then and Now", 2009)

On Structure: Structure in Mathematics (1980-1989)

"A real change of theory is not a change of equations - it is a change of mathematical structure, and only fragments of competing theories, often not very important ones conceptually, admit comparison with each other within a limited range of phenomena." (Yuri I Manin, "Mathematics and Physics", 1981)

"Philosophical objections may be raised by the logical implications of building a mathematical structure on the premise of fuzziness, since it seems (at least superficially) necessary to require that an object be or not be an element of a given set. From an aesthetic viewpoint, this may be the most satisfactory state of affairs, but to the extent that mathematical structures are used to model physical actualities, it is often an unrealistic requirement. [...] Fuzzy sets have an intuitively plausible philosophical basis. Once this is accepted, analytical and practical considerations concerning fuzzy sets are in most respects quite orthodox." (James Bezdek, 1981)

"The formalist makes a distinction between geometry as a deductive structure and geometry as a descriptive science. Only the first is regarded as mathematical. The use of pictures or diagrams, or even mental imagery, all are non- mathematical. In principle, they should be unnecessary. Consequently. he regards them as inappropriate in a mathematics text, perhaps even in a mathematics class." (Philip J Davis & Reuben Hersh, "The Mathematical Experience", 1981)

"[…] mathematics is not just a symbolism, a set of conventions for the use of special, formal vocabularies, but is intimately connected with the structure of rational thought, with reasoning practices. [...] mathematics is not just a language, and of refusing the foundationalist move of trying to reduce mathematics to logic, instead seeing mathematics as providing rational frameworks for science, is to set science against a background of rational structures and rational methods which itself has a built-in dynamics. The rational framework of science is itself historically conditioned, for it changes with developments in mathematics." (Mary Tiles, "Bachelard: Science and Objectivity", 1984)

"Scientific laws give algorithms, or procedures, for determining how systems behave. The computer program is a medium in which the algorithms can be expressed and applied. Physical objects and mathematical structures can be represented as numbers and symbols in a computer, and a program can be written to manipulate them according to the algorithms. When the computer program is executed, it causes the numbers and symbols to be modified in the way specified by the scientific laws. It thereby allows the consequences of the laws to be deduced." (Stephen Wolfram, "Computer Software in Science and Mathematics", 1984)

"Nature is disordered, powerful and chaotic, and through fear of the chaos we impose system on it. We abhor complexity, and seek to simplify things whenever we can by whatever means we have at hand. We need to have an overall explanation of what the universe is and how it functions. In order to achieve this overall view we develop explanatory theories which will give structure to natural phenomena: we classify nature into a coherent system which appears to do what we say it does." (James Burke, "The Day the Universe Changed", 1985) 

"One cannot ‘invent’ the structure of an object. The most we can do is to patiently bring it to the light of day, with humility - in making it known, it is ‘discovered’. If there is some sort of inventiveness in this work, and if it happens that we find ourselves the maker or indefatigable builder, we are in no sense ‘making’ or ’building’ these ‘structures’. They have not waited for us to find them in order to exist, exactly as they are! But it is in order to express, as faithfully as possible, the things that we have been detecting or discovering, the reticent structure which we are trying to grasp at, perhaps with a language no better than babbling. Thereby are we constantly driven to ‘invent’ the language most appropriate to express, with increasing refinement, the intimate structure of the mathematical object, and to ‘construct’ with the help of this language, bit by bit, those ‘theories’ which claim to give a fair account of what has been apprehended and seen. There is a continual coming and going, uninterrupted, between the apprehension of things, and the means of expressing them by a language in constant state improvement [...].The sole thing that constitutes the true inventiveness and imagination of the researcher is the quality of his attention as he listens to the voices of things." (Alexander Grothendieck, "Récoltes et semailles –Rélexions et témoignage sur un passé de mathématicien", 1985)

"Somehow, after all, as the universe ebbs toward its final equilibrium in the featureless heat bath of maximum entropy, it manages to create interesting structures." (James Gleick, "Chaos: Making a New Science", 1987)

On Imagination (BC)

"We invoke the imagination and the intervals that it furnishes, since the form itself is without motion or genesis, indivisible and free of all underlying matter, though the elements latent in the form are produced distinctly and individually on the screen of imagination. What projects the images is the understanding; the source of what is projected is the form in the understanding; and what they are projected in is this 'passive nous' that unfolds in revolution about the partlessness of genuine Nous." (Proclus Lycaeus, "A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements", cca 5th century)

"But since we have, in our work on the soul, treated of imagination, and the faculty of imagination is identical with that of sense-perception, though the being of a faculty of imagination is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since imagination is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be an image (for which occurs in sleep - whether simply or in some particular way - is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua imaginative." (Aristotle, "On Dreams", 4th century BC)

"It is obvious then, that memory belongs to that part of the soul to which imagination belongs. […] Just as the picture painted on the panel is at once a picture and a portrait, and though one and the same, is both, yet the essence of the two is not the same, and it is possible to think of it both as a picture and as a portrait, so in the same way we must regard the mental picture within us both as an object of contemplation in itself and as a mental picture of something else […]. Insofar as we consider it in relation to something else, e.g. as a likeness, it is also an aid to memory." (Aristotle, "De Memoria et Reminiscentia" [On Memory and Recollection], 4th century BC)

"For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it. That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious. For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth." (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"[Imagination is] that in virtue of which we say that an image occurs to us and not as we speak of it metaphorically."  (Aristotle, "De Anima" III, cca. 350 BC)

"Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter. Imagination is different from assertion and denial; for what is true or false involves a synthesis of thoughts. In what will the primary thoughts differ from images? Must we not say that neither these nor even our other thoughts are images, though they necessarily involve them?" (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement: we must therefore first mark off the sphere of imagination and then speak of judgement. If then imagination is that in virtue of which an image arises for us, excluding metaphorical uses of the term, is it a single faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate and are either in error or not? The faculties in virtue of which we do this are sense, opinion, knowledge, thought." (Aristotle, "De Anima", cca. 350 BC)

"Imagination (VIKALPA) is a thought based on a mental image describable by words but not based on an object directly observable." (Patanjali, "Yoga Sutra" cca. 500 BC - 400 AD)

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On Imagination (1925-1949)

"The sciences bring into play the imagination, the building of images in which the reality, of the past is blended with the ideals for the future, and from the picture there springs the prescience of genius." (William J Mayo, "Contributions of Pure Science to Progressive Medicine", The Journal of the American Medical Association Vol. 84 (20), 1925)

"We do not know why the imagination has accepted that image before the reason can reject it; or why such correspondences seem really to correspond to something in the soul." (Gilbert K Chesterton, "The Everlasting Man", 1925)

"The world is not run by thought, nor by imagination, but by opinion." (Elizabeth A Drew, "The Modern Novel", 1926)

