On Induction (1975-1999)

"Mathematical induction […] is an entirely different procedure. Although it, too, leaps from the knowledge of particular cases to knowledge about an infinite sequence of cases, the leap is purely deductive. It is as certain as any proof in mathematics, and an indispensable tool in almost every branch of mathematics." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)

"The word ‘induction’ has two essentially different meanings. Scientific induction is a process by which scientists make observations of particular cases, such as noticing that some crows are black, then leap to the universal conclusion that all crows are black. The conclusion is never certain. There is always the possibility that at least one unobserved crow is not black." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)

"Science sometimes improves hypothesis and sometimes disproves them. But proof would be another matter and perhaps never occurs except in the realms of totally abstract tautology. We can sometimes say that if such and such abstract suppositions or postulates are given, then such and such abstract suppositions or postulates are given, then such and such must follow absolutely. But the truth about what can be perceived or arrived at by induction from perception is something else again." (Gregory Bateson, "Mind and Nature, a Necessary Unity", 1979)

"Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also strongly cultural." (Stephen J Gould, "The Mismeasure of Man", 1980)

"The purpose of scientific enquiry is not to compile an inventory of factual information, nor to build up a totalitarian world picture of Natural Laws in which every event that is not compulsory is forbidden. We should think of it rather as a logically articulated structure of justifiable beliefs about nature. It begins as a story about a Possible World - a story which we invent and criticize and modify as we go along, so that it winds by being, as nearly as we can make it, a story about real life." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Pluto’s Republic: Incorporating the Art of the Soluble and Induction Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1982)

"It is actually impossible in theory to determine exactly what the hidden mechanism is without opening the box, since there are always many different mechanisms with identical behavior. Quite apart from this, analysis is more difficult than invention in the sense in which, generally, induction takes more time to perform than deduction: in induction one has to search for the way, whereas in deduction one follows a straightforward path." (Valentino Braitenberg, "Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology", 1984)

"All great theories are expansive, and all notions so rich in scope and implication are underpinned by visions about the nature of things. You may call these visions ‘philosophy’, or ‘metaphor’, or ‘organizing principle’, but one thing they are surely not - they are not simple inductions from observed facts of the natural world." (Stephen J Gould,"Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle", 1987)

"Nature is not ‘given’ to us - our minds are never virgin in front of reality. Whatever we say we see or observe is biased by what we already know, think, believe, or wish to see. Some of these thoughts, beliefs and knowledge can function as an obstacle to our understanding of the phenomena. […] mathematics is not a natural science. It is not about the phenomena of the real world, it is not about observation and induction. Mathematical induction is not a method for making generalizations." (Anna Sierpinska,"Understanding in Mathematics", 1994)

"Model building is the art of selecting those aspects of a process that are relevant to the question being asked. As with any art, this selection is guided by taste, elegance, and metaphor; it is a matter of induction, rather than deduction. High science depends on this art." (John H Holland," Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity", 1995)

On Induction (1950-1974)

"To say that observations of the past are certain, whereas predictions are merely probable, is not the ultimate answer to the question of induction; it is only a sort of intermediate answer, which is incomplete unless a theory of probability is developed that explains what we should mean by ‘probable’ and on what ground we can assert probabilities." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy", 1951)

"The result of the mathematician's creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. If the learning of mathematics reflects to any degree the invention of mathematics, it must have a place for guessing, for plausible inference." (George Pólya, "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics", 1954)

"[…] the human reason discovers new relations between things not by deduction, but by that unpredictable blend of speculation and insight […] induction, which - like other forms of imagination - cannot be formalized." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Reach of Imagination", 1967)

"Innocent, unbiased observation is a myth." (Sir Peter B Medawar, "Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought", 1969)

"Induction is aimed at revealing regularities and relationships that are hidden behind the outer aspects of the phenomena under study. Its most common tools are generalization, specialization, and analogy. Generalization arises from an attempt to grasp the significance of observed facts and is then verified by further particular cases." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

"Induction is the process of eliciting general laws via observation and the correlation of particular instances. All sciences, including mathematics, make use of the induction method. Now, mathematical induction is applied only by mathematicians in the proof of theorems of a particular kind." (Yakov Khurgin, "Did You Say Mathematics?", 1974)

