On Construction II: Theorems

"I am not content with algebra, in that it yields neither the shortest proofs nor the most beautiful constructions of geometry. Consequently, in view of this, I consider that we need yet another kind of analysis, geometric or linear, which deals directly with position, as algebra deals with magnitude." (Gottfried Leibniz, [letter to Christiaan Huygens] 1670)

"A theorem […] is an inference obtained by constructing a diagram according to a general precept, and after modifying it as ingenuity may dictate, observing in it certain relations, and showing that they must subsist in every case, retranslating the proposition into general terms." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"The question of the origin of the hypothesis belongs to a domain in which no very general rules can be given; experiment, analogy and constructive intuition play their part here. But once the correct hypothesis is formulated, the principle of mathematical induction is often sufficient to provide the proof." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?: An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods", 1941)

"The diagrams incorporate a large amount of information. Their use provides extensive savings in space and in mental effort. In the case of many theorems, the setting up of the correct diagram is the major part of the proof. We therefore urge that the reader stop at the end of each theorem and attempt to construct for himself the relevant diagram before examining the one which is given in the text. Once this is done, the subsequent demonstration can be followed more readily; in fact, the reader can usually supply it himself." (Samuel Eilenberg & Norman E. Steenrod, "Foundations of Algebraic Topology", 1952)

"The construction of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intuition, invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar material. The process must be discussed in psychological, not logical, categories; studied in autobiographies and biographies, not treatises on scientific method; and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or theorem." (Milton Friedman, "Essays in Positive Economics", 1953)

"For the great majority of mathematicians, mathematics is […] a whole world of invention and discovery - an art. The construction of a new theorem, the intuition of some new principle, or the creation of a new branch of mathematics is the triumph of the creative imagination of the mathematician, which can be compared to that of a poet, the painter and the sculptor." (George F J Temple, "100 Years of Mathematics: a Personal Viewpoint", 1981)

"Virtually all mathematical theorems are assertions about the existence or nonexistence of certain entities. For example, theorems assert the existence of a solution to a differential equation, a root of a polynomial, or the nonexistence of an algorithm for the Halting Problem. A platonist is one who believes that these objects enjoy a real existence in some mystical realm beyond space and time. To such a person, a mathematician is like an explorer who discovers already existing things. On the other hand, a formalist is one who feels we construct these objects by our rules of logical inference, and that until we actually produce a chain of reasoning leading to one of these objects they have no meaningful existence, at all." (John L Casti, "Reality Rules: Picturing the world in mathematics" Vol. II, 1992)

"A world view is a system of co-ordinates or a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about the world and ourselves into a global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a certain culture. […] A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible." (Diederick Aerts et al, "World views: From Fragmentation to Integration", 1994)

"What brings us mathematical knowledge? The carriers of mathematical knowledge are proofs, more generally arguments and constructions, as embedded in larger contexts. Mathematicians and teachers of higher mathematics know this, but it should be said. Issues about competence and intuition can be raised as well as factors of knowledge involving the general dissemination of analogical or inductive reasoning or the specific conveyance of methods, approaches or ways of thinking. But in the end, what can be directly conveyed as knowledge are proofs." (Akihiro Kanamori, "Mathematical Knowledge: Motley and Complexity of Proof", Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science Vol. 21, 2013)

Central Limit Theorem

"I know of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of cosmic order expressed by the ‘Law of Frequency of Error’. The law would have been personified by the Greeks and deified, if they had known of it. It reigns with serenity and in complete self-effacement, amidst the wildest confusion. The huger the mob, and the greater the apparent anarchy, the more perfect is its sway. It is the supreme law of Unreason. Whenever a large sample of chaotic elements are taken in hand and marshalled in the order of their magnitude, an unsuspected and most beautiful form of regularity proves to have been latent all along." (Sir Francis Galton, "Natural Inheritance", 1889)

"The central limit theorem […] states that regardless of the shape of the curve of the original population, if you repeatedly randomly sample a large segment of your group of interest and take the average result, the set of averages will follow a normal curve." (Charles Livingston & Paul Voakes, "Working with Numbers and Statistics: A handbook for journalists", 2005)

"The central limit theorem says that, under conditions almost always satisfied in the real world of experimentation, the distribution of such a linear function of errors will tend to normality as the number of its components becomes large. The tendency to normality occurs almost regardless of the individual distributions of the component errors. An important proviso is that several sources of error must make important contributions to the overall error and that no particular source of error dominate the rest." (George E P Box et al, "Statistics for Experimenters: Design, discovery, and innovation" 2nd Ed., 2005)

"Two things explain the importance of the normal distribution: (1) The central limit effect that produces a tendency for real error distributions to be 'normal like'. (2) The robustness to nonnormality of some common statistical procedures, where 'robustness' means insensitivity to deviations from theoretical normality." (George E P Box et al, "Statistics for Experimenters: Design, discovery, and innovation" 2nd Ed., 2005)

"The central limit theorem differs from laws of large numbers because random variables vary and so they differ from constants such as population means. The central limit theorem says that certain independent random effects converge not to a constant population value such as the mean rate of unemployment but rather they converge to a random variable that has its own Gaussian bell-curve description." (Bart Kosko, "Noise", 2006)

"Normally distributed variables are everywhere, and most classical statistical methods use this distribution. The explanation for the normal distribution’s ubiquity is the Central Limit Theorem, which says that if you add a large number of independent samples from the same distribution the distribution of the sum will be approximately normal." (Ben Bolker, "Ecological Models and Data in R", 2007)

"[…] the Central Limit Theorem says that if we take any sequence of small independent random quantities, then in the limit their sum (or average) will be distributed according to the normal distribution. In other words, any quantity that can be viewed as the sum of many small independent random effects. will be well approximated by the normal distribution. Thus, for example, if one performs repeated measurements of a fixed physical quantity, and if the variations in the measurements across trials are the cumulative result of many independent sources of error in each trial, then the distribution of measured values should be approximately normal." (David Easley & Jon Kleinberg, "Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World", 2010)

"These days the term 'central limit theorem' is associated with a multitude of statements having to do with the convergence of probability distributions of functions of an increasing number of one- or multi-dimensional random variables or even more general random elements (with values in Banach spaces or more general spaces) to a normal distribution3 (or related distributions). In an effort to reduce ambiguity - and in view of historic developments - the denotation “central limit theorem” in the present examination will usually refer only to the 'classical' case, which deals with the asymptotic equality of distributions of sums of independent or weakly dependent random variables and of a normal distribution." (Hans Fischer, "A History of the Central Limit Theorem: From Classical to Modern Probability Theory", 2011)

"Statistical inference is really just the marriage of two concepts that we’ve already discussed: data and probability (with a little help from the central limit theorem)." (Charles Wheelan, "Naked Statistics: Stripping the Dread from the Data", 2012)

"The central limit theorem tells us that in repeated samples, the difference between the two means will be distributed roughly as a normal distribution." (Charles Wheelan, "Naked Statistics: Stripping the Dread from the Data", 2012)

"According to the central limit theorem, it doesn’t matter what the raw data look like, the sample variance should be proportional to the number of observations and if I have enough of them, the sample mean should be normal." (Kristin H Jarman, "The Art of Data Analysis: How to answer almost any question using basic statistics", 2013)

"At very small time scales, the motion of a particle is more like a random walk, as it gets jostled about by discrete collisions with water molecules. But virtually any random movement on small time scales will give rise to Brownian motion on large time scales, just so long as the motion is unbiased. This is because of the Central Limit Theorem, which tells us that the aggregate of many small, independent motions will be normally distributed." (Field Cady, "The Data Science Handbook", 2017)

"The central limit conjecture states that most errors are the result of many small errors and, as such, have a normal distribution. The assumption of a normal distribution for error has many advantages and has often been made in applications of statistical models." (David S Salsburg, "Errors, Blunders, and Lies: How to Tell the Difference", 2017)

"Theoretically, the normal distribution is most famous because many distributions converge to it, if you sample from them enough times and average the results. This applies to the binomial distribution, Poisson distribution and pretty much any other distribution you’re likely to encounter (technically, any one for which the mean and standard deviation are finite)." (Field Cady, "The Data Science Handbook", 2017)

