On Principles V: Identity

"The topics of ontology, or metaphysic, are cause, effect, action, passion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, and sign." (Isaac Watts, "Logic, or The right use of reason, in the inquiry after truth", 1725)

"Science arises from the discovery of Identity amid Diversity." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"The very possibility of mathematical science seems an insoluble contradiction. If this science is only deductive in appearance, from whence is derived that perfect rigour which is challenged by none? If, on the contrary, all the propositions which it enunciates may be derived in order by the rules of formal logic, how is it that mathematics is not reduced to a gigantic tautology? The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially new, and if everything must spring from the principle of identity, then everything should be capable of being reduced to that principle." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Metaphors deny distinctions between things: problems often arise from taking structural metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of unidentical things, conflicts can arise which can only be resolved by understanding the metaphor (which requires its recognition as such), which means reconstructing the analogy on which it is based. […] The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than the expansion of meaning." (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"The idea that one can 'introduce' a kind of objects simply by laying down an identity criterion for them really inverts the proper order of explanation. As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of objects one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for them from that conception. […] So, rather than 'abstract' a kind of object from a criterion of identity, one must in general 'extract' a criterion of identity from a metaphysically defensible conception of a given kind of objects." (Edward J Lowe, The metaphysics of abstract objects, Journal of Philosophy 92 (10), 1995) 

"There is no unique, global, and universal relation of identity for abstract objects. [...] Abstract objects are of different sorts and this should mean, almost by definition, that there is no global, universal identity for sorts. Each sort X is equipped with an internal relation of identity but there is no identity relation that would apply to all sorts." (Jean-Pierre Marquis," Categorical foundations of mathematics, or how to provide foundations for abstract mathematics", The Review of Symbolic Logic Vol. 6 (1), 2012) 

"Reason is indeed all about identity, or, rather, tautology. Mathematics is the eternal, necessary system of rational, analytic tautology. Tautology is not 'empty', as it is so often characterized by philosophers. It is in fact the fullest thing there, the analytic ground of existence, and the basis of everything. Mathematical tautology has infinite masks to wear, hence delivers infinite variety. Mathematical tautology provides Leibniz’s world that is 'simplest in hypothesis and the richest in phenomena'. No hypothesis cold be simpler than the one revolving around tautologies concerning 'nothing'. There is something - existence - because nothing is tautologous, and 'something' is how that tautology is expressed. If we write x = 0, where x is any expression that has zero as its net result, then we have a world of infinite possibilities where something ('x') equals nothing (0)." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

On Coherence IV

"Man's general way of thinking of the totality, i.e. his general world view, is crucial for overall order of the human mind itself. If he thinks of the totality as constituted of independent fragments, then that is how his mind will tend to operate, but if he can include everything coherently and harmoniously in an overall whole that is undivided, unbroken and without border (for every border is a division or break) then his mind will tend to move in a similar way, and from this will flow an orderly action within the whole." (David Bohm, "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", 1980)

"Nature is disordered, powerful and chaotic, and through fear of the chaos we impose system on it. We abhor complexity, and seek to simplify things whenever we can by whatever means we have at hand. We need to have an overall explanation of what the universe is and how it functions. In order to achieve this overall view we develop explanatory theories which will give structure to natural phenomena: we classify nature into a coherent system which appears to do what we say it does." (James Burke, "The Day the Universe Changed", 1985)

"Metaphor [is] a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind. So conceived metaphor is not merely a linguistic mode of expression; rather, it is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of. Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organise our more abstract understanding. " (Mark Johnson, "The Body in the Mind", 1987)

"There is no coherent knowledge, i.e. no uniform comprehensive account of the world and the events in it. There is no comprehensive truth that goes beyond an enumeration of details, but there are many pieces of information, obtained in different ways from different sources and collected for the benefit of the curious. The best way of presenting such knowledge is the list - and the oldest scientific works were indeed lists of facts, parts, coincidences, problems in several specialized domains." (Paul K Feyerabend, "Farewell to Reason", 1987)

"When loops are present, the network is no longer singly connected and local propagation schemes will invariably run into trouble. [...] If we ignore the existence of loops and permit the nodes to continue communicating with each other as if the network were singly connected, messages may circulate indefinitely around the loops and process may not converges to a stable equilibrium. […] Such oscillations do not normally occur in probabilistic networks […] which tend to bring all messages to some stable equilibrium as time goes on. However, this asymptotic equilibrium is not coherent, in the sense that it does not represent the posterior probabilities of all nodes of the network." (Judea Pearl, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference", 1988)

"A world view is a system of co-ordinates or a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about the world and ourselves into a global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a certain culture. […] A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible." (Diederick Aerts et al, "World views: From Fragmentation to Integration", 1994)

"There are a variety of swarm topologies, but the only organization that holds a genuine plurality of shapes is the grand mesh. In fact, a plurality of truly divergent components can only remain coherent in a network. No other arrangement-chain, pyramid, tree, circle, hub-can contain true diversity working as a whole. This is why the network is nearly synonymous with democracy or the market." (Kevin Kelly, "Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems and the Economic World", 1995)

"The role of science, like that of art, is to blend proximate imagery with more distant meaning, the parts we already understand with those given as new into larger patterns that are coherent enough to be acceptable as truth. Biologists know this relation by intuition during the course of fieldwork, as they struggle to make order out of the infinitely varying patterns of nature." (Edward O Wilson, "In Search of Nature", 1996)

"Falling between order and chaos, the moment of complexity is the point at which self-organizing systems emerge to create new patterns of coherence and structures of behaviour." (Mark C Taylor, "The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture", 2001)

On Structure: Structure in Mathematics (2000-2009)

"Mathematics is not placid, static and eternal. […] Most mathematicians are happy to make use of those axioms in their proofs, although others do not, exploring instead so-called intuitionist logic or constructivist mathematics. Mathematics is not a single monolithic structure of absolute truth!" (Gregory J Chaitin, "A century of controversy over the foundations of mathematics", 2000)

"Most physical systems, particularly those complex ones, are extremely difficult to model by an accurate and precise mathematical formula or equation due to the complexity of the system structure, nonlinearity, uncertainty, randomness, etc. Therefore, approximate modeling is often necessary and practical in real-world applications. Intuitively, approximate modeling is always possible. However, the key questions are what kind of approximation is good, where the sense of 'goodness' has to be first defined, of course, and how to formulate such a good approximation in modeling a system such that it is mathematically rigorous and can produce satisfactory results in both theory and applications." (Guanrong Chen & Trung Tat Pham, "Introduction to Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Control Systems", 2001)

"Our world resonates with patterns. The waxing and waning of the moon. The changing of the seasons. The microscopic cell structure of all living things have patterns. Perhaps that explains our fascination with prime numbers which are uniquely without pattern. Prime numbers are among the most mysterious phenomena in mathematics." (Manindra Agrawal, 2003)

"[…] mathematicians are much more concerned for example with the structure behind something or with the whole edifice. Mathematicians are not really puzzlers. Those who really solve mathematical puzzles are the physicists. If you like to solve mathematical puzzles, you should not study mathematics but physics!" (Carlo Beenakker, [interview] 2006)

"A good problem solver must also be a conceptual mathematician, with a good intuitive grasp of structures. But structures remain tools for the problem solver, instead of the main object of study." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"A proof in mathematics is a psychological device for convincing some person, or some audience, that a certain mathematical assertion is true. The structure, and the language used, in formulating that proof will be a product of the person creating it; but it also must be tailored to the audience that will be receiving it and evaluating it. Thus there is no ‘unique’ or ‘right’ or ‘best’ proof of any given result. A proof is part of a situational ethic." (Steven G Krantz, "The Proof is in the Pudding", 2007)