"In this way things, external objects, are assimilated to more or less ordered motor schemas, and in this continuous assimilation of objects the child's own activity is the starting point of play. Not only this, but when to pure movement are added language and imagination, the assimilation is strengthened, and wherever the mind feels no actual need for accommodating itself to reality, its natural tendency will be to distort the objects that surround it in accordance with its desires or its fantasy, in short to use them for its satisfaction. Such is the intellectual egocentrism that characterizes the earliest form of child thought." (Jean Piaget, "The Moral Judgment of the Child", 1932)

"What is the inner secret of mathematical power? Briefly stated, it is that mathematics discloses the skeletal outlines of all closely articulated relational systems. For this purpose mathematics uses the language of pure logic with its score or so of symbolic words, which, in its important forms of expression, enables the mind to comprehend systems of relations otherwise completely beyond its power. These forms are creative discoveries which, once made, remain permanently at our disposal. By means of them the scientific imagination is enabled to penetrate ever more deeply into the rationale of the universe about us." (George D Birkhoff, "Mathematics: Quantity and Order", 1934)

"The scientist explores the world of phenomena by successive approximations. He knows that his data are not precise and that his theories must always be tested. It is quite natural that he tends to develop healthy skepticism, suspended judgment, and disciplined imagination." (Edwin P Hubble, 1938)

"The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting on the cause." (Percy B Shelley, "A Defence of Poetry", 1840) [written 1821]

"The artist must bow to the monster of his own imagination." (Richard Wright, "Twelve Million Black Voices", 1941)

"Yet a review of receipt physics has shown that all attempts at mechanical models or pictures have failed and must fail. For a mechanical model or picture must represent things as happening in space and time, while it has recently become clear that the ultimate processes of nature neither occur in, nor admit of representation in, space and time. Thus an understanding of the ultimate processes of nature is for ever beyond our reach: we shall never be able - even in imagination - to open the case of our watch and see how the wheels go round. The true object of scientific study can never be the realities of nature, but only our own observations on nature." (James H Jeans, "Physics and Philosophy", 1942)

"The straight line of the geometers does not exist in the material universe. It is a pure abstraction, an invention of the imagination or, if one prefers, an idea of the Eternal Mind." (Eric T Bell, "The Magic of Numbers", 1946)

"For, in mathematics or symbolic logic, reason can crank out the answer from the symboled equations -even a calculating machine can often do so - but it cannot alone set up the equations. Imagination resides in the words which define and connect the symbols - subtract them from the most aridly rigorous mathematical treatise and all meaning vanishes." (Ralph W Gerard, "The Biological Basis of Imagination", American Thought, 1947)

"Imagination and fiction make up more than three-quarters of our real life." (Simone Weil, "Gravity and Grace", 1947)

"[...] when the pioneer in science sends for the groping feelers of his thoughts, he must have a vivid intuitive imagination, for new ideas are not generated by deduction, but by an artistically creative imagination. Nevertheless, the worth of a new idea is invariably determined, not by the degree of its intuitiveness - which, incidentally, is to a major extent a matter of experience and habit - but by the scope and accuracy of the individual laws to the discovery of which it eventually leads. (Max Planck, The Meaning and Limits of Exact Science, Science Vol. 110 (2857), 1949)

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Peter B Medawar - Collected Quotes

"The formulation of a hypothesis carries with it an obligation to test it as rigorously as we can command skills to do so." (Peter Medawar, "Hypothesis and Imagination", 1963)

"Scientific discovery, or the formulation of scientific theory, starts in with the unvarnished and unembroidered evidence of the senses. It starts with simple observation - simple, unbiased, unprejudiced, naive, or innocent observation - and out of this sensory evidence, embodied in the form of simple propositions or declarations of fact, generalizations will grow up and take shape, almost as if some process of crystallization or condensation were taking place. Out of a disorderly array of facts, an orderly theory, an orderly general statement, will somehow emerge." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Is the Scientific Paper Fraudulent?", The Saturday Review, 1964)

"Innocent, unbiased observation is a myth." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1969)

"Every discovery, every enlargement of the understanding, begins as an imaginative preconception of what the truth might be. The imaginative preconception - a ‘hypothesis’ - arises by a process as easy or as difficult to understand as any other creative act of mind; it is a brainwave, an inspired guess, a product of a blaze of insight. It comes anyway from within and cannot be achieved by the exercise of any known calculus of discovery." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Advice to a Young Scientist", 1979)

"I cannot give any scientist of any age better advice than this: the intensity of a conviction that a hypothesis is true has no bearing over whether it is true or not. The importance of the strength of our conviction is only to provide a proportionately strong incentive to find out if the hypothesis will stand up to critical evaluation." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Advice to a Young Scientist", 1979)

"The intensity of a conviction that a hypothesis is true has no bearing on whether it is true or false." (Peter Medawar, "Advice to a Young Scientist", 1979)