"The central limit theorem in statistics states that, given a sufficiently large sample size, the sampling distribution of the mean for a variable will approximate a normal distribution regardless of that variable’s distribution in the population." (Jim Frost)

On Structure: Structure in Mathematics II

"[…] the major mathematical research acquires an organization and orientation similar to the poetical function which, adjusting by means of metaphor disjunctive elements, displays a structure identical to the sensitive universe. Similarly, by means of its axiomatic or theoretical foundation, mathematics assimilates various doctrines and serves the instructive purpose, the one set up by the unifying moral universe of concepts." (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

"Mathematicians deal with possible worlds, with an infinite number of logically consistent systems. Observers explore the one particular world we inhabit. Between the two stands the theorist. He studies possible worlds but only those which are compatible with the information furnished by observers. In other words, theory attempts to segregate the minimum number of possible worlds which must include the actual world we inhabit. Then the observer, with new factual information, attempts to reduce the list further. And so it goes, observation and theory advancing together toward the common goal of science, knowledge of the structure and observation of the universe." (Edwin P Hubble, "The Problem of the Expanding Universe", 1941)

"To say that mathematics in general has been reduced to logic hints at some new firming up of mathematics at its foundations. This is misleading. Set theory is less settled and more conjectural than the classical mathematical superstructure than can be founded upon it." (Willard van Orman Quine, "Elementary Logic", 1941)

"One expects a mathematical theorem or a mathematical theory not only to describe and to classify in a simple and elegant way numerous and a priori disparate special cases. One also expects ‘elegance’ in its ‘architectural’ structural makeup." (John von Neumann, "The Mathematician" [in "Works of the Mind" Vol. I (1), 1947])

"The constructions of the mathematical mind are at the same time free and necessary. The individual mathematician feels free to define his notions and set up his axioms as he pleases. But the question is will he get his fellow-mathematician interested in the constructs of his imagination. We cannot help the feeling that certain mathematical structures which have evolved through the combined efforts of the mathematical community bear the stamp of a necessity not affected by the accidents of their historical birth. Everybody who looks at the spectacle of modern algebra will be struck by this complementarity of freedom and necessity." (Hermann Weyl, "A Half-Century of Mathematics", The American Mathematical Monthly, 1951)

"Mathematicians create by acts of insight and intuition. Logic then sanctions the conquests of intuition. It is the hygiene that mathematics practice to keep its ideas healthy and strong. Moreover, the whole structure rests fundamentally on uncertain ground, the intuitions of man." (Morris Kline, "Mathematics in Western Culture", 1953)

"Mathematics is not only the model along the lines of which the exact sciences are striving to design their structure; mathematics is the cement which holds the structure together." (Tobias Dantzig, "Number: The Language of Science" 4th Ed, 1954)

"Mathematics, springing from the soil of basic human experience with numbers and data and space and motion, builds up a far-flung architectural structure composed of theorems which reveal insights into the reasons behind appearances and of concepts which relate totally disparate concrete ideas." (Saunders MacLane, "Of Course and Courses"The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol 61, No 3, 1954)

"Chess combines the beauty of mathematical structure with the recreational delights of a competitive game." (Martin Gardner, "Mathematics, Magic, and Mystery", 1956)

"Probability is a mathematical discipline with aims akin to those, for example, of geometry or analytical mechanics. In each field we must carefully distinguish three aspects of the theory: (a) the formal logical content, (b) the intuitive background, (c) the applications. The character, and the charm, of the whole structure cannot be appreciated without considering all three aspects in their proper relation." (William Feller, "An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications", 1957)

"If the system exhibits a structure which can be represented by a mathematical equivalent, called a mathematical model, and if the objective can be also so quantified, then some computational method may be evolved for choosing the best schedule of actions among alternatives. Such use of mathematical models is termed mathematical programming."  (George Dantzig, "Linear Programming and Extensions", 1959)

On Conjecture (1975-1999)

"All knowledge, the sociologist could say, is conjectural and theoretical. Nothing is absolute and final. Therefore all knowledge is relative to the local situation of the thinkers who produce it: the ideas and conjectures that they are capable of producing: the problems that bother them; the interplay of assumptions and criticism in their milieu; their purposes and aims; the experiences they have and the standards and meanings they apply." (David Bloor, "Knowledge and Social Imagery", 1976)

"The essential function of a hypothesis consists in the guidance it affords to new observations and experiments, by which our conjecture is either confirmed or refuted." (Ernst Mach, "Knowledge and Error: Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry", 1976)

"The verb 'to theorize' is now conjugated as follows: 'I built a model; you formulated a hypothesis; he made a conjecture.'" (John M Ziman, "Reliable Knowledge", 1978)

"All advances of scientific understanding, at every level, begin with a speculative adventure, an imaginative preconception of what might be true - a preconception that always, and necessarily, goes a little way (sometimes a long way) beyond anything which we have logical or factual authority to believe in. It is the invention of a possible world, or of a tiny fraction of that world. The conjecture is then exposed to criticism to find out whether or not that imagined world is anything like the real one. Scientific reasoning is therefore at all levels an interaction between two episodes of thought - a dialogue between two voices, the one imaginative and the other critical; a dialogue, as I have put it, between the possible and the actual, between proposal and disposal, conjecture and criticism, between what might be true and what is in fact the case." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"So-called scientific knowledge is not knowledge, for it consists only of conjectures or hypotheses - even if some have gone through the crossfire of ingenious tests." (Karl R Popper, "Epistemology and the Problem of Peace", [lecture in "All Life is Problem Solving", 1999] 1985)

"Three shifts can be detected over time in the understanding of mathematics itself. One is a shift from completeness to incompleteness, another from certainty to conjecture, and a third from absolutism to relativity." (Leone Burton, "Femmes et Mathematiques: Y a–t–il une?",  Association for Women in Mathematics Newsletter, Intersection 18, 1988)

"A mathematical proof is a chain of logical deductions, all stemming from a small number of initial assumptions ('axioms') and subject to the strict rules of mathematical logic. Only such a chain of deductions can establish the validity of a mathematical law, a theorem. And unless this process has been satisfactorily carried out, no relation - regardless of how often it may have been confirmed by observation - is allowed to become a law. It may be given the status of a hypothesis or a conjecture, and all kinds of tentative results may be drawn from it, but no mathematician would ever base definitive conclusions on it. (Eli Maor, "e: The Story of a Number", 1994)

"The sequence for the understanding of mathematics may be: intuition, trial, error, speculation, conjecture, proof. The mixture and the sequence of these events differ widely in different domains, but there is general agreement that the end product is rigorous proof - which we know and can recognize, without the formal advice of the logicians. […] Intuition is glorious, but the heaven of mathematics requires much more. Physics has provided mathematics with many fine suggestions and new initiatives, but mathematics does not need to copy the style of experimental physics. Mathematics rests on proof - and proof is eternal." (Saunders Mac Lan, "Reponses to …", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 30 (2), 1994)

"The methods of science include controlled experiments, classification, pattern recognition, analysis, and deduction. In the humanities we apply analogy, metaphor, criticism, and (e)valuation. In design we devise alternatives, form patterns, synthesize, use conjecture, and model solutions." (Béla H Bánáthy, "Designing Social Systems in a Changing World", 1996)

"A proof of a mathematical theorem is a sequence of steps which leads to the desired conclusion. The rules to be followed [...] were made explicit when logic was formalized early in the this century [...] These rules can be used to disprove a putative proof by spotting logical errors; they cannot, however, be used to find the missing proof of a [...] conjecture. [...] Heuristic arguments are a common occurrence in the practice of mathematics. However... The role of heuristic arguments has not been acknowledged in the philosophy of mathematics despite the crucial role they play in mathematical discovery. [...] Our purpose is to bring out some of the features of mathematical thinking which are concealed beneath the apparent mechanics of proof." (Gian-Carlo Rota, "Indiscrete Thoughts", 1997)