"It thus stands to reason that mathematical structures have a dual origin: in part human, in part purely logical. Human mathematics requires short formulations (because of our poor memory, etc.). But mathematical logic dictates that theorems with a short formulation may have very long proofs, as shown by Gödel. Clearly you don't want to go through the same long proof again and again. You will try instead to use repeatedly the short theorem that you have obtained. And an important tool to obtain short formulations is to give short names to mathematical objects that occur repeatedly. These short names describe new concepts. So we see how concept creation arises in the practice of mathematics as a consequence of the inherent logic of the sub ject and of the nature of human mathematicians." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Logic moves in one direction, the direction of clarity, coherence, and structure. Ambiguity moves in the other direction, that of fluidity, openness, and release. Mathematics moves back and forth between these two poles. Mathematics is not a fixed, static entity that can be structured definitively. It is dynamic, alive: its dynamism a function of the relationship between the two poles that have been described above. It is the interactions between these different aspects that give mathematics its power." (William Byers, "How Mathematicians Think", 2007)

"Mathematics as done by mathematicians is not just heaping up statements logically deduced from the axioms. Most such statements are rubbish, even if perfectly correct. A good mathematician will look for interesting results. These interesting results, or theorems, organize themselves into meaningful and natural structures, and one may say that the object of mathematics is to find and study these structures." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"The panoply of technical tools of mathematics reflects the inside structure of mathematics and is basically all we know about this inside structure, so that building a new theory may change the way we understand the structural relations of different parts of mathematics." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"We must admit, however, that our knowledge of the logical structure of mathematics and of the workings of the human mind remain quite limited, so that we have only partial answers to some questions, while others remain quite open." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"In mathematics, beauty is a very important ingredient. Beauty exists in mathematics as in architecture and other things. It is a difficult thing to define but it is something you recognise when you see it. It certainly has to have elegance, simplicity, structure and form. All sorts of things make up real beauty. There are many different kinds of beauty and the same is true of mathematical theorems. Beauty is an important criterion in mathematics because basically there is a lot of choice in what you can do in mathematics and science. It determines what you regard as important and what is not." (Michael Atiyah, 2009)

"Philosophers have sometimes made a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Analytic truths are not verified by observation; true analytic statements are tautologies and are true by virtue of the definitions of their terms and their logical structure. Synthetic truths relate to the material world; the truth of synthetic statements depends on their correspondence to how physical reality works. Mathematics, according to this distinction, deals exclusively with analytic truths. Its statements are all tautologies and are (analytically) true by virtue of their adherence to formal rules of construction." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning: Patterns, Problems, Conjectures, and Proofs", 2009)

On Complex Numbers XIX (Euler's Formula II)

"The equation e^πi+1 = 0 is true only by virtue of a large number of profound connections across many fields. It is true because of what it means! And it means what it means because of all those metaphors and blends in the conceptual system of a mathematician who understands what it means. To show why such an equation is true for conceptual reasons is to give what we have called an idea analysis of the equation." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"The equation e^πi =-1 says that the function w= e^z, when applied to the complex number πi as input, yields the real number -1 as the output, the value of w. In the complex plane, πi is the point [0,π) - π on the i-axis. The function w=e^z maps that point, which is in the z-plane, onto the point (-1, 0) - that is, -1 on the x-axis-in the w-plane. […] But its meaning is not given by the values computed for the function w=e^z. Its meaning is conceptual, not numerical. The importance of  e^πi =-1 lies in what it tells us about how various branches of mathematics are related to one another - how algebra is related to geometry, geometry to trigonometry, calculus to trigonometry, and how the arithmetic of complex numbers relates to all of them." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"The significance of e^πi+1 = 0 is thus a conceptual significance. What is important is not just the numerical values of e, π, i, 1, and 0 but their conceptual meaning. After all, e, π, i, 1, and 0 are not just numbers like any other numbers. Unlike, say, 192,563,947.9853294867, these numbers have conceptual meanings in a system of common, important nonmathematical concepts, like change, acceleration, recurrence, and self-regulation.

They are not mere numbers; they are the arithmetizations of concepts. When they are placed in a formula, the formula incorporates the ideas the function expresses as well as the set of pairs of complex numbers it mathematically determines by virtue of those ideas." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"We will now turn to e^πi+1 = 0. Our approach will be there as it was here. e^πi+1 = 0 uses the conceptual structure of all the cases we have discussed so far - trigonometry, the exponentials, and the complex numbers. Moreover, it puts together all that conceptual structure. In other words, all those metaphors and blends are simultaneously activated and jointly give rise to inferences that they would not give rise to separately. Our job is to see how e^πi+1 = 0 is a precise consequence that arises when the conceptual structure of these three domains is combined to form a single conceptual blend." (George Lakoff & Rafael E Nuñez, "Where Mathematics Come From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being", 2000)

"[…] the equation’s five seemingly unrelated numbers (e, i, π, 1, and 0) fit neatly together in the formula like contiguous puzzle pieces. One might think that a cosmic carpenter had jig-sawed them one day and mischievously left them conjoined on Euler’s desk as a tantalizing hint of the unfathomable connectedness of things.[…] when the three enigmatic numbers are combined in this form, e^iπ, they react together to carve out a wormhole that spirals through the infinite depths of number space to emerge smack dab in the heartland of integers." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Thus, while feelings may be the essence of subjectivity, they are by no means part of our weaker nature - the valences they automatically generate are integral to our thought processes and without them we’d simply be lost. In particular, we’d have no sense of beauty at all, much less be able to feel (there’s that word again) that we’re in the presence of beauty when contemplating a work such as Euler’s formula. After all, e^iπ + 1 = 0 can give people limbic-triggered goosebumps when they first peer with understanding into its depths." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Today, Euler’s formula is a tool as basic to electrical engineers and physicists as the spatula is to short-order cooks. It’s arguable that the formula’s ability to simplify the design and analysis of circuits contributed to the accelerating pace of electrical innovation during the twentieth century." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"[…] when the three enigmatic numbers are combined in this form, e^iπ, they react together to carve out a wormhole that spirals through the infinite depths of number space to emerge smack dab in the heartland of integers." (David Stipp, "A Most Elegant Equation: Euler's Formula and the Beauty of Mathematics", 2017)

"Euler’s formula - although deceptively simple - is actually staggeringly conceptually difficult to apprehend in its full glory, which is why so many mathematicians and scientists have failed to see its extraordinary scope, range, and ontology, so powerful and extensive as to render it the master equation of existence, from which the whole of mathematics and science can be derived, including general relativity, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism and the strong and weak nuclear forces! It’s not called the God Equation for nothing. It is much more mysterious than any theistic God ever proposed." (Thomas Stark, "God Is Mathematics: The Proofs of the Eternal Existence of Mathematics", 2018)

On Manifolds V (Geometry III)

"Whereas the conception of space and time as a four-dimensional manifold has been very fruitful for mathematical physicists, its effect in the field of epistemology has been only to confuse the issue. Calling time the fourth dimension gives it an air of mystery. One might think that time can now be conceived as a kind of space and try in vain to add visually a fourth dimension to the three dimensions of space. It is essential to guard against such a misunderstanding of mathematical concepts. If we add time to space as a fourth dimension it does not lose any of its peculiar character as time. [...] Musical tones can be ordered according to volume and pitch and are thus brought into a two dimensional manifold. Similarly colors can be determined by the three basic colors red, green and blue… Such an ordering does not change either tones or colors; it is merely a mathematical expression of something that we have known and visualized for a long time. Our schematization of time as a fourth dimension therefore does not imply any changes in the conception of time. [...] the space of visualization is only one of many possible forms that add content to the conceptual frame. We would therefore not call the representation of the tone manifold by a plane the visual representation of the two dimensional tone manifold." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophy of Space and Time", 1928)

"The sequence of numbers which grows beyond any stage already reached by passing to the next number is a manifold of possibilities open towards infinity, it remains forever in the status of creation, but is not a closed realm of things existing in themselves. That we blindly converted one into the other is the true source of our difficulties […]" (Hermann Weyl, "Mathematics and Logic", 1946)

"The first attempts to consider the behavior of so-called 'random neural nets' in a systematic way have led to a series of problems concerned with relations between the 'structure' and the 'function' of such nets. The 'structure' of a random net is not a clearly defined topological manifold such as could be used to describe a circuit with explicitly given connections. In a random neural net, one does not speak of 'this' neuron synapsing on 'that' one, but rather in terms of tendencies and probabilities associated with points or regions in the net." (Anatol Rapoport, "Cycle distributions in random nets", The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 10(3), 1948)

