On Principles V: Identity

"The topics of ontology, or metaphysic, are cause, effect, action, passion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, and sign." (Isaac Watts, "Logic, or The right use of reason, in the inquiry after truth", 1725)

"Science arises from the discovery of Identity amid Diversity." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"The very possibility of mathematical science seems an insoluble contradiction. If this science is only deductive in appearance, from whence is derived that perfect rigour which is challenged by none? If, on the contrary, all the propositions which it enunciates may be derived in order by the rules of formal logic, how is it that mathematics is not reduced to a gigantic tautology? The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially new, and if everything must spring from the principle of identity, then everything should be capable of being reduced to that principle." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Metaphors deny distinctions between things: problems often arise from taking structural metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of unidentical things, conflicts can arise which can only be resolved by understanding the metaphor (which requires its recognition as such), which means reconstructing the analogy on which it is based. […] The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than the expansion of meaning." (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"The idea that one can 'introduce' a kind of objects simply by laying down an identity criterion for them really inverts the proper order of explanation. As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of objects one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for them from that conception. […] So, rather than 'abstract' a kind of object from a criterion of identity, one must in general 'extract' a criterion of identity from a metaphysically defensible conception of a given kind of objects." (Edward J Lowe, The metaphysics of abstract objects, Journal of Philosophy 92 (10), 1995) 

"There is no unique, global, and universal relation of identity for abstract objects. [...] Abstract objects are of different sorts and this should mean, almost by definition, that there is no global, universal identity for sorts. Each sort X is equipped with an internal relation of identity but there is no identity relation that would apply to all sorts." (Jean-Pierre Marquis," Categorical foundations of mathematics, or how to provide foundations for abstract mathematics", The Review of Symbolic Logic Vol. 6 (1), 2012) 

"Reason is indeed all about identity, or, rather, tautology. Mathematics is the eternal, necessary system of rational, analytic tautology. Tautology is not 'empty', as it is so often characterized by philosophers. It is in fact the fullest thing there, the analytic ground of existence, and the basis of everything. Mathematical tautology has infinite masks to wear, hence delivers infinite variety. Mathematical tautology provides Leibniz’s world that is 'simplest in hypothesis and the richest in phenomena'. No hypothesis cold be simpler than the one revolving around tautologies concerning 'nothing'. There is something - existence - because nothing is tautologous, and 'something' is how that tautology is expressed. If we write x = 0, where x is any expression that has zero as its net result, then we have a world of infinite possibilities where something ('x') equals nothing (0)." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

Wïllard v O Quine - Collected Quotes

"To say that mathematics in general has been reduced to logic hints at some new firming up of mathematics at its foundations. This is misleading. Set theory is less settled and more conjectural than the classical mathematical superstructure than can be founded upon it." (Willard v O Quine," Elementary Logic", 1941)

"We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew up in. We can change it, bit by bit, plank by plank, though meanwhile there is nothing to carry us along but the evolving conceptual scheme itself. The philosopher's task was well compared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea." (Willard v O Quine, "The Journal of Philosophy", 1950)

"Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word." (Wïllard v O Quine, "Two dogmas of empiricism" , Philosophical Review Vol. 60, 1951)

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer."(Willard v O Quine, "From a Logical Point of View", 1953) 

"Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics; we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged." (Willard v O Quine, "From a Logical Point of View", 1953)

"Science is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it." (Willard v O Quine, "The Scope and Language of Science", 1954) 

"It is one of the consolations of philosophy that the benefit of showing how to dispense with a concept does not hinge on dispensing with it." (Willard v O Quine, "Word and Object", 1960) 

"Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords, even in principle, no unique definition of truth. Any so-called pragmatic definition of truth is doomed to failure equally." (Willard v O Quine, "Word and Object", 1960) 

"It makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another." (Willard v O Quine, "Ontological Relativity and Other Essays", 1969)

"At root what is needed for scientific inquiry is just receptivity to data, skill in reasoning, and yearning for truth. Admittedly, ingenuity can help too." (Willard v O Quine, "The Web of Belief", 1970) 

"Implication is thus the very texture of our web of belief, and logic is the theory that traces it."  (Willard v O Quine, "The Web of Belief", 1970) 

"It is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described." (Willard v O Quine, "Theories and Things", 1981) 

"Physics investigates the essential nature of the world, and biology describes a local bump. Psychology, human psychology, describes a bump on the bump" (Willard v O Quine, "Theories and Things", 1981) 

"It is the tension between the scientist's laws and his own attempted breaches of them that powers the engines of science and makes it forge ahead." (Willard v O Quine, "Quiddities" , 1987) 

Mental Models XII

"It has become increasingly evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies." (Paul Dirac, "The Principles of Quantum Mechanics", 1935)

"The solution of the difficulty is that the two mental pictures which experiment lead us to form - the one of the particles, the other of the waves - are both incomplete and have only the validity of analogies which are accurate only in limiting cases." (Werner Heisenberg, "The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory", 1949)

"We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew up in. We can change it, bit by bit, plank by plank, though meanwhile there is nothing to carry us along but the evolving conceptual scheme itself. The philosopher's task was well compared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea." (Willard v. O Quine, "The Journal of Philosophy", 1950)

"A conceptual scheme is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it cannot be reconciled; a conceptual scheme is either modified or replaced by a better one, never abandoned with nothing left to take its place." (James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics; we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged." (Willard van Orman Quine, "From a Logical Point of View", 1953)

"Mental pictures offer us an opportunity to practice new traits and attitudes, which otherwise we could not do. This is possible because again - your nervous system cannot tell the difference between an actual experience and one that is vividly imagined." (Maxwell Maltz, "Psycho-Cybernetics", 1960)

"Science begins with the world we have to live in, accepting its data and trying to explain its laws. From there, it moves toward the imagination: it becomes a mental construct, a model of a possible way of interpreting experience." (Northrop Frye, "The Educated Imagination", 1963)

"Information is recorded in vast interconnecting networks. Each idea or image has hundreds, perhaps thousands, of associations and is connected to numerous other points in the mental network." (Peter Russell, "The Brain Book: Know Your Own Mind and How to Use it", 1979)

"Perceptual interpretive processes are applied to mental images in much the same way that they are applied to actual physical objects. In this sense, imagined objects can be 'interpreted' much like physical objects." (Ronald A. Finke, "Creative Imagery", 1990)

"Imagining the unseeable is hard, because imagining means having an image in your mind. And how can you have a mental image of something you have never seen? Like perception itself, the models of science are embedded inextricably in the current worldview we call culture." (K C Cole, "First You Build a Cloud and Other Reflections on Physics as a Way of Life", 1999)