"Architectural conjectures are mathematically precise assertions, as well milled as minted coins, provisionally usable in the commerce of logical arguments; less than ‘coins’ and more aptly, promissory notes to be paid in full by some future demonstration, or to be contradicted. These conjectures are expected to turn out to be true, as, of course, are all conjectures; their formulation is often away of "formally" packaging, or at least acknowledging, an otherwise shapeless body of mathematical experience that points to their truth." (Barry Mazur, "Conjecture", Synthese 111, 1997)

"The everyday usage of 'theory' is for an idea whose outcome is as yet undetermined, a conjecture, or for an idea contrary to evidence. But scientists use the word in exactly the opposite sense. [In science] 'theory' [...] refers only to a collection of hypotheses and predictions that is amenable to experimental test, preferably one that has been successfully tested. It has everything to do with the facts." (Tony Rothman & George Sudarshan, "Doubt and Certainty: The Celebrated Academy: Debates on Science, Mysticism, Reality, in General on the Knowable and Unknowable", 1998)

"A mathematician experiments, amasses information, makes a conjecture, finds out that it does not work, gets confused and then tries to recover. A good mathematician eventually does so - and proves a theorem." (Steven Krantz, "Conformal Mappings", American Scientist, 1999)

Mathematics through Students' Eyes I

"Often I have considered the fact that most of the difficulties which block the progress of students trying to learn analysis stem from this: that although they understand little of ordinary algebra, still they attempt this more subtle art. From this it follows not only that they remain on the fringes, but in addition they entertain strange ideas about the concept of the infinite, which they must try to use." (Leonhard Euler, "Introduction to Analysis of the Infinite", 1748)

"The first thing to be attended to in reading any algebraical treatise, is the gaining a perfect understanding of the different processes there exhibited, and of their connection with one another. This cannot be attained by a mere reading of the book, however great the attention which may be given. It is impossible, in a mathematical work, to fill up every process in the manner in which it must be filled up in the mind of the student before he can be said to have completely mastered it. Many results must be given of which the details are suppressed, such are the additions, multiplications, extractions of the square root, etc., with which the investigations abound. These must not be taken on trust by the student, but must be worked by his own pen, which must never be out of his hand, while engaged in any algebraical process." (Augustus de Morgan, "On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics", 1830)

"This science, Geometry, is one of indispensable use and constant reference, for every student of the laws of nature; for the relations of space and number are the alphabet in which those laws are written. But besides the interest and importance of this kind which geometry possesses, it has a great and peculiar value for all who wish to understand the foundations of human knowledge, and the methods by which it is acquired. For the student of geometry acquires, with a degree of insight and clearness which the unmathematical reader can but feebly imagine, a conviction that there are necessary truths, many of them of a very complex and striking character; and that a few of the most simple and self-evident truths which it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend, may, by systematic deduction, lead to the most remote and unexpected results." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1858)

"Besides accustoming the student to demand complete proof, and to know when he has not obtained it, mathematical studies are of immense benefit to his education by habituating him to precision. It is one of the peculiar excellencies of mathematical discipline, that the mathematician is never satisfied with à peu près. He requires the exact truth." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"Therefore, the great business of the scientific teacher is, to imprint the fundamental, irrefragable facts of his science, not only by words upon the mind, but by sensible impressions upon the eye, and ear, and touch of the student, in so complete a manner, that every term used, or law enunciated, should afterwards call up vivid images of the particular structural, or other, facts which furnished the demonstration of the law, or the illustration of the term." (Thomas H Huxley, "Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews", 1870)

"Thought is symbolical of Sensation as Algebra is of Arithmetic, and because it is symbolical, is very unlike what it symbolises. For one thing, sensations are always positive; in this resembling arithmetical quantities. A negative sensation is no more possible than a negative number. But ideas, like algebraic quantities, may be either positive or negative. However paradoxical the square of a negative quantity, the square root of an unknown quantity, nay, even in imaginary quantity, the student of Algebra finds these paradoxes to be valid operations. And the student of Philosophy finds analogous paradoxes in operations impossible in the sphere of Sense. Thus although it is impossible to feel non-existence, it is possible to think it; although it is impossible to frame an image of Infinity, we can, and do, form the idea, and reason on it with precision." (George H Lewes "Problems of Life and Mind", 1873)

"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32 (127), 1875)

On Heuristics I

"The materialistic point of view in psychology can claim, at best, only the value of an heuristic hypothesis." (Wilhelm Wundt, "Principles of Physiological Psychology", 1874)

"Heuristic reasoning is good in itself. What is bad is to mix up heuristic reasoning with rigorous proof. What is worse is to sell heuristic reasoning for rigorous proof." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic, or heuretic, or 'ars inveniendi' was the name of a certain branch of study, not very clearly circumscribed, belonging to logic, or to philosophy, or to psychology, often outlined, seldom presented in detail, and as good as forgotten today. The aim of heuristic is to study the methods and rules of discovery and invention. [...] Heuristic, as an adjective, means 'serving to discover'." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We are often obliged to use heuristic reasoning. We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"The attempt to characterize exactly models of an empirical theory almost inevitably yields a more precise and clearer understanding of the exact character of a theory. The emptiness and shallowness of many classical theories in the social sciences is well brought out by the attempt to formulate in any exact fashion what constitutes a model of the theory. The kind of theory which mainly consists of insightful remarks and heuristic slogans will not be amenable to this treatment. The effort to make it exact will at the same time reveal the weakness of the theory." (Patrick Suppes," A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences", Synthese  Vol. 12 (2/3), 1960)

"Factoring big numbers is a strange kind of mathematics that closely resembles the experimental sciences, where nature has the last and definitive word. […] as with the experimental sciences, both rigorous and heuristic analyses can be valuable in understanding the subject and moving it forward. And, as with the experimental sciences, there is sometimes a tension between pure and applied practitioners." (Carl B Pomerance, "A Tale of Two Sieves", The Notices of the American Mathematical Society 43, 1996)

"[…] mathematics does not come to us written indelibly on Nature’s Tablets, but rather is the product of a controlled search governed by metaphorical considerations, the premier instance being the heuristics of the conservation principles." (Philip Mirowski, "More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature’s Economics", 1989)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"You can often hear from non-mathematicians, especially from philosophers, that mathematics consists exclusively in drawing conclusions from clearly stated premises; and that in this process, it makes no difference what these premises signify, whether they are true or fa1se, provided only that they do not contradict one another. But a per. son who has done productive mathematical work will talk quite differently. In fact these people [the non-mathematicians] are thinking only of the crystallized form into which finished mathematica1 theories are finally cast. However, the investigator himself, in mathematics as in every other science, does not work in this rigorous deductive fashion. On the contrary, he makes essential use of his imagination and proceeds inductively aided by heuristic expedients. One can give numerous examples of mathematicians who have discovered theorems of the greatest importance which they were unable to prove. Should one then refuse to recognize this as a great accomplishment and in deference to the above definition insist that this is not mathematics? After all it is an arbitrary thing how the word is to be used, but no judgment of value can deny that the inductive work of the person who first announces the theorem is at least as valuable as the deductive work. of the one who proves it. For both are equally necessary and the discovery is the presupposition of the later conclusion." (Felix Klein)

On Facts (-1799)

"While those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations." (Aristotle, "De Caelo" ["On the Heavens"], cca. 350 BC)

"Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth." (Marcus Aurelius, "Meditations", cca. 2nd century)

"The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction." (Francis Bacon, "The New Organon", 1620)

"There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are possible." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "Monadology", 1714)

"We have three principal means: observation of nature, reflection, and experiment. Observation gathers the facts reflection combines them, experiment verifies the result of the combination. It is essential that the observation of nature be assiduous, that reflection be profound, and that experimentation be exact. Rarely does one see these abilities in combination. And so, creative geniuses are not common." (Denis Diderot, "On the Interpretation of Nature", 1753)

"Facts, observations, experiments - these are the materials of a great edifice, but in assembling them we must combine them into classes, distinguish which belongs to which order and to which part of the whole each pertains." (Antoine L Lavoisier, "Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences", 1777)

"The impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a science from the science itself is owing to this, that every branch of physical science must consist of three things: the series of facts which are the objects of the science, the ideas which represent these facts, and the words by which these ideas are expressed. Like three impressions of the same seal, the word ought to produce the idea, and the idea to be a picture of the fact." (Antoine L Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)