"The main object of study in differential geometry is, at least for the moment, the differential manifolds, structures on the manifolds (Riemannian, complex, or other), and their admissible mappings. On a manifold the coordinates are valid only locally and do not have a geometric meaning themselves." (Shiing-Shen Chern, "Differential geometry, its past and its future", 1970)

"[...] a manifold is a set M on which 'nearness' is introduced (a topological space), and this nearness can be described at each point in M by using coordinates. It also requires that in an overlapping region, where two coordinate systems intersect, the coordinate transformation is given by differentiable transition functions." (Kenji Ueno & Toshikazu Sunada, "A Mathematical Gift, III: The Interplay Between Topology, Functions, Geometry, and Algebra", Mathematical World Vol. 23, 1996)

"It is commonly said that the study of manifolds is, in general, the study of the generalization of the concept of surfaces. To some extent, this is true. However, defining it that way can lead to overshadowing by 'figures' such as geometrical surfaces." (Kenji Ueno & Toshikazu Sunada, "A Mathematical Gift, III: The Interplay Between Topology, Functions, Geometry, and Algebra", Mathematical World Vol. 23, 1996)

"One could also question whether we are looking for a single overarching mathematical structure or a combination of different complementary points of view. Does a fundamental theory of Nature have a global definition, or do we have to work with a series of local definitions, like the charts and maps of a manifold, that describe physics in various 'duality frames'. At present string theory is very much formulated in the last kind of way." (Robbert Dijkgraaf, "Mathematical Structures", 2005)

"Quantum physics, in particular particle and string theory, has proven to be a remarkable fruitful source of inspiration for new topological invariants of knots and manifolds. With hindsight this should perhaps not come as a complete surprise. Roughly one can say that quantum theory takes a geometric object (a manifold, a knot, a map) and associates to it a (complex) number, that represents the probability amplitude for a certain physical process represented by the object." (Robbert Dijkgraaf, "Mathematical Structures", 2005)

"The primary aspects of the theory of complex manifolds are the geometric structure itself, its topological structure, coordinate systems, etc., and holomorphic functions and mappings and their properties. Algebraic geometry over the complex number field uses polynomial and rational functions of complex variables as the primary tools, but the underlying topological structures are similar to those that appear in complex manifold theory, and the nature of singularities in both the analytic and algebraic settings is also structurally very similar." (Raymond O Wells Jr, "Differential and Complex Geometry: Origins, Abstractions and Embeddings", 2017)

"Therefore one has taken everywhere the opposite road, and each time one encounters manifolds of several dimensions in geometry, as in the doctrine of definite integrals in the theory of imaginary quantities, one takes spatial intuition as an aid. It is well known how one gets thus a real overview over the subject and how only thus are precisely the essential points emphasized." (Bernhard Riemann)

Mental Models LX

"Chemistry and physics are experimental sciences; and those who are engaged in attempting to enlarge the boundaries of science by experiment are generally unwilling to publish speculations; for they have learned, by long experience, that it is unsafe to anticipate events. It is true, they must make certain theories and hypotheses. They must form some kind of mental picture of the relations between the phenomena which they are trying to investigate, else their experiments would be made at random, and without connection." (William Ramsay, "Radium and Its Products", Harper’s Magazine, 1904)

"A mental image gives you a framework upon which to work. It is like the drawing of the architect, or the map of the explorer. Think over this for a few moments until you get the idea firmly fixed in your mind." (William W Atkinson, "Practical Mental Influence and Mental Fascination", 1908)

"A mind exclusively bent upon the idea of utility necessarily narrows the range of the imagination. For it is the imagination which pictures to the inner eye of the investigator the indefinitely extending sphere of the possible, - that region of hypothesis and explanation, of underlying cause and controlling law. The area of suggestion and experiment is thus pushed beyond the actual field of vision." (John G Hibben, "The Paradox of Research", The North American Review 188 (634), 1908)

"The unconscious [...] is always empty - or, more accurately, it is as alien to mental images as is the stomach to the foods which pass through it." (Claude Levi-Strauss, "Structural Anthropology", 1958)

"A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow front this structure. […]  a person might use his cognitive map to derive explanations of the past, make predictions for the future, and choose policies in the present." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)

"The cognitive map is not a picture or image which 'looks like' what it represents; rather, it is an information structure from which map-like images can be reconstructed and from which behaviour dependent upon place information can be generated." (John O'Keefe & Lynn Nadel, "The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map", 1978)

"A symbol is a mental representation regarding the internal reality referring to its object by a convention and produced by the conscious interpretation of a sign. In contrast to signals, symbols may be used every time if the receiver has the corresponding representation. Symbols also relate to feelings and thus give access not only to information but also to the communicator’s motivational and emotional state. The use of symbols makes it possible for the organism using it to evoke in the receiver the same response it evokes in himself. To communicate with symbols is to use a language." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"In the definition of meaning, it is assumed that both the source and receiver have previously coded (and stored) signals of the same or similar referents, such that the messages may have meaning and relate to behaviour. That is, the used symbols must have the same signification for both sender and receiver. If not, the receiver will create a different mental picture than intended by the transmitter. Meaning is generated by individuals in a process of social interaction with a more or less common environment. It is a relation subsisting within a field of experience and appears as an emergent property of a symbolic representation when used in culturally accepted interaction. The relation between the symbolic representation and its meaning is random. Of this, however, the mathematical theory has nothing to say. If human links in the chain of communication are missing, of course no questions of meaning will arise." (Lars Skyttner, "General Systems Theory: Ideas and Applications", 2001)

"The mental model is the arena where imagination takes place. It enables us to experiment with different scenarios by making local alterations to the model. […] To speak of causality, we must have a mental model of the real world. […] Our shared mental models bind us together into communities." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"A mental model is a representation, inside your head, of an external reality. Mental models are the basic units which construct a person’s world view. It is the representation that a person has in his mind about the object he is interacting with. It is the way the person thinks about what it is they are doing or dealing with. Mental models shape our actions as to how we act or behave in a particular situation. They define what people will pay attention to and how they approach and solve problems. Mental models are tools for the mind." (Anshul Khare & Vishal Khandelwal, "Mental Models, Investing, And You" Vol 1)

Mental Models LVI (Conceptual Models III)

"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)

"The 'physical' does not mean any particular kind of reality, but a particular kind of denoting reality, namely a system of concepts in the natural sciences which is necessary for the cognition of reality. 'The physical' should not be interpreted wrongly as an attribute of one part of reality, but not of the other ; it is rather a word denoting a kind of conceptual construction, as, e.g., the markers 'geographical' or 'mathematical', which denote not any distinct properties of real things, but always merely a manner of presenting them by means of ideas." (Moritz Schlick, "Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre", 1925)

"The rule is derived inductively from experience, therefore does not have any inner necessity, is always valid only for special cases and can anytime be refuted by opposite facts. On the contrary, the law is a logical relation between conceptual constructions; it is therefore deductible from upper laws and enables the derivation of lower laws; it has as such a logical necessity in concordance with its upper premises; it is not a mere statement of probability, but has a compelling, apodictic logical value once its premises are accepted."(Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Kritische Theorie der Formbildung", 1928)

"As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometimes called a schema." (Mary Douglas, "Purity and Danger", 1966)

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

"The understanding of a thing begins and ends with some conceptual model of it. The model is the better, the more accurate, and inclusive. But even rough models can be used to guide - or misguide - research." (Bunge A Mario, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001)

"A conceptual model is a mental image of a system, its components, its interactions. It lays the foundation for more elaborate models, such as physical or numerical models. A conceptual model provides a framework in which to think about the workings of a system or about problem solving in general. An ensuing operational model can be no better than its underlying conceptualization." (Henry N Pollack, "Uncertain Science … Uncertain World", 2005)

"[...] a single thing may elicit several appearances, various conceptual models of it, or several plans of action for it, depending on the subject’s abilities and interests." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts.  This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical).  This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception, and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception.  We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it.  And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