"All advances of scientific understanding, at every level, begin with a speculative adventure, an imaginative preconception of what might be true - a preconception that always, and necessarily, goes a little way (sometimes a long way) beyond anything which we have logical or factual authority to believe in. It is the invention of a possible world, or of a tiny fraction of that world. The conjecture is then exposed to criticism to find out whether or not that imagined world is anything like the real one. Scientific reasoning is therefore at all levels an interaction between two episodes of thought - a dialogue between two voices, the one imaginative and the other critical; a dialogue, as I have put it, between the possible and the actual, between proposal and disposal, conjecture and criticism, between what might be true and what is in fact the case." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"If the purpose of scientific methodology is to prescribe or expound a system of enquiry or even a code of practice for scientific behavior, then scientists seem able to get on very well without it." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"In a modern professional vocabulary a hypothesis is an imaginative preconception of what might be true in the form of a declaration with verifiable deductive consequences. It no longer tows ‘gratuitous’, ‘mere’, or ‘wild’ behind it, and the pejorative usage (‘Evolution is a mere hypothesis’, ‘It is only a hypothesis that smoking causes lung cancer’) is one of the outward signs of little learning." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"In all sensation we pick and choose, interpret, seek and impose order, and devise and test hypotheses about what we witness. Sense data are taken, not merely given: we learn to perceive. […] The teacher has forgotten, and the student himself will soon forget, that what he sees conveys no information until he knows beforehand the kind of thing he is expected to see."  (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Intuition takes many different forms in science and mathematics, though all forms of it have certain properties in common: the suddenness of their origin, the wholeness of the conception they embody, and the absence of conscious premeditation." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Observation is the generative act in scientific discovery. For all its aberrations, the evidence of the senses is essentially to be relied upon - provided we observe nature as a child does, without prejudices and preconceptions, but with that clear and candid vision which adults lose and scientists must strive to regain." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Scientific theories (I have said) begin as imaginative constructions. The begin, if you like, as stories, and the purpose of the critical or rectifying episode in scientific reasoning is precisely to find out whether or not these stories are stories about real life. Literal or empiric truthfulness is not therefore the starting-point of scientific enquiry, but rather the direction in which scientific reasoning moves. If this is a fair statement, it follows that scientific and poetic or imaginative accounts of the world are not distinguishable in their origins. They start in parallel, but diverge from one another at some later stge. We all tell stories, but the stories differ in the purposes we expect them to fulfil and in the kinds of evaluations to which they are exposed." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Scientific discovery is a private event, and the delight that accompanies it, or the despair of finding it illusory, does not travel. One scientist may get great satisfaction from another’s work and admire it deeply; it may give him great intellectual pleasure; but it gives him no sense of participation in the discovery, it does not carry him away, and his appreciation of it does not depend on his being carried away. If it were otherwise the inspirational origin of scientific discovery would never have been in doubt." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"Simultaneous discovery is utterly commonplace, and it was only the rarity of scientists, not the inherent improbability of the phenomenon, that made it remarkable in in the past." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The ballast of factual information, so far from being just about to sink us, is growing daily less. The factual burden of a science varies inversely with its degree of maturity. As a science advances, particular facts are comprehended within, and therefore in a sense annihilated by, general statements of steadily increasing explanatory power and compass - whereupon the facts need no longer be known explicitly, that is, spelled out and kept in mind. In all sciences we are being progressively relieved of the burden of singular instances, the tyranny of the particular. We need no longer record the fall of every apple." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The critical task of science is not complete and never will be, for it is the merest truism that we do not abandon mythologies and superstitions, but merely substitute new variants for old." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The formulation of a natural ‘law’ always begins as an imaginative exploit, and without imagination scientific thought is barren." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The purpose of scientific enquiry is not to compile an inventory of factual information, nor to build up a totalitarian world picture of Natural Laws in which every event that is not compulsory is forbidden. We should think of it rather as a logically articulated structure of justifiable beliefs about nature. It begins as a story about a Possible World - a story which we invent and criticize and modify as we go along, so that it winds by being, as nearly as we can make it, a story about real life." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"The scientific method is a potentiation of common sense, exercised with a specially firm determination not to persist in error if any exertion of hand or mind can deliver us from it. Like other exploratory processes, it can be resolved into a dialogue between fact and fancy, the actual and the possible; between what could be true and what is in fact the case. The purpose of scientific enquiry is not to compile an inventory of factual information, nor to build up a totalitarian world picture of Natural Laws in which every event that is not compulsory is forbidden. We should think of it rather as a logically articulated structure of justifiable beliefs about nature. It begins as a story about a Possible World - a story which we invent and criticise and modify as we go along, so that it ends by being, as nearly as we can make it, a story about real life." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"There is no such thing as a Scientific Mind. Scientists are people of very dissimilar temperaments doing different things in very different ways. Among scientists are collectors, classifiers and compulsive tidiers-up; many are detectives by temperament and many are explorers; some are artists and others artisans. There are poet-scientists and philosopher-scientists and even a few mystics. What sort of mind or temperament can all these people be supposed to have in common? Obligative scientists must be very rare, and most people who are in fact scientists could easily have been something else instead." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"What shows a theory to be inadequate or mistaken is not, as a rule, the discovery of a mistake in the information that led us to propound it; more often it is the contradictory evidence of a new observation which we were led to make because we held that theory." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"A scientist is no more a collector and classifier of facts than a historian is a man who complies and classifies a chronology of the dates of great battles and major discoveries." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Aristotle to Zoos: A Philosophical Dictionary of Biology", 1983)

"The attempt to discover and promulgate the truth is nevertheless an obligation upon all scientists, one that must be persevered in no matter what the rebuffs - for otherwise what is the point in being a scientist?" (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Aristotle to Zoos: A Philosophical Dictionary of Biology", 1983)

On Physics (1900-1909)

"The laws of thermodynamics, as empirically determined, express the approximate and probable behavior of systems of a great number of particles, or, more precisely, they express the laws of mechanics for such systems as they appear to beings who have not the fineness of perception to enable them to appreciate quantities of the order of magnitude of those which relate to single particles, and who cannot repeat their experiments often enough to obtain any but the most probable results." (Josiah W Gibbs, "Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics", 1902)

"Chemistry and physics are experimental sciences; and those who are engaged in attempting to enlarge the boundaries of science by experiment are generally unwilling to publish speculations; for they have learned, by long experience, that it is unsafe to anticipate events. It is true, they must make certain theories and hypotheses. They must form some kind of mental picture of the relations between the phenomena which they are trying to investigate, else their experiments would be made at random, and without connection." (William Ramsay, "Radium and Its Products", Harper’s Magazine, 1904)

"The mathematical formula is the point through which all the light gained by science passes in order to be of use to practice; it is also the point in which all knowledge gained by practice, experiment, and observation must be concentrated before it can be scientifically grasped. The more distant and marked the point, the more concentrated will be the light coming from it, the more unmistakable the insight conveyed. All scientific thought, from the simple gravitation formula of Newton, through the more complicated formulae of physics and chemistry, the vaguer so called laws of organic and animated nature, down to the uncertain statements of psychology and the data of our social and historical knowledge, alike partakes of this characteristic, that it is an attempt to gather up the scattered rays of light, the different parts of knowledge, in a focus, from whence it can be again spread out and analyzed, according to the abstract processes of the thinking mind. But only when this can be done with a mathematical precision and accuracy is the image sharp and well-defined, and the deductions clear and unmistakable. As we descend from the mechanical, through the physical, chemical, and biological, to the mental, moral, and social sciences, the process of focalization becomes less and less perfect, - the sharp point, the focus, is replaced by a larger or smaller circle, the contours of the image become less and less distinct, and with the possible light which we gain there is mingled much darkness, the sources of many mistakes and errors. But the tendency of all scientific thought is toward clearer and clearer definition; it lies in the direction of a more and more extended use of mathematical measurements, of mathematical formulae." (John T Merz, "History of European Thought in the 19th Century" Vol. 1, 1904)

"The science of physics does not only give us [mathematicians] an opportunity to solve problems, but helps us also to discover the means of solving them, and it does this in two ways: it leads us to anticipate the solution and suggests suitable lines of argument." (Henri Poincaré, "La valeur de la science" ["The Value of Science"], 1905)

"[...] as for physics, it has developed remarkably as a precision science, in such a way that we can justifiably claim that the majority of all the greatest discoveries in physics are very largely based on the high degree of accuracy which can now be obtained in measurements made during the study of physical phenomena. [... Accuracy of measurement] is the very root, the essential condition, of our penetration deeper into the laws of physics - our only way to new discoveries." (K Bernhard Hasselberg, [Nobel Lecture] 1907)

"If the aim of physical theories is to explain experimental laws, theoretical physics is not an autonomous science; it is subordinate to metaphysics." (Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem, "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", 1908)

"It is impossible to follow the march of one of the greatest theories of physics, to see it unroll majestically its regular deductions starting from initial hypotheses, to see its consequences represent a multitude of experimental laws down to the smallest detail, without being charmed by the beauty of such a construction, without feeling keenly that such a creation of the human mind is truly a work of art." (Pierre-Maurice-Marie DuhemDuhem, "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", 1908)