"We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoin-Laurent de Lavoisiere, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)

"[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"It has never yet been supposed, that all the facts of nature, and all the means of acquiring precision in the computation and analysis of those facts, and all the connections of objects with each other, and all the possible combinations of ideas, can be exhausted by the human mind." (Nicolas de Condorcet, "Outlines Of An Historical View Of The Progress Of The Human Mind", 1795)

On Axioms (2000-2009)

"Mathematics is not placid, static and eternal. […] Most mathematicians are happy to make use of those axioms in their proofs, although others do not, exploring instead so-called intuitionist logic or constructivist mathematics. Mathematics is not a single monolithic structure of absolute truth!" (Gregory J Chaitin, "A century of controversy over the foundations of mathematics", 2000)

"We start from vague pictures or ideas […] which we encapsulate by rules, and then we discover that those rules persuade us to modify our mental images. We engage in a dialog between our mental images and our ability to justify them via equations. As we understand what we are investigating more clearly, the pictures become sharper and the equations more elaborate. Only at the end of the process does anything like a formal set of axioms followed by logical proofs" (E Brian Davies, "Science in the Looking Glass", 2003)

"A recurring concern has been whether set theory, which speaks of infinite sets, refers to an existing reality, and if so how does one ‘know’ which axioms to accept. It is here that the greatest disparity of opinion exists (and the greatest possibility of using different consistent axiom systems)." (Paul Cohen, "Skolem and pessimism about proof in mathematics". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 363 (1835), 2005)

"An axiomatic theory starts out of some primitive (undefined) concepts and out of a set of primitive propositions, the theory’s axioms or postulates. Other concepts are obtained by definition from the primitive concepts and from defined concepts; theorems of the theory are derived by proof mechanisms out of the axioms." (Cristian S Calude, "Randomness & Complexity, from Leibniz to Chaitin", 2007)

"Human language is a vehicle of truth but also of error, deception, and nonsense. Its use, as in the present discussion, thus requires great prudence. One can improve the precision of language by explicit definition of the terms used. But this approach has its limitations: the definition of one term involves other terms, which should in turn be defined, and so on. Mathematics has found a way out of this infinite regression: it bypasses the use of definitions by postulating some logical relations (called axioms) between otherwise undefined mathematical terms. Using the mathematical terms introduced with the axioms, one can then define new terms and proceed to build mathematical theories. Mathematics need, not, in principle rely on a human language. It can use, instead, a formal presentation in which the validity of a deduction can be checked mechanically and without risk of error or deception." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"If you have the rules of deduction and some initial choice of statements as sumed to be true (called axioms), then you are ready to derive many more true statements (called theorems). The rules of deduc tion constitute the logical machinery of mathematics, and the axioms comprise the basic properties of the objects you are interested in (in geometry these may be points, line segments, angles, etc.). There is some flexibility in selecting the rules of deduction, and many choices of axioms are possible. Once these have been decided you have all you need to do mathematics." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"In mathematics, the first principles are called axioms, and the rules are referred to as deduction/inference rules. A proof is a series of steps based on the (adopted) axioms and deduction rules which reaches a desired conclusion. Every step in a proof can be checked for correctness by examining it to ensure that it is logically sound." (Cristian S Calude et al, "Proving and Programming", 2007)

"Mathematics as done by mathematicians is not just heaping up statements logically deduced from the axioms. Most such statements are rubbish, even if perfectly correct. A good mathematician will look for interesting results. These interesting results, or theorems, organize themselves into meaningful and natural structures, and one may say that the object of mathematics is to find and study these structures." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Reducing theorems to a small number of axioms turns out to be deeply reminiscent of what scientists do. The mark of a good scientific theory, after all, is that it describes a large number of observations of the world while making only a small number of assumptions." (Marcus Chown, "God’s Number: Where Can We Find the Secret of the Universe? In a Single Number!", 2007)

"The fact that we have an efficient conceptualization of mathematics shows that this reflects a certain mathematical reality, even if this reality is quite invisible in the formal listing of the axioms of set theory." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"We axiomatize a theory not only to better understand its inner workings but also in order to obtain metatheorems about that theory. We will therefore be interested in, say, proving that a given axiomatic treatment for some physical theory is incomplete (that is, the system exhibits the incompleteness phenomenon), among other things." (Cristian S Calude, "Randomness & Complexity, from Leibniz to Chaitin", 2007)

"When we introduce the concept of a group, we do this by imposing certain properties that should hold: these properties are called axioms. The axioms defining a group are, however, of a somewhat different nature from the ZFC axioms of set theory. Basically, whenever we do mathematics, we accept ZFC: a current mathematical paper systematically uses well-known consequences of ZFC (and normally does not mention ZFC). The axioms of a group by contrast are used only when appropriate." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Why are proofs so important? Suppose our task were to construct a building. We would start with the foundations. In our case these are the axioms or definitions - everything else is built upon them. Each theorem or proposition represents a new level of knowledge and must be firmly anchored to the previous level. We attach the new level to the previous one using a proof. So the theorems and propositions are the new heights of knowledge we achieve, while the proofs are essential as they are the mortar which attaches them to the level below. Without proofs the structure would collapse." (Sidney A Morris, "Topology without Tears", 2007)

On Axioms (1900-1909)

"If geometry is to serve as a model for the treatment of physical axioms, we shall try first by a small number of axioms to include as large a class as possible of physical phenomena, and then by adjoining new axioms to arrive gradually at the more special theories. […] The mathematician will have also to take account not only of those theories coming near to reality, but also, as in geometry, of all logically possible theories. We must be always alert to obtain a complete survey of all conclusions derivable from the system of axioms assumed." (David Hilbert, 1900)

"When we are engaged in investigating the foundations of a science, we must set up a system of axioms which contains an exact and complete description of the relations subsisting between the elementary ideas of that science. The axioms so set up are at the same time the definitions of those elementary ideas; and no statement within the realm of the science... is held to be correct unless it can be derived from axioms by means of a finite number of logical steps. Upon closer consideration the question arises: Whether, in any way, certain statements of single axioms depend upon one another, and whether the axioms may not therefore contain certain parts in common, which must be isolated if one wishes to arrive at a system of axioms that shall be altogether independent of one another." (David Hilbert, "Mathematische Probleme", Gŏttinger Nachrichten, 1900)

"No theorem can be new unless a new axiom intervenes in its demonstration; reasoning can only give us immediately evident truths borrowed from direct intuition; it would only be an intermediary parasite." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Syllogistic reasoning remains incapable of adding anything to the data that are given it; the data are reduced to axioms, and that is all we should find in the conclusions." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Like almost every subject of human interest, this one [mathematics] is just as easy or as difficult as we choose to make it. A lifetime may be spent by a philosopher in discussing the truth of the simplest axiom. The simplest fact as to our existence may fill us with such wonder that our minds will remain overwhelmed with wonder all the time." (John Perry, "Teaching of Mathematics", 1902)

"No theorem can be new unless a new axiom intervenes in its demonstration; reasoning can only give us immediately evident truths borrowed from direct intuition; it would only be an intermediary parasite." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)

"The requisites for the axioms are various. They should be simple, in the sense that each axiom should enumerate one and only one statement. The total number of axioms should be few. A set of axioms must be consistent, that is to say, it must not be possible to deduce the contradictory of any axiom from the other axioms. According to the logical 'Law of Contradiction,' a set of entities cannot satisfy inconsistent axioms. Thus the existence theorem for a set of axioms proves their consistency. Seemingly this is the only possible method of proof of consistency." (Alfred N Whitehead, "The axioms of projective geometry, 1906) 

"Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré," Science and Method", 1908)

"It has been argued that mathematics is not or, at least, not exclusively an end in itself; after all it should also be applied to reality. But how can this be done if mathematics consisted of definitions and analytic theorems deduced from them and we did not know whether these are valid in reality or not. One can argue here that of course one first has to convince oneself whether the axioms of a theory are valid in the area of reality to which the theory should be applied. In any case, such a statement requires a procedure which is outside logic." (Ernst Zermelo, "Mathematische Logik - Vorlesungen gehalten von Prof. Dr. E. Zermelo zu Göttingen im S. S", 1908)