Information Theory I

"Cybernetics is concerned primarily with the construction of theories and models in science, without making a hard and fast distinction between the physical and the biological sciences. The theories and models occur both in symbols and in hardware, and by 'hardware’ we shall mean a machine or computer built in terms of physical or chemical, or indeed any handleable parts. Most usually we shall think of hardware as meaning electronic parts such as valves and relays. Cybernetics insists, also, on a further and rather special condition that distinguishes it from ordinary scientific theorizing: it demands a certain standard of effectiveness. In this respect it has acquired some of the same motive power that has driven research on modern logic, and this is especially true in the construction and application of artificial languages and the use of operational definitions. Always the search is for precision and effectiveness, and we must now discuss the question of effectiveness in some detail. It should be noted that when we talk in these terms we are giving pride of place to the theory of automata at the expense, at least to some extent, of feedback and information theory." (Frank H George, "The Brain As A Computer", 1962)

"The general notion in communication theory is that of information. In many cases, the flow of information corresponds to a flow of energy, e. g. if light waves emitted by some objects reach the eye or a photoelectric cell, elicit some reaction of the organism or some machinery, and thus convey information." (Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General System Theory", 1968) 

"The 'flow of information' through human communication channels is enormous. So far no theory exists, to our knowledge, which attributes any sort of unambiguous measure to this 'flow'." (Anatol Rapoport, "Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist", 1969)

"Probability plays a central role in many fields, from quantum mechanics to information theory, and even older fields use probability now that the presence of "noise" is officially admitted. The newer aspects of many fields start with the admission of uncertainty." (Richard Hamming, "Methods of Mathematics Applied to Calculus, Probability, and Statistics", 1985)

"The field of 'information theory' began by using the old hardware paradigm of transportation of data from point to point." (Marshall McLuhan & Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: The New Science, 1988)

"Without an understanding of causality there can be no theory of communication. What passes as information theory today is not communication at all, but merely transportation." (Marshall McLuhan & Eric McLuhan, "Laws of Media: The New Science", 1988)

"If quantum communication and quantum computation are to flourish, a new information theory will have to be developed." (Hans Christian von Baeyer, "Information, The New Language of Science", 2003)

"In fact, an information theory that leaves out the issue of noise turns out to have no content." (Hans Christian von Baeyer, "Information, The New Language of Science", 2003)

"In an information economy, entrepreneurs master the science of information in order to overcome the laws of the purely physical sciences. They can succeed because of the surprising power of the laws of information, which are conducive to human creativity. The central concept of information theory is a measure of freedom of choice. The principle of matter, on the other hand, is not liberty but limitation - it has weight and occupies space." (George Gilder, "Knowledge and Power: The Information Theory of Capitalism and How it is Revolutionizing our World", 2013)

"Information theory leads to the quantification of the information content of the source, as denoted by entropy, the characterization of the information-bearing capacity of the communication channel, as related to its noise characteristics, and consequently the establishment of the relationship between the information content of the source and the capacity of the channel. In short, information theory provides a quantitative measure of the information contained in message signals and help determine the capacity of a communication system to transfer this information from source to sink over a noisy channel in a reliable fashion." (Ali Grami, "Information Theory", 2016)

On Symbols (1920-1929)

"Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols." (Edward Sapir, "Language", 1921) 

"The essence of language lies, not in the use of this or that special means of communication, but in the employment of fixed associations (however these may have originated) in order that something now sensible - a spoken word, a picture, a gesture, or what not — may call up the 'idea' of something else. Whenever this is done, what is now sensible may be called a 'sign' or 'symbol', and that of which it is intended to call up the 'idea' may be called its 'meaning'." This is a rough outline of what constitutes 'meaning'." (Bertrand Russell, "Analysis of Mind", 1921)

"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)

"The fundamental concepts of each science, the instruments with which it pro pounds its questions and formulates its solutions, are regarded no longer as passive images of something but as symbols created by the intellect itself." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"The logic of things, i.e., of the material concepts and relations on which the structure of a science rests, cannot be separated by the logic of signs. For the sign is no mere accidental cloak of the idea, but its necessary and essential organ. It serves not merely to communicate a complete and given thought content, but is an instrument, by means of which this content develops and fully defines itself. […] Consequently, all truly strict and exact thought is sustained by the symbolic and semiotics on which it is based." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"These symbols are so constituted that the necessary logical consequences of the image are always images of the necessary natural consequences of the imagined objects." (Ernst Cassirer, "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms", 1923)

"All traditional logic habitually assumes that precise symbols are being employed. It is therefore not applicable to this terrestrial life but only to an imagined celestial existence." (Bertrand Russell, 1923)

"A poem therefore is to be defined as a structure of words whose sound constitutes a rhythmical unity, complete in itself, irrefragable, unanalyzable, completing its symbolic references within the ambit of its sound effects." (Herbert Read, "What is a Poem", 1926) 

"Once a statement is cast into mathematical form it may be manipulated in accordance with [mathematical] rules and every configuration of the symbols will represent facts in harmony with and dependent on those contained in the original statement. Now this comes very close to what we conceive the action of the brain structures to be in performing intellectual acts with the symbols of ordinary language. In a sense, therefore, the mathematician has been able to perfect a device through which a part of the labor of logical thought is carried on outside the central nervous system with only that supervision which is requisite to manipulate the symbols in accordance with the rules." (Horatio B Williams, "Mathematics and the Biological Sciences", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 38, 1927)

"The self-organisation of society depends on commonly diffused symbols evoking commonly diffused ideas, and at the same time indicating commonly understood action." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect", 1927)

"Science aims at constructing a world which shall be symbolic of the world of commonplace experience." (Sir Arthur S Eddington, "The Nature of the Physical World", 1928)

"If to-day you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the æther or the electron to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that; it has no means of probing beneath the symbolism. To understand the phenomena of the physical world it is necessary to know the equations which the symbols obey but not the nature of that which is being symbolised [...]" (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world behind the symbols, because it is unadapted to anything except symbols, and its perfection is a perfection of symbolic linkage. You cannot apply such a scheme to the parts of our personality which are not measurable by symbols any more than you can extract the square root of a sonnet." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Our environment may and should mean something towards us which is not to be measured with the tools of the physicist or described by the metrical symbols of the mathematician." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"The exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols, beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating." (Arthur S Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", 1929)

"Language is the communicative process par excellence in every known society, and it is exceedingly important to observe that whatever may be the shortcomings of a primitive society judged from the vantage point of civilization its language inevitably forms as sure, complete and potentially creative an apparatus of referential symbolism as the most sophisticated language that we know of." (Edward Sapir, "Communication", 1931)

On Symbols (1940-1949)

"Symbols have a trick of stealing the show away from the thing they stand for." (Henry S Haskins, "Meditations in Wall Street", 1940) 

"We now come to a decisive step of mathematical abstraction: we forget about what the symbols stand for […] The mathematician] need not be idle; there are many operations which he may carry out with these symbols, without ever having to look at the things they stand for." (Hermann Weyl, "The Mathematical Way of Thinking", 1940)

"Nothing is harder to understand than a symbolic work. A symbol always transcends the one who makes use of it and makes him say in reality more than he is aware of expressing." (Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus", 1942)

"[The power of understanding symbols] issues in an unconscious, spontaneous process of abstraction, which goes on all the time in the human mind: a process of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience, and forming a conception accordingly." (Suzanne K Langer, "Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art", 1942)

"It is generally agreed that thought employs symbols such as written or spoken words or tokens; but it is not generally considered whether the whole of thought may not consist of a process of symbolism, nor is the nature of symbolism and its presence or absence in the inorganic world discussed." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"My hypothesis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality - that its essential feature is not ‘the mind’, ‘the self’, ‘sense-data’, nor propositions but symbolism, and that this symbolism is largely of the same kind as that which is familiar to us in mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is evidence of similar mechanisms at work in our own sensory and central nervous systems; and the function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise […]" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Thus we do not try to prove the existence of the external world – we discover it, because the fundamental power of words or other symbols to represent events [...] permits us to put forward hypotheses and test their truth by reference to experience. [..] A particular type of symbolism may always fail in a particular case, as Euclidean geometry apparently fails to represent stellar space; but if all types of symbolism always failed, we should be unable to recognise any objects or exist at all." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Without falling into the trap of attempting a precise definition, we may suggest a theory as to the general nature of symbolism, viz. that it is the ability of processes to parallel or imitate each other, or the fact that they can do so since there are recurrent patterns in reality." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Man has [...] discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system." (Ernst Cassirer, "An Essay on Man", 1944)