"[...] physics makes progress because experiment constantly causes new disagreements to break out between laws and facts, and because physicists constantly touch up and modify laws in order that they may more faithfully represent the facts." (Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem, "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", 1908)

"The laws of physics are therefore provisional in that the symbols they relate too simple to represent reality completely." (Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem, "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", 1908)

On Entropy (1960-1969)

"Science is usually understood to depict a universe of strict order and lawfulness, of rigorous economy - one whose currency is energy, convertible against a service charge into a growing common pool called entropy." (Paul A Weiss,"Organic Form: Scientific and Aesthetic Aspects", 1960)

"The basic objection to attempts to deduce the unidirectional nature of time from concepts such as entropy is that they are attempts to reduce a more fundamental concept to a less fundamental one." (Gerald J Whitrow, "The Natural Philosophy of Time", 1961)

"Both the uncertainty principle and the negentropy principle of information make Laplace's scheme [of exact determinism] completely unrealistic. The problem is an artificial one; it belongs to imaginative poetry, not to experimental science." (Léon Brillouin, "Science and Information Theory" 2nd Ed., 1962)

"Entropy is a measure of the heat energy in a substance that has been lost and is no longer available for work. It is a measure of the deterioration of a system." (William B. Sill & Norman Hoss (Eds.), "Popular Science Encyclopedia of the Sciences", 1963)

"The homeostatic principle does not apply literally to the functioning of all complex living systems, in that in counteracting entropy they move toward growth and expansion." (Daniel Katz, "The Social Psychology of Organizations", 1966) 

"Higher, directed forms of energy (e.g., mechanical, electric, chemical) are dissipated, that is, progressively converted into the lowest form of energy, i.e., undirected heat movement of molecules; chemical systems tend toward equilibria with maximum entropy; machines wear out owing to friction; in communication channels, information can only be lost by conversion of messages into noise but not vice versa, and so forth." (Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Robots, Men and Minds", 1967)

On Symbols (-1799)

"Natural justice is a symbol or expression of usefulness, to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another."  (Epicurus, "Sovereign Maxims"

"All teems with symbol; the wise man is the man who in any one thing can read another." Plotinus, The Enneads c. 250)

"Letters are signs of things, symbols of words, whose power is so great that without a voice they speak to us the words of the absent; for they introduce words by the eye, not by the ear." (Isidore of Seville, "Etymologiae", cca. 800-625)

"The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction." (Francis Bacon, The New Organon, 1620)

"Nature's great book is written in mathematical symbols." (Galileo Galilei, "The Assayer", 1623)

"It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs suited for expressing all our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry expresses lines, we could do in all matters, insofar as they are subject to reasoning, all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry." (Gottfried W Leibniz, 1677)

"In symbols one observes an advantage in discovery which is greatest when they express the exact nature of a thing briefly and, as it were, picture it; then indeed the labor of thought is wonderfully diminished." (Gottfried W Leibniz, [letter to Ehrenfried W von Tschirnhaus] cca. 1680)

"Algebra is a general Method of Computation by certain signs and symbols which have been contrived for the Purpose, and found convenient." (Colin Maclaurin, "A Treatise of Algebra", 1748)

As a general rule - never substitute the symbol for the thing signified, unless it is impossible to show the thing itself; for the child's attention is so taken up with the symbol that he will forget what it signifies." (Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Emile, or On Education", 1762) 

On Symbols (1870-1879)

"Ideas are substitutions which require a secondary process when what is symbolized by them is translated into the images and experiences it replaces; and this secondary process is frequently not performed at all, generally only performed to a very small extent. Let anyone closely examine what has passed in his mind when he has constructed a chain of reasoning, and he will be surprised at the fewness and faintness of the images which have accompanied the ideas." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"Mathematicians may flatter themselves that they possess new ideas which mere human language is yet unable to express. Let them make the effort to express these ideas in appropriate words without the aid of symbols, and if they succeed they will not only lay us laymen under a lasting obligation, but we venture to say, they will find themselves very much enlightened during the process, and will even be doubtful whether the ideas as expressed in symbols had ever quite found their way out of the equations of their minds." (James C Maxwell Scottish, "Thomson & Tait's Natural Philosophy", Nature Vol. 7, 1873) 

"The invention of a new symbol is a step in the advancement of civilisation. Why were the Greeks, in spite of their penetrating intelligence and their passionate pursuit of Science, unable to carry Mathematics farther than they did? and why, having formed the conception of the Method of Exhaustions, did they stop short of that of the Differential Calculus? It was because they had not the requisite symbols as means of expression. They had no Algebra. Nor was the place of this supplied by any other symbolical language sufficiently general and flexible; so that they were without the logical instruments necessary to construct the great instrument of the Calculus." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"The leading characteristic of algebra is that of operation on relations. This also is the leading characteristic of Thought. Algebra cannot exist without values, nor Thought without Feelings. The operations are so many blank forms till the values are assigned. Words are vacant sounds, ideas are blank forms, unless they symbolize images and sensations which are their values. Nevertheless it is rigorously true, and of the greatest importance, that analysts carry on very extensive operations with blank forms, never pausing to supply the symbols with values until the calculation is completed; and ordinary men, no less than philosophers, carry on long trains of thought without pausing to translate their ideas (words) into images." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"The rules of Arithmetic operate in Algebra; the logical operations supposed to be peculiar to Ideation operate in Sensation, There is but one Calculus, but one Logic; though for convenience we divide the one into Arithmetic the calculus of values, and Algebra the calculus of relations; the other into the Logic of Feeling and the Logic of Signs." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"Thought is symbolical of Sensation as Algebra is of Arithmetic, and because it is symbolical, is very unlike what it symbolises. For one thing, sensations are always positive; in this resembling arithmetical quantities. A negative sensation is no more possible than a negative number. But ideas, like algebraic quantities, may be either positive or negative. However paradoxical the square of a negative quantity, the square root of an unknown quantity, nay, even in imaginary quantity, the student of Algebra finds these paradoxes to be valid operations. And the student of Philosophy finds analogous paradoxes in operations impossible in the sphere of Sense. Thus although it is impossible to feel non-existence, it is possible to think it; although it is impossible to frame an image of Infinity, we can, and do, form the idea, and reason on it with precision." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"With Algebra we enter a new sphere, that of symbolical quantities; here letters are symbols of any values we please; all we deal with in them is the relations of equality which the letters symbolise. Although the values are changeable, jet, once assigned, they must remain fixed throughout the operation. Illogical reasoning, in philosophic as in ordinary minds, is not due to any irregularity in the normal operation, but to a departure from the values assigned." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32 (127), 1875)

"Some definite interpretation of a linear algebra would, at first sight, appear indispensable to its successful application. But on the contrary, it is a singular fact, and one quite consonant with the principles of sound logic, that its first and general use is mostly to be expected from its want of significance. The interpretation is a trammel to the use. Symbols are essential to comprehensive argument." (Benjamin Peirce, "On the Uses and Transformations of Linear Algebra", 1875)