"It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. [...] Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)

"I do in no wise share this view [that the axioms are arbitrary propositions which we assume wholly at will, and that in like manner the fundamental conceptions are in the end only arbitrary symbols with which we operate] but consider it the death of all science: in my judgment the axioms of geometry are not arbitrary, but reasonable propositions which generally have the origin in space intuition and whose separate content and sequence is controlled by reasons of expediency." (Felix Klein, "Elementarmathematik vom hoheren Standpunkte aus", 1909)

On Structure: Structure in Mathematics (2000-2009)

"Mathematics is not placid, static and eternal. […] Most mathematicians are happy to make use of those axioms in their proofs, although others do not, exploring instead so-called intuitionist logic or constructivist mathematics. Mathematics is not a single monolithic structure of absolute truth!" (Gregory J Chaitin, "A century of controversy over the foundations of mathematics", 2000)

"Most physical systems, particularly those complex ones, are extremely difficult to model by an accurate and precise mathematical formula or equation due to the complexity of the system structure, nonlinearity, uncertainty, randomness, etc. Therefore, approximate modeling is often necessary and practical in real-world applications. Intuitively, approximate modeling is always possible. However, the key questions are what kind of approximation is good, where the sense of 'goodness' has to be first defined, of course, and how to formulate such a good approximation in modeling a system such that it is mathematically rigorous and can produce satisfactory results in both theory and applications." (Guanrong Chen & Trung Tat Pham, "Introduction to Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Control Systems", 2001)

"Our world resonates with patterns. The waxing and waning of the moon. The changing of the seasons. The microscopic cell structure of all living things have patterns. Perhaps that explains our fascination with prime numbers which are uniquely without pattern. Prime numbers are among the most mysterious phenomena in mathematics." (Manindra Agrawal, 2003)

"[…] mathematicians are much more concerned for example with the structure behind something or with the whole edifice. Mathematicians are not really puzzlers. Those who really solve mathematical puzzles are the physicists. If you like to solve mathematical puzzles, you should not study mathematics but physics!" (Carlo Beenakker, [interview] 2006)

"A good problem solver must also be a conceptual mathematician, with a good intuitive grasp of structures. But structures remain tools for the problem solver, instead of the main object of study." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"A proof in mathematics is a psychological device for convincing some person, or some audience, that a certain mathematical assertion is true. The structure, and the language used, in formulating that proof will be a product of the person creating it; but it also must be tailored to the audience that will be receiving it and evaluating it. Thus there is no ‘unique’ or ‘right’ or ‘best’ proof of any given result. A proof is part of a situational ethic." (Steven G Krantz, "The Proof is in the Pudding", 2007)

"It thus stands to reason that mathematical structures have a dual origin: in part human, in part purely logical. Human mathematics requires short formulations (because of our poor memory, etc.). But mathematical logic dictates that theorems with a short formulation may have very long proofs, as shown by Gödel. Clearly you don't want to go through the same long proof again and again. You will try instead to use repeatedly the short theorem that you have obtained. And an important tool to obtain short formulations is to give short names to mathematical objects that occur repeatedly. These short names describe new concepts. So we see how concept creation arises in the practice of mathematics as a consequence of the inherent logic of the sub ject and of the nature of human mathematicians." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Logic moves in one direction, the direction of clarity, coherence, and structure. Ambiguity moves in the other direction, that of fluidity, openness, and release. Mathematics moves back and forth between these two poles. Mathematics is not a fixed, static entity that can be structured definitively. It is dynamic, alive: its dynamism a function of the relationship between the two poles that have been described above. It is the interactions between these different aspects that give mathematics its power." (William Byers, "How Mathematicians Think", 2007)

"Mathematics as done by mathematicians is not just heaping up statements logically deduced from the axioms. Most such statements are rubbish, even if perfectly correct. A good mathematician will look for interesting results. These interesting results, or theorems, organize themselves into meaningful and natural structures, and one may say that the object of mathematics is to find and study these structures." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"The panoply of technical tools of mathematics reflects the inside structure of mathematics and is basically all we know about this inside structure, so that building a new theory may change the way we understand the structural relations of different parts of mathematics." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"We must admit, however, that our knowledge of the logical structure of mathematics and of the workings of the human mind remain quite limited, so that we have only partial answers to some questions, while others remain quite open." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"In mathematics, beauty is a very important ingredient. Beauty exists in mathematics as in architecture and other things. It is a difficult thing to define but it is something you recognise when you see it. It certainly has to have elegance, simplicity, structure and form. All sorts of things make up real beauty. There are many different kinds of beauty and the same is true of mathematical theorems. Beauty is an important criterion in mathematics because basically there is a lot of choice in what you can do in mathematics and science. It determines what you regard as important and what is not." (Michael Atiyah, 2009)

"Philosophers have sometimes made a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Analytic truths are not verified by observation; true analytic statements are tautologies and are true by virtue of the definitions of their terms and their logical structure. Synthetic truths relate to the material world; the truth of synthetic statements depends on their correspondence to how physical reality works. Mathematics, according to this distinction, deals exclusively with analytic truths. Its statements are all tautologies and are (analytically) true by virtue of their adherence to formal rules of construction." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning: Patterns, Problems, Conjectures, and Proofs", 2009)

On Imagination (1900-1924)

"This is the greatest degree of impoverishment; the [mental] image, deprived little by little of its own characteristics, is nothing more than a shadow. […] Being dependent on the state of the brain, the image undergoes change like all living substance, - it is subject to gains and losses, especially losses. But each of the foregoing three classes has its use for the inventor. They serve as material for different kinds of imagination - in their concrete form, for the mechanic and the artist; in their schematic form, for the scientist and for others." (Théodule-Armand Ribot, "Essay on the Creative Imagination", 1900)

"This means that it is not a dead thing; it is not at all like a photographic plate with which one may reproduce copies indefinitely. Being dependent on the state of the brain, the image undergoes change like all living substance, - it is subject to gains and losses, especially losses. But each of the foregoing three classes has its use for the inventor. They serve as material for different kinds of imagination - in their concrete form, for the mechanic and the artist; in their schematic form, for the scientist and for others." (Théodule-Armand Ribot, "Essay on the Creative Imagination" , 1900)

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"Imagination is as vital to any advance in science as learning and precision are essential for starting points." (Percival Lowell, "The Solar System", 1903)

"Nature talks in symbols; he who lacks imagination cannot understand her." (Abraham Miller, "Unmoral Maxims", 1906)

"Mathematics makes constant demands upon the imagination, calls for picturing in space (of one, two, three dimensions), and no considerable success can be attained without a growing ability to imagine all the various possibilities of a given case, and to make them defile before the mind's eye." (Jacob W A Young, "The Teaching of Mathematics", 1907)

"The motive for the study of mathematics is insight into the nature of the universe. Stars and strata, heat and electricity, the laws and processes of becoming and being, incorporate mathematical truths. If language imitates the voice of the Creator, revealing His heart, mathematics discloses His intellect, repeating the story of how things came into being. And the value of mathematics, appealing as it does to our energy and to our honor, to our desire to know the truth and thereby to live as of right in the household of God, is that it establishes us in larger and larger certainties. As literature develops emotion, understanding, and sympathy, so mathematics develops observation, imagination, and reason." (William E Chancellor, "A Theory of Motives, Ideals and Values in Education" 1907)

"The beautiful has its place in mathematics as elsewhere. The prose of ordinary intercourse and of business correspondence might be held to be the most practical use to which language is put, but we should be poor indeed without the literature of imagination. Mathematics too has its triumphs of the Creative imagination, its beautiful theorems, its proofs and processes whose perfection of form has made them classic. He must be a 'practical' man who can see no poetry in mathematics." (Wiliam F White, "A Scrap-book of Elementary Mathematics: Notes, Recreations, Essays", 1908)