"A mathematician is not a man who can readily manipulate figures; often he cannot. He is not even a man who can readily perform the transformations of equations by the use of calculus. He is primarily an individual who is skilled in the use of symbolic logic on a high plane, and especially he is a man of intuitive judgment in the choice of the manipulative processes he employs." (Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think", 1945)

"Figures and symbols are closely connected with mathematical thinking, their use assists the mind. […] At any rate, the use of mathematical symbols is similar to the use of words. Mathematical notation appears as a sort of language, une langue bien faite, a language well adapted to its purpose, concise and precise, with rules which, unlike the rules of ordinary grammar, suffer no exception." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"For, in mathematics or symbolic logic, reason can crank out the answer from the symboled equations -even a calculating machine can often do so - but it cannot alone set up the equations. Imagination resides in the words which define and connect the symbols - subtract them from the most aridly rigorous mathematical treatise and all meaning vanishes." (Ralph W Gerard, "The Biological Basis of Imagination", American Thought, 1947)

"When one analyzes the pre-conscious step to concepts, one always finds ideas which consist of 'symbolic images'. The first step to thinking is a painted vision of these inner pictures whose origin cannot be reduced only and firstly to the sensual perception but which are produced by an 'instinct to imagining' and which are re-produced by different individuals independently, i.e. collectively [...] But the archaic image is also the necessary predisposition and the source of a scientific attitude. To a total recognition belong also those images out of which have grown the rational concepts." (Wolfgang Pauli, [Letter to Markus Fierz] 1948)

"Belief has its structures, and its symbols change. Its tradition changes. All the relationships within these forms are inter-dependent. We look at the symbols, we hope to read them, we hope for sharing and communication." (Muriel Rukeyser, "The Life of Poetry", 1949)

"However obvious these facts may appear at first glance, they are actually not so obvious as they seem except when we take special pains to think about the subject. Symbols and things symbolized are independent of each other; nevertheless, we all have a way of feeling as if […] there were necessary connections." (Samuel I Hayakawa, "Language in Thought and Action", 1949)

"Men cannot be treated as units in operations of political arithmetic because they behave like the symbols for zero and the infinite, which dislocate all mathematical operations." (Arthur Koestler, "Crossman", 1949)

"The first of the principles governing symbols is this: The symbol is NOT the thing symbolized; the word is NOT the thing; the map is NOT the territory it stands for." (Samuel I Hayakawa, "Language in Thought and Action", 1949)

On Symbols (1960-1969)

"By a symbol I do not mean an allegory or a sign, but an image that describes in the best possible way the dimly discerned nature of the spirit. A symbol does not define or explain; it points beyond itself to a meaning that is darkly divined yet still beyond our grasp, and cannot be adequately expressed in the familiar words of our language." (Carl G Jung, "The Structure And Dynamics Of The Psyche", 1960)

"Language, in its origin and essence, is simply a system of signs or symbols that denote real occurrences or their echo in the human soul." (Carl G Jung, "The Structure And Dynamics Of The Psyche", 1960)

"Cybernetics is concerned primarily with the construction of theories and models in science, without making a hard and fast distinction between the physical and the biological sciences. The theories and models occur both in symbols and in hardware, and by 'hardware’ we shall mean a machine or computer built in terms of physical or chemical, or indeed any handleable parts." (Frank H George, "The Brain As A Computer", 1962)

"Science is the reduction of the bewildering diversity of unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol systems, and technology is the art of using these symbol systems so as to control and organize unique events. Scientific observation is always a viewing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system, and technological praxis is always handling of things in ways that some symbol system has dictated. Education in science and technology is essentially education on the symbol level." (Aldous L Huxley, "Essay", Daedalus, 1962)

"For Science in its totality, the ultimate goal is the creation of a monistic system in which - on the symbolic level and in terms of the inferred components of invisibility and intangibly fine structure - the world’s enormous multiplicity is reduced to something like unity, and the endless successions of unique events of a great many different kinds get tidied and simplified into a single rational order. Whether this goal will ever be reached remains to be seen. Meanwhile we have the various sciences, each with its own system coordinating concepts, its own criterion of explanation." (Aldous Huxley, "Literature and Science", 1963)

"It is always extremely difficult to express thoughts. Words and phrases are so many fretters by which our spirit is bound. Words are mere symbols of reality, and the written word is not more than a one-dimensional fl ow across the two-dimensional page of a three-dimensional book." (Charles-Noël Martin, "The Role of Perception in Science", 1963)

"The aim of science is to apprehend this purely intelligible world as a thing in itself, an object which is what it is independently of all thinking, and thus antithetical to the sensible world. [...] The world of thought is the universal, the timeless and spaceless, the absolutely necessary, whereas the world of sense is the contingent, the changing and moving appearance which somehow indicates or symbolizes it." (Robin G Collingwood, "Essays in the Philosophy of Art", 1964)

"This language controls by reducing the linguistic forms and symbols of reflection, abstraction, development, contradiction; by substituting images for concepts. It denies or absorbs the transcendent vocabulary; it does not search for but establishes and imposes truth and falsehood." (Herbert Marcuse, "One-Dimensional Man", 1964)

"Thus a word or an image is symbolic when it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider ‘unconscious’ aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. […] As the mind explores the symbols it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason." (Carl G Jung, "Man and His Symbols", 1964)

"[…] it took men about five thousand years, counting from the beginning of number symbols, to think of a symbol for nothing." (Isaac Asimov, "Of Time and Space and Other Things" , 1965)

"Specific procedures of universe-maintenance become necessary when the symbolic universe has become a problem. As long as this is not the case, the symbolic universe is self-maintaining, that is, self-legitimating by the sheer facticity of its objective existence in the society in question." (Peter L Berger, "The Social Construction of Reality", 1966) 

"There is nothing that can be said by mathematical symbols and relations which cannot also be said by words. The converse, however, is false. Much that can be and is said by words cannot successfully be put into equations, because it is nonsense." (Clifford A Truesdell, "Six Lectures on Modern Natural Philosophy", 1966)

"The symbol is the tool which gives man his power, and it is the same tool whether the symbols are images or words, mathematical signs or mesons." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Reach of Imagination", 1967)

"Symbolic interactionism rests [...] on three simple premises. The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. [...] The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters." (Herbert Blumer, "Symbolic Interactionism", 1969)

Set Theory I

"[a set is] an embodiment of the idea or concept which we conceive when we regard the arrangement of its parts as a matter of indifference." (Bernard Bolzano, 1847)

"Since the examination of consistency is a task that cannot be avoided, it appears necessary to axiomatize logic itself and to prove that number theory and set theory are only parts of logic. This method was prepared long ago (not least by Frege’s profound investigations); it has been most successfully explained by the acute mathematician and logician Russell. One could regard the completion of this magnificent Russellian enterprise of the axiomatization of logic as the crowning achievement of the work of axiomatization as a whole." (David Hilbert, "Axiomatisches Denken" ["Axiomatic Thinking"], [address] 1917)

"It seems clear that [set theory] violates against the essence of the continuum, which, by its very nature, cannot at all be battered into a single set of elements. Not the relationship of an element to a set, but of a part to a whole ought to be taken as a basis for the analysis of a continuum." (Hermann Weyl, "Reimanns geometrische Ideen, ihre Auswirkungen und ihre Verknüpfung mit der Gruppentheorie", 1925)

"To say that mathematics in general has been reduced to logic hints at some new firming up of mathematics at its foundations. This is misleading. Set theory is less settled and more conjectural than the classical mathematical superstructure than can be founded upon it." (Willard van Orman Quine, "Elementary Logic", 1941)

"The emphasis on mathematical methods seems to be shifted more towards combinatorics and set theory - and away from the algorithm of differential equations which dominates mathematical physics." (John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", 1944)