"The strongest use of the symbol is to be found in its magical power of doubling the actual universe, and placing by its side an ideal universe, its exact counterpart, with which it can be compared and contrasted, and, by means of curiously connecting fibres, form with it an organic whole, from which modern analysis has developed her surpassing geometry." (Benjamin Peirce, "On the Uses and Transformations of Linear Algebra", 1875)

"When the formulas admit of intelligible interpretation, they are accessions to knowledge; but independently of their interpretation they are invaluable as symbolical expressions of thought. But the most noted instance is the symbol called the impossible or imaginary, known also as the square root of minus one, and which, from a shadow of meaning attached to it, may be more definitely distinguished as the symbol of semi-inversion. This symbol is restricted to a precise signification as the representative of perpendicularity in quaternions, and this wonderful algebra of space is intimately dependent upon the special use of the symbol for its symmetry, elegance, and power."  (Benjamin Peirce, "On the Uses and Transformations of Linear Algebra", 1875)

On Symbols (1890-1899)

"Judged by the only standards which are admissible in a pure doctrine of numbers i is imaginary in the same sense as the negative, the fraction, and the irrational, but in no other sense; all are alike mere symbols devised for the sake of representing the results of operations even when these results are not numbers (positive integers)." (Henry B Fine, "The Number-System of Algebra", 1890)

"The mathematician, carried along on his flood of symbols, dealing apparently with purely formal truths, may still reach results of endless importance for our description of the physical universe." (Karl Pearson, “The Grammar of Science”, 1892)

"The mechanism of thought consists in combinations, separations, and recombinations of representative images or symbols […] the object of thought is adaptation to environment." (Paul Carus, “Le probeme de la conscience du moi", 1893)

"At the basis of our Symbolic Logic, however represented, whether by words by letters or by diagrams, we shall always find the same state of things. What we ultimately have to do is to break up the entire field before us into a definite number of classes or compartments which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

"The best way of introducing this question will be to enquire a little more strictly whether it is really classes that we thus represent, or merely compartments into which classes may be put? […] The most accurate answer is that our diagrammatic subdivisions, or for that matter our symbols generally, stand for compartments and not for classes. We may doubtless regard them as representing the latter, but if we do so we should never fail to keep in mind the proviso, 'if there be such things in existence'. And when this condition is insisted upon, it seems as if we expressed our meaning best by saying that what our symbols stand for are compartments which may or may not happen to be occupied." (John Venn, "Symbolic Logic" 2nd Ed., 1894)

“We form ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured." (Heinrich Hertz, 1894)

"Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one consciously, by means of certain external symbols, conveys to others the feelings one has experienced, whereby people so infected by these feelings, also experience them." (Leo Tolstoy, "What is Art?", 1897)

"The elements of plane geometry should precede algebra for every reason known to sound educational theory. It is more fundamental, it is more concrete, and it deals with things and their relations rather than with symbols." (Nicholas M Butler, "The Meaning of Education, and Other Essays and Addresses", 1898)

On Engineering VI

"Can one think that because we are engineers, beauty does not preoccupy us or that we do not try to build beautiful, as well as solid and long lasting structures? Aren’t the genuine functions of strength always in keeping with unwritten conditions of harmony? [...] Besides, there is an attraction, a special charm in the colossal to which ordinary theories of art do not apply." (Gustave Eiffel, [interview in 'Le Temps'] 1887)

"The characteristic feature of our age results from the wedding of science and engineering. It is the working together of disciplined curiosity and purposeful ingenuity to create new materials, new forces, and new opportunities which powerfully affect our manner of living and ways of thinking." (Karl T Compton, "A Scientist Speaks: Excerpts from Addresses by Karl Taylor Compton - During the Years 1930-1949", 1955)

"[An engineer's] invention causes things to come into existence from ideas, makes world conform to thought; whereas science, by deriving ideas from observation, makes thought conform to existence." (Carl Mitcham, "Types of Technology", Research in Philosophy & Technology Vol. 1, 1978)

"Engineers use knowledge primarily to design, produce, and operate artifacts. [...] Scientists, by contrast, use knowledge primarily to generate more knowledge." (Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It, 1990)

"Engineering is quite different from science. Scientists try to understand nature. Engineers try to make things that do not exist in nature. Engineers stress invention. To embody an invention the engineer must put his idea in concrete terms, and design something that people can use. That something can be a device, a gadget, a material, a method, a computing program, an innovative experiment, a new solution to a problem, or an improvement on what is existing. Since a design has to be concrete, it must have its geometry, dimensions, and characteristic numbers. Almost all engineers working on new designs find that they do not have all the needed information. Most often, they are limited by insufficient scientific knowledge. Thus they study mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and mechanics. Often they have to add to the sciences relevant to their profession. Thus engineering sciences are born." (Yuan-Cheng Fung & Pin Tong, "Classical and Computational Solid Mechanics", 2001)

"Engineering isn't about perfect solutions; it's about doing the best you can with limited resources." (Randy Pausch, "The Last Lecture", 2008)

"The central activity of engineering, as distinguished from science, is the design of new devices, processes and systems." (Myron Tribus, "Rational Descriptions, Decisions and Designs", 2016)

"Engineering is a living branch of human activity and its frontiers are by no means exhausted." (Igor I Sikorsky)

"Engineering is not merely knowing and being knowledgeable, like a walking encyclopedia; engineering is not merely analysis; engineering is not merely the possession of the capacity to get elegant solutions to non-existent engineering problems; engineering is practicing the art of the organizing forces of technological change. [...] Engineers operate at the interface between science and society." (Gordon S Brown)

"The scientist describes what is; the engineer creates what never was." (Theodore von Kármán)

On Symbols (1990-1999)

"When a person has learned a symbolic system well enough to use it, she has established a portable self-contained world within the mind." (Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "Flow", 1990)

"Mathematics […] is mired in a language of symbols foreign to most of us, [it] explores regions of the infinitesimally small and the infinitely large that elude words, much less understanding." (Robert Kanigel, "The Man Who Knew Infinity", 1991)

"Great mathematics seldom comes from idle speculation about abstract spaces and symbols. More often than not it is motivated by definite questions arising in the worlds of nature and humans." (John L Casti, "Reality Rules: Picturing the world in mathematics", 1992)

"Mathematical modeling is about rules - the rules of reality. What distinguishes a mathematical model from, say, a poem, a song, a portrait or any other kind of ‘model’, is that the mathematical model is an image or picture of reality painted with logical symbols instead of with words, sounds or watercolors." (John Casti, "Reality Rules", 1992)

"Scientific claims or statements are inexact and provisional. They depend on dozens of simplifying assumptions and on a particular choice of words and symbols and on 'all other things being equal'." (Bart Kosko, "Fuzzy Thinking: The new science of fuzzy logic", 1993)