"No system would have ever been framed if people had been simply interested in knowing what is true, whatever it may be. What produces systems is the interest in maintaining against all comers that some favourite or inherited idea of ours is sufficient and right. A system may contain an account of many things which, in detail, are true enough; but as a system, covering infinite possibilities that neither our experience nor our logic can prejudge, it must be a work of imagination and a piece of human soliloquy: It may be expressive of human experience, it may be poetical; but how should anyone who really coveted truth suppose that it was true?" (George Santayana, "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy", 1911)

"Only in men’s imagination does every truth find an effective and undeniable existence." (Joseph Conrad, "Some Reminiscences", 1912)

"What is the imagination? Only an arm or weapon of the interior energy; only the precursor of the reason." (Ralph W Emerson, "Miscellanies, Natural history of intellect", 1912)

"The concept of an independent system is a pure creation of the imagination. For no material system is or can ever be perfectly isolated from the rest of the world. Nevertheless it completes the mathematician’s ‘blank form of a universe’ without which his investigations are impossible. It enables him to introduce into his geometrical space, not only masses and configurations, but also physical structure and chemical composition." (Lawrence J Henderson, "The Order of Nature: An Essay", 1917)

"[…] because mathematics contains truth, it extends its validity to the whole domain of art and the creatures of the constructive imagination." (James B Shaw, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics", 1918)

"Nature uses human imagination to lift her work of creation to even higher levels." (Luigi Pirandello, "Six Characters in Search of an Author", 1921)

"The story of scientific discovery has its own epic unity - a unity of purpose and endeavour - the single torch passing from hand to hand through the centuries; and the great moments of science when, after long labour, the pioneers saw their accumulated facts falling into a significant order - sometimes in the form of a law that revolutionised the whole world of thought - have an intense human interest, and belong essentially to the creative imagination of poetry." (Alfred Noyes, "Watchers of the Sky", 1922)

Complexity vs Mathematics I

"But ignorance of the different causes involved in the production of events, as well as their complexity, taken together with the imperfection of analysis, prevents our reaching the same certainty about the vast majority of phenomena. Thus there are things that are uncertain for us, things more or less probable, and we seek to compensate for the impossibility of knowing them by determining their different degrees of likelihood. So it was that we owe to the weakness of the human mind one of the most delicate and ingenious of mathematical theories, the science of chance or probability." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Recherches, 1º, sur l'Intégration des Équations Différentielles aux Différences Finies, et sur leur Usage dans la Théorie des Hasards", 1773)

"So completely is nature mathematical that some of the more exact natural sciences, in particular astronomy and physics, are in their theoretic phases largely mathematical in character, while other sciences which have hitherto been compelled by the complexity of their phenomena and the inexactitude of their data to remain descriptive and empirical, are developing towards the mathematical ideal, proceeding upon the fundamental assumption that mathematical relations exist between the forces and the phenomena, and that nothing short, of the discovery and formulations of these relations would constitute definitive knowledge of the subject. Progress is measured by the closeness of the approximation to this ideal formulation." (Jacob W A Young, "The Teaching of Mathematics", 1907)

"Mathematics is a study which, when we start from its most familiar portions, may be pursued in either of two opposite directions. The more familiar direction is constructive, towards gradually increasing complexity: from integers to fractions, real numbers, complex numbers; from addition and multiplication to differentiation and integration, and on to higher mathematics. The other direction, which is less familiar, proceeds, by analyzing, to greater and greater abstractness and logical simplicity." (Bertrand Russell, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy", 1919)

"We love to discover in the cosmos the geometrical forms that exist in the depths of our consciousness. The exactitude of the proportions of our monuments and the precision of our machines express a fundamental character of our mind. Geometry does not exist in the earthly world. It has originated in ourselves. The methods of nature are never so precise as those of man. We do not find in the universe the clearness and accuracy of our thought. We attempt, therefore, to abstract from the complexity of phenomena some simple systems whose components bear to one another certain relations susceptible of being described mathematically." (Alexis Carrel, "Man the Unknown", 1935)

"Mathematics succeeds in dealing with tangible reality by being conceptual. We cannot cope with the full physical complexity; we must idealize." (George Pólya, "Mathematical Methods in Science", 1977)

"Theorems often tell us complex truths about the simple things, but only rarely tell us simple truths about the complex ones. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking or ‘mathematics envy’." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"Somehow the breathless world that we witness seems far removed from the timeless laws of Nature which govern the elementary particles and forces of Nature. The reason is clear. We do not observe the laws of Nature: we observe their outcomes. Since these laws find their most efficient representation as mathematical equations, we might say that we see only the solutions of those equations not the equations themselves. This is the secret which reconciles the complexity observed in Nature with the advertised simplicity of her laws." (John D Barrow, "New Theories of Everything", 1991)

"To find the simple in the complex, the finite in the infinite - that is not a bad description of the aim and essence of mathematics. (Jacob T Schwartz, "Discrete Thoughts: Essays on Mathematics, Science, and Philosophy", 1992)

"Mathematical truth is not totally objective. If a mathematical statement is false, there will be no proofs, but if it is true, there will be an endless variety of proofs, not just one! Proofs are not impersonal, they express the personality of their creator/discoverer just as much as literary efforts do. If something important is true, there will be many reasons that it is true, many proofs of that fact. [...] each proof will emphasize different aspects of the problem, each proof will lead in a different direction. Each one will have different corollaries, different generalizations. [...] the world of mathematical truth has infinite complexity […]" (Gregory Chaitin, "Meta Math: The Quest for Omega", 2005)

"[All phenomena] are equally susceptible of being calculated, and all that is necessary, to reduce the whole of nature to laws similar to those which Newton discovered with the aid of the calculus, is to have a sufficient number of observations and a mathematics that is complex enough." (Nicolas de Condorcet) 

On Diagrams (1975-1999)

"Pencil and paper for construction of distributions, scatter diagrams, and run-charts to compare small groups and to detect trends are more efficient methods of estimation than statistical inference that depends on variances and standard errors, as the simple techniques preserve the information in the original data." (W Edwards Deming, "On Probability as Basis for Action", American Statistician, Volume 29, Number 4, November 1975)

"The formalist makes a distinction between geometry as a deductive structure and geometry as a descriptive science. Only the first is regarded as mathematical. The use of pictures or diagrams, or even mental imagery, all are non- mathematical. In principle, they should be unnecessary. Consequently. he regards them as inappropriate in a mathematics text, perhaps even in a mathematics class." (Philip J Davis & Reuben Hersh, "The Mathematical Experience", 1981)

"The thinking person goes over the same ground many times. He looks at it from varying points of view - his own, his arch-enemy’s, others’. He diagrams it, verbalizes it, formulates equations, constructs visual images of the whole problem, or of troublesome parts, or of what is clearly known. But he does not keep a detailed record of all this mental work, indeed could not. […] Deep understanding of a domain of knowledge requires knowing it in various ways. This multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard work and sets the state for the re-cognition we experience as a new insight." (Howard E Gruber, "Darwin on Man", 1981)

"[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; [...] it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, [...] it has no proper place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array." (Neil Tennant, "The withering away of formal semantics", Mind and Language Vol. 1 (4), 1986)

"We distinguish diagrammatic from sentential paper-and-pencil representations of information by developing alternative models of information-processing systems that are informationally equivalent and that can be characterized as sentential or diagrammatic. Sentential representations are sequential, like the propositions in a text. Diagrammatic representations are indexed by location in a plane. Diagrammatic representations also typically display information that is only implicit in sentential representations and that therefore has to be computed, sometimes at great cost, to make it explicit for use. We then contrast the computational efficiency of these representations for solving several. illustrative problems in mathematics and physics." (Herbert A Simon, "Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words", 1987) 

"People who have a casual interest in mathematics may get the idea that a topologist is a mathematical playboy who spends his time making Möbius bands and other diverting topological models. If they were to open any recent textbook in topology, they would be surprised. They would find page after page of symbols, seldom relieved by a picture or diagram." (Martin Gardner, "Hexaflexagons and Other Mathematical Diversions", 1988)

"The value of diagram techniques even at this rudimentary level should be clear by now: it is easier to visualize where simplifications may be found in a complicated network by searching for a reducible linkage than by examining a complicated algebraic expression."(Geoffrey E Stedman, "Diagram Techniques in Group Theory", 1990)