"But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future sense perception will agree with them and, moreover, to believe that a question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in future." (Kurt Gödel, "What is Cantor’s Continuum problem?", American Mathematical Monthly 54, 1947)

"Categorical algebra has developed in recent years as an effective method of organizing parts of mathematics. Typically, this sort of organization uses notions such as that of the category G of all groups. [...] This raises the problem of finding some axiomatization of set theory - or of some foundational discipline like set theory - which will be adequate and appropriate to realizing this intent. This problem may turn out to have revolutionary implications vis-`a-vis the accepted views of the role of set theory." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categorical algebra and set-theoretic foundations", 1967)

"In set theory, perhaps more than in any other branch of mathematics, it is vital to set up a collection of symbolic abbreviations for various logical concepts. Because the basic assumptions of set theory are absolutely minimal, all but the most trivial assertions about sets tend to be logically complex, and a good system of abbreviations helps to make otherwise complex statements."  (Keith Devlin, "Sets, Functions, and Logic: An Introduction to Abstract Mathematics", 1979)

"Set theory is peculiarly important [...] because mathematics can be exhibited as involving nothing but set-theoretical propositions about set-theoretical entities." (David M Armstrong, "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility", 1989)

"At the basis of the distance concept lies, for example, the concept of convergent point sequence and their defined limits, and one can, by choosing these ideas as those fundamental to point set theory, eliminate the notions of distance." (Felix Hausdorff)

Mental Models LVIII

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"A mental model is conceived here as a knowledge structure possessing slots that can be filled not only with empirically gained information but also with 'default assumptions' resulting from prior experience. These default assumptions can be substituted by updated information so that inferences based on the model can be corrected without abandoning the model as a whole. Information is assimilated to the slots of a mental model in the form of 'frames' which are understood here as 'chunks' of knowledge with a well-defined meaning anchored in a given body of shared knowledge." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"In the language of mental models, such past experience provided the default assumptions necessary to fill the gaps in the emerging and necessarily incomplete framework of a relativistic theory of gravitation. It was precisely the nature of these default assumptions that allowed them to be discarded again in the light of novel information - provided, for instance, by the further elaboration of the mathematical formalism - without, however, having to abandon the underlying mental models which could thus continue to function as heuristic orientations." (Jürgen Renn, "Before the Riemann Tensor: The Emergence of Einstein’s Double Strategy", [in "The Universe of General Relativity"] 2000)

"A mental model represents a possibility, or, to be precise, the structure and content of the model capture what is common to the different ways in which the possibility could occur [...]" (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"According to mental model theory, human reasoning relies on the construction of integrated mental representations of the information that is given in the reasoning problem's premises. These integrated representations are the mental models. A mental model is a mental representation that captures what is common to all the different ways in which the premises can be interpreted. It represents in "small scale" how "reality" could be— according to what is stated in the premises of a reasoning problem. Mental models, though, must not be confused with images. A mental model often forms the basis of one or more visual images, but some of them represent situations that cannot be visualized. Instead, mental models are often likened to diagrams since, as with diagrams, their structure is analogous to the structure of the states of affairs they represent." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Mental models are mental representations of a certain type. The main problem in the philosophy of mental representation is to characterize the relation between a mental representation and the represented object. Naively speaking, a mental representation is an entity that 'stands for' another—the represented object - , but here 'stands for' is just a metaphoric place-holder for 'represents', thus requires further explanation." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"Prom the processing view, the model theory distinguishes between three different operations. In the construction phase, reasoners construct the mental model that reflects the information from the premises. In the inspection phase, this model is inspected to find new information that is not explicitly given in the premises. In most variants of the model theory, the inspection process is conceptualized as a spatial focus that scans the model to find new information not given in the premises.. In the variation phase, reasoners try to construct alternative models from the premises that refute the putative conclusion. If no such model is found, the putative conclusion is considered true." (Carsten Held et al, "Mental Models and the Mind", 2006)

"The model theory postulates that mental models are parsimonious. They represent what is possible, but not what is impossible, according to assertions. This principle of parsimony minimizes the load on working memory, and so it applies unless something exceptional occurs to overrule it." (Philip N Johnson-Laird, Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences, [in "Mental Models and the Mind"], 2006)

"Just as physicists have created models of the atom based on observed data and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in their data, so must designers create models of users based on observed behaviors and intuitive synthesis of the patterns in the data. Only after we formalize such patterns can we hope to systematically construct patterns of interaction that smoothly match the behavior patterns, mental models, and goals of users. Personas provide this formalization." (Alan Cooper et al, "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

"We tend to form mental models that are simpler than reality; so if we create represented models that are simpler than the actual implementation model, we help the user achieve a better understanding. […] Understanding how software actually works always helps someone to use it, but this understanding usually comes at a significant cost. One of the most significant ways in which computers can assist human beings is by putting a simple face on complex processes and situations. As a result, user interfaces that are consistent with users’ mental models are vastly superior to those that are merely reflections of the implementation model." (Alan Cooper et al,  "About Face 3: The Essentials of Interaction Design", 2007)

On Diagrams (2000-2019)

"Concept maps have long provided visual languages widely used in many different disciplines and application domains. Abstractly, they are sorted graphs visually represented as nodes having a type, name and content, some of which are linked by arcs. Concretely, they are structured diagrams having discipline- and domain-specific interpretations for their user communities, and, sometimes, formally defining computer data structures. Concept maps have been used for a wide range of purposes and it would be useful to make such usage available over the World Wide Web." (Brian R Gaines, "WebMap: Concept Mapping on the Web", 2001) 

"Data is transformed into graphics to understand. A map, a diagram are documents to be interrogated. But understanding means integrating all of the data. In order to do this it’s necessary to reduce it to a small number of elementary data. This is the objective of the 'data treatment' be it graphic or mathematic." (Jacques Bertin, [interview] 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. […] [Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"A causal map is a word-and-arrow diagram in which ideas and actions are causally linked with one another through the use of arrows. The arrows indicate how one idea or action leads to another. Causal mapping makesit possible to articulate a large number of ideas and their interconnections in such a way that people can know what to do in an area of concern, how to do it and why, because the arrows indicate the causes and consequences of an idea or action. Causal mapping is therefore a technique for linking strategic thinking and acting, helping make sense of complex problems, and communicating to oneself and others what might be done about them." (John M Bryson et al, "Visible Thinking: Unlocking Causal Mapping For Practical Business Results", 2004)

"Graphical design notations have been with us for a while [...] their primary value is in communication and understanding. A good diagram can often help communicate ideas about a design, particularly when you want to avoid a lot of details. Diagrams can also help you understand either a software system or a business process. As part of a team trying to figure out something, diagrams both help understanding and communicate that understanding throughout a team. Although they aren't, at least yet, a replacement for textual programming languages, they are a helpful assistant." (Martin Fowler," UML Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Standard Object Modeling", 2004)

"In mathematics a good diagram is an invaluable aid to clear reasoning, whereas a bad one can seriously mislead. But it is not often that a diagram is good enough to suggest fresh avenues of inquiry altogether." (Anthony W F Edwards, "Cogwheels of the mind: The story of Venn diagrams", 2004)

"Good diagrams clarify. Very good diagrams force the ideas upon the viewer. The best diagrams compellingly embody the ideas themselves." (R W Oldford & W H Cherry, "Picturing Probability: the poverty of Venn diagrams, the richness of Eikosograms", 2006)

"A diagram is a graphic shorthand. Though it is an ideogram, it is not necessarily an abstraction. It is a representation of something in that it is not the thing itself. In this sense, it cannot help but be embodied. It can never be free of value or meaning, even when it attempts to express relationships of formation and their processes. At the same time, a diagram is neither a structure nor an abstraction of structure." (Peter Eisenman, "Written Into the Void: Selected Writings", 1990-2004, 2007)

"A modeling language is usually based on some kind of computational model, such as a state machine, data flow, or data structure. The choice of this model, or a combination of many, depends on the modeling target. Most of us make this choice implicitly without further thinking: some systems call for capturing dynamics and thus we apply for example state machines, whereas other systems may be better specified by focusing on their static structures using feature diagrams or component diagrams. For these reasons a variety of modeling languages are available." (Steven Kelly & Juha-Pekka Tolvanen, "Domain-specific Modeling", 2008)