"The insight at the root of artificial intelligence was that these 'bits' (manipulated by computers) could just as well stand as symbols for concepts that the machine would combine by the strict rules of logic or the looser associations of psychology." (Daniel Crevier, "AI: The tumultuous history of the search for artificial intelligence", 1993)

"Above all, words must be recognized as symbolic pointers to truth, not objective containers of truth." (John S Spong, "Resurrection: Myth or Reality?", 1994) 

"[...] images are probably the main content of our thoughts, regardless of the sensory modality in which they are generated and regardless of whether they are about a thing or a process involving things; or about words or other symbols, in a given language, which correspond to a thing or process. Hidden behind those images, never or rarely knowable by us, there are indeed numerous processes that guide the generation and deployment of those images in space and time. Those processes utilize rules and strategies embodied in dispositional representations. They are essential for our thinking but are not a content of our thoughts.” (Antonio R Damasio, “Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain”, 1994)

"Just as music comes alive in the performance of it, the same is true of mathematics. The symbols on the page have no more to do with mathematics than the notes on a page of music. They simply represent the experience." (Keith Devlin, "Mathematics: The Science of Patterns", 1994)

"Every phenomenon on earth is symbolic, and each symbol is an open gate through which the soul, if it is ready, can enter into the inner part of the world, where you and I and day and night are all one." (Hermann Hesse, "The Fairy Tales of Hermann Hesse", 1995)

“Mathematics is not the study of an ideal, preexisting nontemporal reality. Neither is it a chess-like game with made-up symbols and formulas. Rather, it is the part of human studies which is capable of achieving a science-like consensus, capable of establishing reproducible results. The existence of the subject called mathematics is a fact, not a question. This fact means no more and no less than the existence of modes of reasoning and argument about ideas which are compelling an conclusive, ‘noncontroversial when once understood’." (Philip J Davis & Rueben Hersh, “The Mathematical Experience”, 1995)

"Schematic diagrams are more abstract than pictorial drawings, showing symbolic elements and their interconnection to make clear the configuration and/or operation of a system." (Ernest O Doebelin, "Engineering experimentation: planning, execution, reporting", 1995)

"The logic of the emotional mind is associative; it takes elements that symbolize a reality, or trigger a memory of it, to be the same as that reality. That is why similes, metaphors and images speak directly to the emotional mind." (Daniel Goleman, "Emotional Intelligence", 1996)

“In many ways, the mathematical quest to understand infinity parallels mystical attempts to understand God. Both religions and mathematics attempt to express the relationships between humans, the universe, and infinity. Both have arcane symbols and rituals, and impenetrable language. Both exercise the deep recesses of our mind and stimulate our imagination. Mathematicians, like priests, seek ‘ideal’, immutable, nonmaterial truths and then often try to apply theses truth in the real world.” (Clifford A Pickover, "The Loom of God: Mathematical Tapestries at the Edge of Time", 1997)

"Reality contains not only evidence, but also the means (such as our minds, and our artefacts) of understanding it. There are mathematical symbols in physical reality. The fact that it is we who put them there does not make them any less physical." (David Deutsch, "The Fabric of Reality", 1997)

"Meaning is conferred not by a one-to-one correspondence of a symbol with some external concept or object, but by the relationships between the structural components of the system itself." (Paul Cilliers, "Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems", 1998)

"A formal system consists of a number of tokens or symbols, like pieces in a game. These symbols can be combined into patterns by means of a set of rules which defines what is or is not permissible (e.g. the rules of chess). These rules are strictly formal, i.e. they conform to a precise logic. The configuration of the symbols at any specific moment constitutes a ‘state’ of the system. A specific state will activate the applicable rules which then transform the system from one state to another. If the set of rules governing the behaviour of the system are exact and complete, one could test whether various possible states of the system are or are not permissible." (Paul Cilliers, "Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems", 1998)

“Cultural archetypes are the unconscious models that help us make sense of the world: they are the myths, narratives, images, symbols, and files into which we organize the data of our life experience” (Clotaire Rapaille, “Cultural Imprints”, Executive Excellence Vol. 16 (10), 1999)

"In broad terms, a mental model is to be understood as a dynamic symbolic representation of external objects or events on the part of some natural or artificial cognitive system. Mental models are thought to have certain properties which make them stand out against other forms of symbolic representations." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

On Symbols (2000-2009)

"Precision is greatly enhanced by the human capacity to symbolize. Symbols can be devised to stand for mathematical ideas, entities, operations, and relations. Symbols also permit precise and repeatable calculation." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, 2000)

"The motion of the mind is conveyed along a cloud of meaning. There is this paradox that we get to meaning only when we strip the meaning from symbols." (David Berlinski, "The Advent of the Algorithm: The Idea that Rules the World", 2000)

"A symbol is a mental representation regarding the internal reality referring to its object by a convention and produced by the conscious interpretation of a sign. In contrast to signals, symbols may be used every time if the receiver has the corresponding representation. Symbols also relate to feelings and thus give access not only to information but also to the communicator’s motivational and emotional state. The use of symbols makes it possible for the organism using it to evoke in the receiver the same response it evokes in himself. To communicate with symbols is to use a language." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"In the definition of meaning, it is assumed that both the source and receiver have previously coded (and stored) signals of the same or similar referents, such that the messages may have meaning and relate to behaviour. That is, the used symbols must have the same signification for both sender and receiver. If not, the receiver will create a different mental picture than intended by the transmitter. Meaning is generated by individuals in a process of social interaction with a more or less common environment. It is a relation subsisting within a field of experience and appears as an emergent property of a symbolic representation when used in culturally accepted interaction. The relation between the symbolic representation and its meaning is random. Of this, however, the mathematical theory has nothing to say. If human links in the chain of communication are missing, of course no questions of meaning will arise." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"A person thinking in the nonverbal mode is actually thinking with the meaning of the language in the form of mental pictures of the concepts and ideas it contains. Nonverbal thought doesn't require literacy. An illiterate person can communicate without knowing what the symbols look like. [...] Literacy, then, is established as the person learns how the symbols look and becomes able to recognize them as representing certain things or concepts." (Ronald D Davis & Eldon M Braun, "The Gift of Learning", 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. […] [Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"I often told the fanatics of realism that there is no such thing as realism in art: it only exists in the mind of the observer. Art is a symbol, a thing conjuring up reality in our mental image. That is why I don't see any contradiction between abstract and figurative art either." (Antoni Tàpies, "Tàpies, Werke auf Papier 1943 – 2003", 2004)

"A symbol is an object, act, or event that conveys meaning to others. Symbols can be considered a rich, non-verbal language that vibrantly conveys the organization’s important values concerning how people relate to one another and interact with the environment" (Richard L Daft & Dorothy Marcic, "Understanding Management" 5th Ed., 2006)