"Diagrams are physical situations. They must be, since we can see them. As such, they obey their own set of constraints. […] By choosing a representational scheme appropriately, so that the constraints on the diagrams have a good match with the constraints on the described situation, the diagram can generate a lot of information that the user never need infer. Rather, the user can simply read off facts from the diagram as needed." (Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy, "Visual information and valid reasoning", [in "Visualization in Teaching and Learning Mathematics"], 1991)

"It has been said that the art of geometry is to reason well from false diagrams." (Jean Dieudonné, "Mathematics - The Music of Reason", 1992)

"A mental model is not normally based on formal definitions but rather on concrete properties that have been drawn from life experience. Mental models are typically analogs, and they comprise specific contents, but this does not necessarily restrict their power to deal with abstract concepts, as we will see. The important thing about mental models, especially in the context of mathematics, is the relations they represent. We will use diagrams to depict mental models for a variety of concepts, and it is important to keep in mind that any diagram, or even a non-diagrammatic representation that represents the same essential relations would be equally effective." (Lyn D English & Graeme S Halford," "Mathematics Education: Models and Processes", 1995) 

"Schematic diagrams are more abstract than pictorial drawings, showing symbolic elements and their interconnection to make clear the configuration and/or operation of a system." (Ernest O Doebelin, "Engineering experimentation: planning, execution, reporting", 1995)

"Given particular tasks of reasoning, different types of diagrams show different degrees of suitedness. For example, Euler diagrams are superior in handling certain problems concerning inclusion and membership among classes and individuals, but they cannot be generally applied to such problems without special provisos. Diagrams make many proofs in geometry shorter and more intuitive, while they take certain precautions of the reasoner's to be used validly. […] Mathematicians experience that coming up with the 'right' sorts of diagrams is more than half-way to the solution of most complicated problems." (Atsushi Shimojima, "Operational Constraints in Diagrammatic Reasoning" , [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Making a good choice of representational conventions is always important in solving a problem, but especially true of charts. This sensitivity of type of chart to the particularities of the task at hand makes a very general logic of charts useless." (Jon Barwise & Eric Hammer, "Diagrams and the Concept of Logical System", [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

On Diagrams (1900-1924)

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"We imagine cases, place mental diagrams before our mind's eye, and multiply these cases, until a habit is formed of expecting that always to turn out the case, which has been seen to be the result in all the diagrams. To appeal to such a habit is a very different thing from appealing to any immediate instinct of rationality. That the process of forming a habit of reasoning by the use of diagrams is often performed there is no room for doubt. It is perfectly open to consciousness." (Charles S Peirce,"Fallibility of Reasoning and the Feeling of Rationality", cca. 1902)

"Arithmetical symbols are written diagrams and geometrical figures are graphic formulas." (David Hilbert, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Mathematical Problems Vol. 8, 1902)

"A diagram is a representamen [representation] which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of representation, founded upon a simple and easily intelligible basic idea." (Charles S Peirce, 1903)

"A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to construct a new general predicate." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904) 

"A theorem […] is an inference obtained by constructing a diagram according to a general precept, and after modifying it as ingenuity may dictate, observing in it certain relations, and showing that they must subsist in every case, retranslating the proposition into general terms." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"By [diagrams] it is possible to present at a glance all the facts which could be obtained from figures as to the increase,  fluctuations, and relative importance of prices, quantities, and values of different classes of goods and trade with various countries; while the sharp irregularities of the curves give emphasis to the disturbing causes which produce any striking change." (Arthur L Bowley, "A Short Account of England's Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century, its Economic and Social Results", 1905)

"Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If logicians would only embrace this method, we should no longer see attempts to base their science on the fragile foundations of metaphysics or a psychology not based on logical theory; and there would soon be such an advance in logic that every science would feel the benefit of it." (Charles S Peirce, "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism", Monist 16(4), 1906)

"To facilitate eyeless observation of his sense-transcending world, the mathematician invokes the aid of physical diagrams and physical symbols in endless variety and combination [...]" (Cassius J Keyser, "Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art", 1907-1908, 1908)

"This diagrammatic method has, however, serious inconveniences as a method for solving logical problems. It does not show how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain constituents, nor does it show how to combine the remaining constituents so as to obtain the consequences sought. In short, it serves only to exhibit one single step in the argument, namely the equation of the problem; it dispenses neither with the previous steps, i.e., 'throwing of the problem into an equation' and the transformation of the premises, nor with the subsequent steps, i.e., the combinations that lead to the various consequences. Hence it is of very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal with in this form." (Louis Couturat, "The Algebra of Logic", 1914)

"We rise from the conception of form to an understanding of the forces which gave rise to it. [...] in the representation of form we see a diagram of forces in equilibrium, and in the comparison of kindred forms we discern the magnitude and the direction of the forces which have sufficed to convert the one form into the other." (D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, "On Growth and Form" Vol. II, 1917)

On Machines I (Mathematics vs Machine I)

"The whole of the developments and operations of analysis are now capable of being executed by machinery. […] As soon as an Analytical Engine exists, it will necessarily guide the future course of science.” (Charles Babbage, “Passages from the Life of a Philosopher”, 1864)

"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32 (127), 1875)

"Mathematics is an instrument of thought. It is a sort of machine by which the crude and imperfect results of thought are taken and disentangled, and arranged in such a way that the thought can act upon them most readily." (Charles C Everett, "The Science of Thought" II, 1890)

"For, in mathematics or symbolic logic, reason can crank out the answer from the symboled equations -even a calculating machine can often do so - but it cannot alone set up the equations. Imagination resides in the words which define and connect the symbols - subtract them from the most aridly rigorous mathematical treatise and all meaning vanishes." (Ralph W Gerard, "The Biological Basis of Imagination", American Thought, 1947)

"A modern mathematical proof is not very different from a modern machine, or a modern test setup: the simple fundamental principles are hidden and almost invisible under a mass of technical details." (Hermann Weyl, "Unterrichtsblätter für Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften", 1932)

"On the basis of what has been proved so far, it remains possible that there may exist (and even be empirically discoverable) a theorem-proving machine which in fact is equivalent to mathematical intuition, but cannot be proved to be so, nor even be proved to yield only correct theorems of finitary number theory." (Kurt Gödel, 1951)

"Mathematics is not, then, merely a bunch of calculations that could be done much faster and better by an electronic machine; nor is it a science developed in ancient times, with nothing added to it since then except a bit of polish here and there." (C Stanley Ogilvy, "Excursions in Mathematics", 1956)

"The structures with which mathematics deals are more like lace, the leaves of trees, and the play of light and shadow on a human face, than they are like buildings and machines, the least of their representatives. The best proofs in mathematics are short and crisp like epigrams, and the longest have swings and rhythms that are like music. The structures of mathematics and the propositions about them are ways for the imagination to travel and the wings, or legs, or vehicles to take you where you want to go." (Scott Buchanan, "Poetry and Mathematics", 1975)

"In the initial stages of research, mathematicians do not seem to function like theorem-proving machines. Instead, they use some sort of mathematical intuition to ‘see’ the universe of mathematics and determine by a sort of empirical process what is true. This alone is not enough, of course. Once one has discovered a mathematical truth, one tries to find a proof for it." (Rudy Rucker, "Infinity and the Mind: The science and philosophy of the infinite", 1982)

"Algebra is the offer made by the devil to the mathematician. The devil says: I will give you this powerful machine, it will answer any question you like. All you need to do is give me your soul: give up geometry and you will have this marvelous machine." (Michael F Atiyah, 2004)

Mathematics as Game I

"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)

"Mathematics is not like a game whose tasks are determined by arbitrarily stipulated rules. Rather, it is a conceptual system possessing internal necessity that can only be so and by no means otherwise." (David Hilbert, "Natur und Mathematisches Erkennen", 1919–20) 

"A serious threat to the very life of science is implied in the assertion that mathematics is nothing but a system of conclusions drawn from definitions and postulates that must be consistent but otherwise may be created by the free will of the mathematician. If this description were accurate, mathematics could not attract any intelligent person. It would be a game with definitions, rules and syllogisms, without motivation or goal." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?", 1941)