"What was clearly useful was the use of diagrams to prove certain results either in algebraic topology, homological algebra or algebraic geometry. It is clear that doing category theory, or simply applying category theory, implies manipulating diagrams: constructing the relevant diagrams, chasing arrows by going via various paths in diagrams and showing they are equal, etc. This practice suggests that diagram manipulation, or more generally diagrams, constitutes the natural syntax of category theory and the category-theoretic way of thinking. Thus, if one could develop a formal language based on diagrams and diagrams manipulation, one would have a natural syntactical framework for category theory. However, moving from the informal language of categories which includes diagrams and diagrammatic manipulations to a formal language based on diagrams and diagrammatic manipulations is not entirely obvious." (Jean-Pierre Marquis, "From a Geometrical Point of View: A Study of the History and Philosophy of Category Theory", 2009)

"Diagrams are information graphics that are made up primarily of geometric shapes, such as rectangles, circles, diamonds, or triangles, that are typically (but not always) interconnected by lines or arrows. One of the major purposes of a diagram is to show how things, people, ideas, activities, etc. interrelate and interconnect. Unlike quantitative charts and graphs, diagrams are used to show interrelationships in a qualitative way." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"What advantages do diagrams have over verbal descriptions in promoting system understanding? First, by providing a diagram, massive amounts of information can be presented more efficiently. A diagram can strip down informational complexity to its core - in this sense, it can result in a parsimonious, minimalist description of a system. Second, a diagram can help us see patterns in information and data that may appear disordered otherwise. For example, a diagram can help us see mechanisms of cause and effect or can illustrate sequence and flow in a complex system. Third, a diagram can result in a less ambiguous description than a verbal description because it forces one to come up with a more structured description." (Robbie T Nakatsu, "Diagrammatic Reasoning in AI", 2010)

"[…] a conceptual model is a diagram connecting variables and constructs based on theory and logic that displays the hypotheses to be tested." (Mary Wolfinbarger Celsi et al, "Essentials of Business Research Methods", 2011)

"Diagrams furnish only approximate information. They do not add anything to the meaning of the data and, therefore, are not of much use to a statistician or research worker for further mathematical treatment or statistical analysis. On the other hand, graphs are more obvious, precise and accurate than the diagrams and are quite helpful to the statistician for the study of slopes, rates of change and estimation, (interpolation and extrapolation), wherever possible." (S C Gupta & Indra Gupta, "Business Statistics", 2013)

"Systems archetypes thus provide a good starting theory from which we can develop further insights into the nature of a particular system. The diagram that results from working with an archetype should not be viewed as the 'truth', however, but rather a good working model of what we know at any point in time." (Daniel H Kim, "Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Theories", The Systems Thinker Vol. 24 (1), 2013)

"As mathematics gets more abstract, diagrams become more and more prominent as the ways that things fit together abstractly become both more subtle and more important. Moreover, the diagram often sums up the situation more succinctly than the explanation in words, [..]" (Eugenia Cheng, "Beyond Infinity: An Expedition to the Outer Limits of Mathematics", 2017)

"Models are formal structures represented in mathematics and diagrams that help us to understand the world. Mastery of models improves your ability to reason, explain, design, communicate, act, predict, and explore." (Scott E Page, "The Model Thinker", 2018) 

On Diagrams (1950-1974)

"The diagrams incorporate a large amount of information. Their use provides extensive savings in space and in mental effort. In the case of many theorems, the setting up of the correct diagram is the major part of the proof. We therefore urge that the reader stop at the end of each theorem and attempt to construct for himself the relevant diagram before examining the one which is given in the text. Once this is done, the subsequent demonstration can be followed more readily; in fact, the reader can usually supply it himself." (Samuel Eilenberg & Norman E. Steenrod, "Foundations of Algebraic Topology", 1952)

"A logic machine is a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving problems in formal logic. A logic diagram is a geometrical method for doing the same thing. […] A logic diagram is a two-dimensional geometric figure with spatial relations that are isomorphic with the structure of a logical statement. These spatial relations are usually of a topological character, which is not surprising in view of the fact that logic relations are the primitive relations underlying all deductive reasoning and topological properties are, in a sense, the most fundamental properties of spatial structures. Logic diagrams stand in the same relation to logical algebras as the graphs of curves stand in relation to their algebraic formulas; they are simply other ways of symbolizing the same basic structure." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958)

"The diagrams and circles aid the understanding by making it easy to visualize the elements of a given argument. They have considerable mnemonic value […] They have rhetorical value, not only arousing interest by their picturesque, cabalistic character, but also aiding in the demonstration of proofs and the teaching of doctrines. It is an investigative and inventive art. When ideas are combined in all possible ways, the new combinations start the mind thinking along novel channels and one is led to discover fresh truths and arguments, or to make new inventions. Finally, the Art possesses a kind of deductive power." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958) 

"An information retrieval system is therefore defined here as any device which aids access to documents specified by subject, and the operations associated with it. The documents can be books, journals, reports, atlases, or other records of thought, or any parts of such records - articles, chapters, sections, tables, diagrams, or even particular words. The retrieval devices can range from a bare list of contents to a large digital computer and its accessories. The operations can range from simple visual scanning to the most detailed programming." (Brian C Vickery, "The Structure of Information Retrieval Systems", 1959)

"Diagrams are sometimes used, not merely to convey several pieces of information such as several time series on one chart, but also to provide visual evidence of relationships between the series." (Alfred R Ilersic, "Statistics", 1959)

"It is extremely helpful to the imagination to have a geometric picture available in terms of which we can visualize sets and operations on sets. […] Diagrammatic thought of this kind is admittedly loose and imprecise; nevertheless, the reader will find it invaluable. No mathematics, however abstract it may appear, is ever carried on without the help of mental images of some kind, and these are often nebulous, personal, and difficult to describe." (George F Simmons, "Introduction to Topology and Modern Analysis", 1963)

"A model is a qualitative or quantitative representation of a process or endeavor that shows the effects of those factors which are significant for the purposes being considered. A model may be pictorial, descriptive, qualitative, or generally approximate in nature; or it may be mathematical and quantitative in nature and reasonably precise. It is important that effective means for modeling be understood such as analog, stochastic, procedural, scheduling, flow chart, schematic, and block diagrams." (Harold Chestnut, "Systems Engineering Tools", 1965) 

"A diagram thus enables us to discover the internal categorization which characterizes the information being processed in a much shorter time than does a map. […] A diagram permits the rapid and precise internal processing of information having three components, but it does not permit introducing the information into a universal system of visual memorization and geographic comparison. It is a closed graphic system, limited solely to the information being processed. […] In a diagram, one begins by attributing a meaning to the planar dimensions, then one plots the correspondences." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"A graphic is a diagram when correspondences on the plane can be established among all elements of another component." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"To analyse graphic representation precisely, it is helpful to distinguish it from musical, verbal and mathematical notations, all of which are perceived in a linear or temporal sequence. The graphic image also differs from figurative representation essentially polysemic, and from the animated image, governed by the laws of cinematographic time. Within the boundaries of graphics fall the fields of networks, diagrams and maps. The domain of graphic imagery ranges from the depiction of atomic structures to the representation of galaxies and extends into the spheres of topography and cartography."  (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"When the correspondences on the plane can be established between: - all the divisions of one component - and all the divisions of another component, the construction is a DIAGRAM." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"Pure mathematics are concerned only with abstract propositions, and have nothing to do with the realities of nature. There is no such thing in actual existence as a mathematical point, line or surface. There is no such thing as a circle or square. But that is of no consequence. We can define them in words, and reason about them. We can draw a diagram, and suppose that line to be straight which is not really straight, and that figure to be a circle which is not strictly a circle. It is conceived therefore by the generality of observers, that mathematics is the science of certainty." (William Godwin, "Thoughts on Man", 1969)

"A diagram is worth a thousand proofs." (Carl E Linderholm, "Mathematics Made Difficult", 1971)