"But because of the way in which depictions represent, there is a correspondence between parts and spatial relations of the representation and those of the object; this structural mapping, which confers a type of resemblance, underlies the way images convey specific content. In this respect images are like pictures. Unlike words and symbols, depictions are not arbitrarily paired with what they represent." (Stephen Kosslyn et al," The Case for Mental Imagery", 2006)

"Imagination has the creative task of making symbols, joining things together in such a way that they throw new light on each other and on everything around them. The imagination is a discovering faculty, a faculty for seeing relationships, for seeing meanings that are special and even quite new." (Thomas Merton, "Angelic Mistakes: The Art of Thomas Merton", 2006)

"[...] the scientific models of concrete things are symbolic rather than iconic: they are systems of propositions, not pictures. Besides, such models are seldom if ever completely accurate, if only because they involve more or less brutal simplifications, such as pretending that a metallic surface is smooth, a crystal has no impurities, a biopopulation has a single predator, or a market is in equilibrium.  These are all fictions. However, they are stylizations rather than wild fantasies. Hence, introducing and using them to account for real existents does not commit us to fictionism, just as defending the role of experience need not make us empiricists, nor is admitting the role of intuition enough to qualify as intuitionist." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"But notice, a subatomic particle is itself a holon [hole/parts]. And so is a cell. And so is a symbol, and an image, and a concept. What all of those entities are, before they are anything else, is a holon. So the world is not composed of atoms or symbols or cells or concepts. It is composed of holons." (Ken Wilber, "A Brief History of Everything", 2007)

"Language use is a curious behavior, but once the transition to language is made, literature is a likely consequence, since it is linked to the dynamic of the linguistic symbol through the functioning of the imagination." (Russell Berman, "Fiction Sets You Free: Literature, Liberty and Western Culture", 2007)

"Images and pictures […] have played a key role in shaping our scientific picture of the world. […] Carefully constructed families of pictures can act as a calculus all their own. Like any successful systems of symbols, with an appropriate grammar they enlarge the number of things that we can do without consciously thinking." (John D Barrow, "Cosmic Imagery: Key Images in the History of Science", 2008)

"How are we to explain the contrast between the matter-of-fact way in which √-1 and other imaginary numbers are accepted today and the great difficulty they posed for learned mathematicians when they first appeared on the scene? One possibility is that mathematical intuitions have evolved over the centuries and people are generally more willing to see mathematics as a matter of manipulating symbols according to rules and are less insistent on interpreting all symbols as representative of one or another aspect of physical reality. Another, less self-congratulatory possibility is that most of us are content to follow the computational rules we are taught and do not give a lot of thought to rationales." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning: Patterns, Problems, Conjectures, and Proofs", 2009)

"Mathematicians are sometimes described as living in an ideal world of beauty and harmony. Instead, our world is torn apart by inconsistencies, plagued by non sequiturs and, worst of all, made desolate and empty by missing links between words, and between symbols and their referents; we spend our lives patching and repairing it. Only when the last crack disappears are we rewarded by brief moments of harmony and joy." (Alexandre V Borovik, "Mathematics under the Microscope: Notes on Cognitive Aspects of Mathematical Practice", 2009)

"Mathematical ideas like number can only be really 'seen' with the 'eyes of the mind' because that is how one 'sees' ideas. Think of a sheet of music which is important and useful but it is nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the music it represents. One can appreciate music without reading the sheet of music. Similarly, mathematical notation and symbols on a blackboard are just like the sheet of music; they are important and useful but they are nowhere near as interesting, beautiful or powerful as the actual mathematics (ideas) they represent." (Fiacre O Cairbre, "The Importance of Being Beautiful in Mathematics", IMTA Newsletter 109, 2009)

On Diagrams (1925-1949)

"The preliminary examination of most data is facilitated by the use of diagrams. Diagrams prove nothing, but bring outstanding features readily to the eye; they are therefore no substitutes for such critical tests as may be applied to the data, but are valuable in suggesting such tests, and in explaining the conclusions founded upon them." (Sir Ronald A Fisher, "Statistical Methods for Research Workers", 1925)

"What the diagram has in common with the symbolic schema is the fact that the diagram spatially represents an abstract and unextended object. But there is here nothing other than a determinate location in space. This location serves as a mooring, an attachment, an orientation for our memory, but does not play any role in our thought." (Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination", 1940)

"[…] statistical literacy. That is, the ability to read diagrams and maps; a 'consumer' understanding of common statistical terms, as average, per cent, dispersion, correlation, and index number." (Douglas Scates, “Statistics: The Mathematics for Social Problems”, 1943)

"When I undertake some geometrical research, I have generally a mental view of the diagram itself, though generally an inadequate or incomplete one, in spite of which it affords the necessary synthesis - a tendency which, it would appear, results from a training which goes back to my very earliest childhood." (Jacques Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field”, 1949)

"I believe, that the decisive idea which brings the solution of a problem is rather often connected with a well-turned word or sentence. The word or the sentence enlightens the situation, gives things, as you say, a physiognomy. It can precede by little the decisive idea or follow on it immediately; perhaps, it arises at the same time as the decisive idea. […] The right word, the subtly appropriate word, helps us to recall the mathematical idea, perhaps less completely and less objectively than a diagram or a mathematical notation, but in an analogous way. […] It may contribute to fix it in the mind." (George Polya [in a letter to Jaque Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field", 1949])

Mental Models LIV (Limitations VII)

"In specific cases, we think by applying mental rules, which are similar to rules in computer programs. In most of the cases, however, we reason by constructing, inspecting, and manipulating mental models. These models and the processes that manipulate them are the basis of our competence to reason. In general, it is believed that humans have the competence to perform such inferences error-free. Errors do occur, however, because reasoning performance is limited by capacities of the cognitive system, misunderstanding of the premises, ambiguity of problems, and motivational factors. Moreover, background knowledge can significantly influence our reasoning performance. This influence can either be facilitation or an impedance of the reasoning process." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Mental models abide by the principle of parsimony: They represent only possibilities compatible with the premises, and they represent clauses in the premises only when they hold in a possibility. Fully explicit models represent clauses when they do not hold too. The advantage of mental models over fully explicit models is that they contain less information, and so they are easier to work with. But they can lead reasoners astray. The occurrence of these systematic and compelling fallacies is shocking. The model theory predicts them, and they are a 'litmus' test for mental models, because no other current theory predicts them. They have so far resisted explanation by theories of reasoning based on formal rules of inference, because these theories rely on valid rules." (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"People don’t need to know all the details of how a complex mechanism actually works in order to use it, so they create a cognitive shorthand for explaining it, one that is powerful enough to cover their interactions with it, but that doesn’t necessarily reflect its actual inner mechanics. […] In the digital world, however, the differences between a user’s mental model and the implementation model are often quite distinct. The discrepancy between implementation and mental models is particularly stark in the case of software applications, where the complexity of implementation can make it nearly impossible for the user to see the mechanistic connections between his actions and the program’s reactions." (Alan Cooper et al,  "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