"Geometry, whatever others may think, is the study of different shapes, many of them very beautiful, having harmony, grace and symmetry. […] Most of us, if we can play chess at all, are content to play it on a board with wooden chess pieces; but there are some who play the game blindfolded and without touching the board. It might be a fair analogy to say that abstract geometry is like blindfold chess – it is a game played without concrete objects." (Edward Kasner & James R Newman, "New Names for Old", 1956) 

"To the average mathematician who merely wants to know that his work is securely based, the most appealing choice is to avoid difficulties by means of Hilbert's program. Here one regards mathematics as a formal game and one is only concerned with the question of consistency." (Paul Cohen, "Axiomatic set theory, American Mathematical Society", 1971)

"There is an infinite regress in proofs; therefore proofs do not prove. You should realize that proving is a game, to be played while you enjoy it and stopped when you get tired of it." (Imre Lakatos, "Proofs and Refutations", 1976)

"The way the mathematics game is played, most variations lie outside the rules, while music can insist on perfect canon or tolerate a casual accompaniment." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"If doing mathematics or science is looked upon as a game, then one might say that in mathematics you compete against yourself or other mathematicians; in physics your adversary is nature and the stakes are higher." (Mark Kac, "Enigmas Of Chance", 1985)

"Mathematicians are used to game-playing according to a set of rules they lay down in advance, despite the fact that nature always writes her own. One acquires a great deal of humility by experiencing the real wiliness of nature." (Philip W Anderson, "More and Different: Notes from a Thoughtful Curmudgeon", 2011)

"Often the key contribution of intuition is to make us aware of weak points in a problem, places where it may be vulnerable to attack. A mathematical proof is like a battle, or if you prefer a less warlike metaphor, a game of chess. Once a potential weak point has been identified, the mathematician’s technical grasp of the machinery of mathematics can be brought to bear to exploit it." (Ian Stewart, "Visions of Infinity", 2013)

On Definitions V

"The use of a mathematical definition is, to deduce from it the properties of the thing defined […]" (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

"The language of mathematics, permitting great sharpness and accuracy of definition, conduces largely to their power of drawing necessary conclusions. Language is not only a means of recording the results of our thinking; it is an instrument of thought, and that of the highest value." (Thomas Hill, "The Imagination in Mathematics", The North American Review Vol. 85 (176), 1857)

"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32, 1875)

"The apodictic quality of mathematical thought, the certainty and correctness of its conclusions, are due, not to a special mode of ratiocination, but to the character of the concepts with which it deals. What is that distinctive characteristic? I answer: precision, sharpness, completeness of definition. But how comes your mathematician by such completeness? There is no mysterious trick involved; some ideas admit of such precision, others do not; and the mathematician is one who deals with those that do." (Cassius J Keyser, "The Universe and Beyond", Hibbert Journal Vol. 3, 1904–1905)

"[…] mathematics is a science whose concepts are too breakable, too dry, too precisely limited. The disciplines of life and society, of human thinking, are fluid disciplines, with some flexibility, with concepts that are not clearly defined, but which are able to include things less strictly delimited than a mathematical definition does it." (Grigore C Moisil, 1968)

"Because mathematical proofs are long, they are also difficult to invent. One has to construct, without making any mistakes, long chains of assertions, and see what one is doing, see where one is going. To see means to be able to guess what is true and what is false, what is useful and what is not. To see means to have a feeling for which definitions one should introduce, and what the key assertions are that will allow one to develop a theory in a natural manner." (David Ruelle, "Chance and Chaos", 1991)

"It is not surprising to find many mathematical ideas interconnected or linked. The expansion of mathematics depends on previously developed ideas. The formation of any mathematical system begins with some undefined terms and axioms (assumptions) and proceeds from there to definitions, theorems, more axioms and so on. But history points out this is not necessarily the route that creativity" (Theoni Pappas, "More Joy of Mathematics: Exploring mathematical insights & concepts", 1991)

"This absolutist view of mathematical knowledge is based on two types of assumptions: those of mathematics, concerning the assumption of axioms and definitions, and those of logic concerning the assumption of axioms, rules of inference and the formal language and its syntax. These are local or micro-assumptions. There is also the possibility of global or macro-assumptions, such as whether logical deduction suffices to establish all mathematical truths." (Paul Ernest, "The Philosophy of Mathematics Education", 1991)

"The goal of a definition is to introduce a mathematical object. The goal of a theorem is to state some of its properties, or interrelations between various objects. The goal of a proof is to make such a statement convincing by presenting a reasoning subdivided into small steps each of which is justified as an "elementary" convincing argument." (Yuri I Manin, "Mathematics as Metaphor: Selected Essays of Yuri I. Manin", 2007)

"As students, we learned mathematics from textbooks. In textbooks, mathematics is presented in a rigorous and logical way: definition, theorem, proof, example. But it is not discovered that way. It took many years for a mathematical subject to be understood well enough that a cohesive textbook could be written. Mathematics is created through slow, incremental progress, large leaps, missteps, corrections, and connections." (Richard S Richeson, "Eulers Gem: The Polyhedron Formula and the birth of Topology", 2008)

On Paradox I

"[Paradoxes of the infinite arise] only when we attempt, with our finite minds, to discuss the infinite, assigning to it those properties which we give to the finite and limited; but this […] is wrong, for we cannot speak of infinite quantities as being the one greater or less than or equal to another." (Galileo Galilei, "Two New Sciences", 1638)

"Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an hypothesis, which means a supposition, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if their ulterior results are found in Nature." (Augustus de Morgan, "A Budget of Paradoxes", 1872)

"The manner in which a paradoxer will show himself, as to sense or nonsense, will not depend upon what he maintains, but upon whether he has or has not made a sufficient knowledge of what has been done by others, especially as to the mode of doing it, a preliminary to inventing knowledge for himself."  (Augustus De Morgan, "A Budget of Paradoxes", 1872)

"It sounds paradoxical to say the attainment of scientific truth has been effected, to a great extent, by the help of scientific errors." (Thomas H Huxley, "The Progress of Science", 1887)

"The folly of mistaking a paradox for a discovery, a metaphor for a proof, a torrent of verbiage for a spring of capital truths, and oneself for an oracle, is inborn in us." (Paul Valéry, "Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da Vinci", 1895)

"The very name calculus of probabilities is a paradox. Probability opposed to certainty is what we do not know, and how can we calculate what we do not know?" (Henri Poincaré, "The Foundations of Science", 1913)

"Although this may seem a paradox, all exact science is dominated by the idea of approximation. When a man tells you that he knows the exact truth about anything, you are safe in inferring that he is an inexact man." (Bertrand Russell, "The Scientific Outlook", 1931)

"Perhaps the greatest paradox of all is that there are paradoxes in mathematics […] because mathematics builds on the old but does not discard it, because its theorems are deduced from postulates by the methods of logic, in spite of its having undergone revolutionary changes we do not suspect it of being a discipline capable of engendering paradoxes." (James R Newman, "Mathematics and the Imagination", 1940)

"[…] there is probably less difference between the positions of a mathematician and of a physicist than is generally supposed, [...] the mathematician is in much more direct contact with reality. This may seem a paradox, since it is the physicist who deals with the subject-matter usually described as 'real', but [...] [a physicist] is trying to correlate the incoherent body of crude fact confronting him with some definite and orderly scheme of abstract relations, the kind of scheme he can borrow only from mathematics." (Godfrey H Hardy, "A Mathematician's Apology", 1940)

"A discovery in science, or a new theory, even when it appears most unitary and most all-embracing, deals with some immediate element of novelty or paradox within the framework of far vaster, unanalysed, unarticulated reserves of knowledge, experience, faith, and presupposition. Our progress is narrow; it takes a vast world unchallenged and for granted. This is one reason why, however great the novelty or scope of new discovery, we neither can, nor need, rebuild the house of the mind very rapidly. This is one reason why science, for all its revolutions, is conservative. This is why we will have to accept the fact that no one of us really will ever know very much. This is why we shall have to find comfort in the fact that, taken together, we know more and more." (J Robert Oppenheimer, "Science and the Common Understanding", 1954)

|| > Next Post