"Category theory starts with the observation that many properties of mathematical systems can be unified and simplified by a presentation with diagrams of arrows." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categories for the Working Mathematician", 1971)

"The result of the implementation, the logical design, is traditionally shown as a series of block diagrams. These blocks represent in effect a series of statements, Actually, a direct presentation of these statements is more suitable and, although less familiar, more easily understood. The Harvard Mark IV was to large degree designed and described by such statements, as has been the case with several subsequent developments." (Gerrit Blaauw, "Computer Architecture", 1972) 

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

Marvin Minsky - Collected Quotes

"Computer languages of the future will be more concerned with goals and less with procedures specified by the programmer." (Marvin Minsky, "Form and Content in Computer Science", [Turing Award lecture] 1969)

"A memory should induce a state through which we see current reality as an instance of the remembered event - or equivalently, see the past as an instance of the present. […] the system can perform a computation analogous to one from the memorable past, but sensitive to present goals and circumstances." (Marvin Minsky, "K-Linesː A Theory of Memory", 1980) 

"Since we have no systematic way to avoid all the inconsistencies of commonsense logic, each person must find his own way by building a private collection of 'cognitive censors' to suppress the kinds of mistakes he has discovered in the past." (Marvin Minsky, "Jokes and their Relation to the Cognitive Unconscious", 1980) 

"When you, ‘get an idea’, or ‘solve a problem’, or have a ‘memorable experience’, you create what we shall call a K-line. This K-line gets connected to those ‘mental agencies’ that were actively involved in the memorable event. When that K-line is later ‘activated’, it reactivates some of those mental agencies, creating a ‘partial mental state’ resembling the original." (Marvin Minsky, "K-Linesː A Theory of Memory", 1980) 

"If explaining minds seems harder than explaining songs, we should remember that sometimes enlarging problems makes them simpler! The theory of the roots of equations seemed hard for centuries within its little world of real numbers, but it suddenly seemed simple once Gauss exposed the larger world of so-called complex numbers. Similarly, music should make more sense once seen through listeners' minds." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"The way the mathematics game is played, most variations lie outside the rules, while music can insist on perfect canon or tolerate a casual accompaniment." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"Theorems often tell us complex truths about the simple things, but only rarely tell us simple truths about the complex ones. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking or ‘mathematics envy’." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"What is the difference between merely knowing (or remembering, or memorizing) and understanding? […] A thing or idea seems meaningful only when we have several different ways to represent it - different perspectives and different associations […]. Then we can turn it around in our minds, so to speak: however it seems at the moment, we can see it another way and we never come to a full stop. In other words, we can 'think' about it. If there were only one way to represent this thing or idea, we would not call this representation thinking." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"The hardest problems we have to face do not come from philosophical questions about whether brains are machines or not. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that brains are anything other than machines with enormous numbers of parts that work in perfect accord with physical laws. As far as anyone can tell, our minds are merely complex processes. The serious problems come from our having had so little experience with machines of such complexity that we are not yet prepared to think effectively about them." (Marvin Minsky, 1986) 

"For generations, scientists and philosophers have tried to explain ordinary reasoning in terms of logical principles - with virtually no success. I suspect this enterprise failed because it was looking in the wrong direction: common sense works so well not because it is an approximation of logic; logic is only a small part of our great accumulation of different, useful ways to chain things together." (Marvin Minsky, "The Society of Mind", 1987) 

"Unless we can explain the mind in terms of things that have no thoughts or feelings of their own, we'll only have gone around in a circle." (Marvin Minsky, "The Society of Mind", 1987) 

"Every system that we build will surprise us with new kinds of flaws until those machines become clever enough to conceal their faults from us." (Marvin Minsky, "The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind", 2006)

"It makes no sense to seek a single best way to represent knowledge - because each particular form of expression also brings its particular limitations. For example, logic-based systems are very precise, but they make it hard to do reasoning with analogies. Similarly, statistical systems are useful for making predictions, but do not serve well to represent the reasons why those predictions are sometimes correct." (Marvin Minsky, "The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind", 2006)

"The idea that the world exists is like adding an extra term to an equation that doesn’t belong there." (Marvin Minsky)

On Complex Numbers X (Quantum Mechanics I)

"Meantime, there is no doubt a certain crudeness in the use of a complex wave function. If it were unavoidable in principle, and not merely a facilitation of the calculation, this would mean that there are in principle two wave functions, which must be used together in order to obtain information on the state of the system. [...] Our inability to give more accurate information about this is intimately connected with the fact that, in the pair of equations [considered], we have before us only the substitute - extraordinarily convenient for the calculation, to be sure - for a real wave equation of probably the fourth order, which, however, I have not succeeded in forming for the non-conservative case."(Edwin Schrödinger, "Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values" , Annalen der Physik Vol. 81 (4), 1926)

"Our bra and ket vectors are complex quantities, since they can be multiplied by complex numbers and are then of the same nature as before, but they are complex quantities of a special kind which cannot be split up into real and pure imaginary parts. The usual method of getting the real part of a complex quantity, by taking half the sum of the quantity itself and its conjugate, cannot be applied since a bra and a ket vector are of different natures and cannot be added." (Paul Dirac, "The Principles of Quantum Mechanics", 1930)

"In his desire to consider at any cost the propagation phenomenon of the waves ψ as something real in the classical sense of the word, the author had refused to acknowledge that the whole development of the theory increasingly tended to highlight the essential complex nature of the wave function." (Edwin Schrödinger. "Mémoires sur la mécanique ondulatoire", 1933) [author‘s comment in the French translation] 

"One might think one could measure a complex dynamical variable by measuring separately its real and pure imaginary parts. But this would involve two measurements or two observations, which would be alright in classical mechanics, but would not do in quantum mechanics, where two observations in general interfere with one another - it is not in general permissible to consider that two observations can be made exactly simultaneously, and if they are made in quick succession the first will usually disturb the state of the system and introduce an indeterminacy that will affect the second." (Ernst C K Stückelberg, "Quantum Theory in Real Hilbert Space", 1960) 

"It has been generally believed that only the complex numbers could legitimately be used as the ground field in discussing quantum-mechanical operators. Over the complex field, Frobenius' theorem is of course not valid; the only division algebra over the complex field is formed by the complex numbers themselves. However, Frobenius' theorem is relevant precisely because the appropriate ground field for much of quantum mechanics is real rather than complex." (Freeman Dyson, "The Threefold Way. Algebraic Structure of Symmetry Groups and Ensembles in Quantum Mechanics" , Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 3, 1962)

"Quantum theory may be formulated using Hilbert spaces over any of the three associative normed division algebras: the real numbers, the complex numbers and the quaternions. Indeed, these three choices appear naturally in a number of axiomatic approaches. However, there are internal problems with real or quaternionic quantum theory. Here we argue that these problems can be resolved if we treat real, complex and quaternionic quantum theory as part of a unified structure. Dyson called this structure the ‘three-fold way’ […] This three-fold classification sheds light on the physics of time reversal symmetry, and it already plays an important role in particle physics." (John C Baez, "Division Algebras and Quantum Theory", 2011)

"It is particularly helpful to use complex numbers to model periodic phenomena, especially to operate with phase differences. Mathematically, one can treat a physical quantity as being complex, but address physical meaning only to its real part. Another possibility is to treat the real and imaginary parts of a complex number as two related (real) physical quantities. In both cases, the structure of complex numbers is useful to make calculations more easily, but no physical meaning is actually attached to complex variables." (Ricardo Karam, "Why are complex numbers needed in quantum mechanics? Some answers for the introductory level", American Journal of Physics Vol. 88 (1), 2020)

"What is essentially different in quantum mechanics is that it deals with complex quantities (e.g. wave functions and quantum state vectors) of a special kind, which cannot be split up into pure real and imaginary parts that can be treated independently. Furthermore, physical meaning is not attached directly to the complex quantities themselves, but to some other operation that produces real numbers (e.g. the square modulus of the wave function or of the inner product between state vectors)." (Ricardo Karam, "Why are complex numbers needed in quantum mechanics? Some answers for the introductory level", American Journal of Physics Vol. 88 (1), 2020)