"The closer the represented model comes to the user’s mental model, the easier he will find the program to use and to understand. Generally, offering a represented model that follows the implementation model too closely significantly reduces the user’s ability to learn and use the program, assuming (as is almost always the case) that the user’s mental model of his tasks differs from the implementation model of the software." (Alan Cooper et al,  "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

"Gaining awareness about how the system is built up and how it works can also help us to avoid solutions that only treat the symptoms of an underlying problem without curing the problem itself. System thinking is powerful because it helps us to see our own mental models and how these models color our perception of the world. In many cases, it is difficult for us to alter our mental models. There are always some beliefs or viewpoints that we are not willing to change, no matter what evidence is presented against it. This causes a certain resistance to new concepts. Problems can occur, however, when a rigid mental model stands in the way of a solution that might solve a problem. In such situations, adherence to mental models can be dangerous to the health of the organization." (Akhilesh Bajaj & Stanisław Wrycza, "Systems Analysis and Design for Advanced Modeling Methods: Best Practices", 2009)

"We all use mental models every day. Our minds do not contain real economic or social systems. Instead, they contain representations - models - of reality. We use these models in all aspects of decision-making. Being explicitly aware of our mental models can help us in understanding why we make the decisions we do and how we can improve our decision-making processes. If everyone’s mental models are brought to light in the context of an organization, we can begin to see where, how, and why the models diverge. This is the first step in building a shared understanding within an organization. As long as mental models remain hidden, they constitute an obstacle to building shared understanding." (Akhilesh Bajaj & Stanisław Wrycza, "Systems Analysis and Design for Advanced Modeling Methods: Best Practices", 2009)

"Each person has a different mental model and, therefore, potentially a different interpretation of the Facts. The danger comes when we start to assume that our interpretation of the Facts is the only interpretation and we believe that what we see and think is the Truth, and that there is only one Truth." (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)

Our mental model governs what we see, how we think about things and how we act, but is this just an individual phenomenon, or can whole communities and professions share a common mental model, a shared view of reality? […] What is beyond doubt is that all professions have their own vocabularies, lexicons, tools and techniques. These models, techniques and ways of analysing things are not value-free; they represent a way of seeing the world. When we select and use them we are subconsciously buying into that way of thinking and, inevitably, we are also reinforcing our own mental model of cause and effect. We tend to expend significant effort in understanding the inner workings of a new tool or practice, but we give scant attention to the thought paradigm that underpins it. (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)

"Our past (mental model) governs what we perceive (See) and how we make sense of it (Assess). This, in turn, prescribes our range of possible actions (Do), which leads to results (Get). We are therefore trapped into repeating well-understood, but possibly ineffective, patterns of behaviour and can Get sub-optimal results. The cycle is both self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing – we tend to apply the same assessment techniques to review what we get, thus further reinforcing our mental model and further limiting our ability to perceive the unusual or the remarkable." (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)

"[…] our strong mental models tend to make us blind to certain possibilities, and therefore we unknowingly engage in biased listening. Whenever we interpret information, we subconsciously access three filters based upon how we feel about the content, the information source and situation (or context) in which we receive the information." (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)

Mental Models LVII

"Thoughts are the images of things, words are of thoughts; and we all know that images and pictures are only so true as they are true representations men and things. […] For poets as well painters think it their business to take likeness of things from their appearance."(Joseph Trapp, "Lectures on Poetry", 1711)

"By reducing imagination to the power of forming images, and by  insisting that no image can be formed except out of the elements furnished by experience, I do not mean to confound imagination with memory; indeed, the frequent occurrence of great strength of memory with comparative feebleness of imagination, would suffice to warn us against such a conclusion." (George H Lewes, "The Principles of Success in Literature", 1865)

"However rapid and remote their flight of thought, it is a succession of images, not of abstractions. The details which give significance, and which by us are seen vaguely as through a vanishing mist, are by them seen in sharp outlines. The image which to us is a mere suggestion, is to them almost as vivid as the object. And it is because they see vividly that they can paint effectively." (George H Lewes, "The Principles of Success in Literature", 1865)

"The strangest and most wonderful constructions in the whole animal world are the amazing, intricate constructions made by the primate Homo sapiens. Each normal individual of this species makes a self. Out of its brain it spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the other creatures, it doesn't have to know what it's doing; it just does it. This web protects it, just like the snail's shell. […] As such, it plays a singularly important role in the ongoing cognitive economy of that living body, because, of all the things in the environment an active body must make mental models of, none is more crucial than the model the agent has of itself." (Daniel Dennett, "Consciousness Explained", 1991)

"[Language comprehension] involves many components of intelligence: recognition of words, decoding them into meanings, segmenting word sequences into grammatical constituents, combining meanings into statements, inferring connections among statements, holding in short-term memory earlier concepts while processing later discourse, inferring the writer’s or speaker’s intentions, schematization of the gist of a passage, and memory retrieval in answering questions about the passage. [… The reader] constructs a mental representation of the situation and actions being described. […] Readers tend to remember the mental model they constructed from a text, rather than the text itself." (Gordon H Bower & Daniel G Morrow, 1990)

"We build mental models that represent significant aspects of our physical and social world, and we manipulate elements of those models when we think, plan, and try to explain events of that world. The ability to construct and manipulate valid models of reality provides humans with our distinctive adaptive advantage; it must be considered one of the crowning achievements of the human intellect." (Gordon H Bower & Daniel G Morrow, 1990)

"[For] us to be able to speak and understand novel sentences, we have to store in our heads not just the words of our language but also the patterns of sentences possible in our language. These patterns, in turn, describe not just patterns of words but also patterns of patterns. Linguists refer to these patterns as the rules of language stored in memory; they refer to the complete collection of rules as the mental grammar of the language, or grammar for short." (Ray Jackendoff, "Patterns in the Mind", 1994)

"When we visually perceive the world, we do not just process information; we have a subjective experience of color, shape, and depth. We have experiences associated with other senses (think of auditory experiences of music, or the ineffable nature of smell experiences), with bodily sensations (e.g., pains, tickles, and orgasms), with mental imagery (e.g., the colored shapes that appear when one tubs one's eyes), with emotion (the sparkle of happiness, the intensity of anger, the weight of despair), and with the stream of conscious thought." (David Chalmers, "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience", Scientific American, 1995)

"Actually, around 80% of the data we use to make decisions is already in our heads before we engage with a situation. Our power to perceive is governed and limited by cognitive filters, sometimes termed our ‘mental model’. Mental models are formed as a result of past experience, knowledge and attitudes. They are deeply ingrained, often subconscious, structures that limit what we perceive and also colour our interpretation of supposed facts." (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)

"Mental models are formed over time through a deep enculturation process, so it follows that any attempt to align mental models must focus heavily on collective sense making. Alignment only happens through a process of socialisation; people working together, solving problems together, making sense of the world together." (Robina Chatham & Brian Sutton, "Changing the IT Leader’s Mindset", 2010)