On Induction (1875-1899)

"Whatever lies beyond the limits of experience, and claims another origin than that of induction and deduction from established data, is illegitimate." (George H Lewes, "The Foundations of a Creed", 1875)

"In the Theory of Numbers it happens rather frequently that, by some unexpected luck, the most elegant new truths spring up by induction." (Carl Friedrich Gauss, Werke, 1876)

"The general mental qualification necessary for scientific advancement is that which is usually denominated 'common sense', though added to this, imagination, induction, and trained logic, either of common language or of mathematics, are important adjuncts." (Joseph Henry, [Address] 1877)

"Mathematics is not the discoverer of laws, for it is not induction; neither is it the framer of theories, for it is not hypothesis; but it is the judge over both, and it is the arbiter to which each must refer its claims; and neither law can rule nor theory explain without the sanction of mathematics." (Benjamin Peirce, "Linear Associative Algebra", American Journal of Mathematics Vol. 4, 1881)

"I am convinced that it is impossible to expound the methods of induction in a sound manner, without resting them on the theory of probability. Perfect knowledge alone can give certainty, and in nature perfect knowledge would be infinite knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities. We have, therefore, to content ourselves with partial knowledge, - knowledge mingled with ignorance, producing doubt." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1887)

"There is as great a distinction between mathematics and the mathematical sciences as there is between induction and the inductive sciences. Practically, few cases of induction do not involve, to a greater or less extent, deductions; so few mathematical processes do not involve some strictly logical procedure." (Charles C Everett, "The Science of Thought", 1890)

"In every science, after having analysed the ideas, expressing the more complicated by means of the more simple, one finds a certain number that cannot be reduced among them, and that one can define no further. These are the primitive ideas of the science; it is necessary to acquire them through experience, or through induction; it is impossible to explain them by deduction." (Giuseppe Peano, "Notations de Logique Mathématique", 1894)

"Observe, finally, that this induction is possible only if the same operation can be repeated indefinitely. That is why the theory of chess can never become a science: the different moves of the game do not resemble one another." (Henri Poincaré, "On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning", 1894)

"If men of science owe anything to us, we may learn much from them that is essential. For they can show how to test proof, how to secure fulness and soundness in induction, how to restrain and to employ with safety hypothesis and analogy." (Lord John Acton, [Lecture] "The Study of History", 1895)

"As for me (and probably I am not alone in this opinion), I believe that a single universally valid principle summarizing an abundance of established experimental facts according to the rules of induction, is more reliable than a theory which by its nature can never be directly verified; so I prefer to give up the theory rather than the principle, if the two are incompatible." (Ernst Zermelo, "Über mechanische Erklärungen irreversibler Vorgänge. Eine Antwort auf Hrn. Boltzmann’s ‘Entgegnung’" Annalen der Physik und Chemie 59, 1896)

"The ordinary logic has a great deal to say about genera and species, or in our nineteenth century dialect, about classes. Now a class is a set of objects compromising all that stand to one another in a special relation of similarity. But where ordinary logic talks of classes the logic of relatives talks of systems. A system is a set of objects compromising all that stands to one another in a group of connected relations. Induction according to ordinary logic rises from the contemplation of a sample of a class to that of a whole class; but according to the logic of relatives it rises from the contemplation of a fragment of a system to the envisagement of the complete system." (Charles S Peirce, "Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics", 1898)

On Induction (1900-1949)

"Induction applied to the physical sciences is always uncertain, because it rests on the belief in a general order of the universe, an order outside of us." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"I may as well say at once that I do not distinguish between inference and deduction. What is called induction appears to me to be either disguised deduction or a mere method of making plausible guesses." (Bertrand Russell, "Principles of Mathematics", 1903)

"If one intends to base arithmetic on the theory of natural numbers as finite cardinals, one has to deal mainly with the definition of finite set; for the cardinal is, according to its nature, a property of a set, and any proposition about finite cardinals can always be expressed as a proposition about finite sets. In the following I will try to deduce the most important property of natural numbers, namely the principle of complete induction, from a definition of finite set which is as simple as possible, at the same time showing that the different definitions [of finite set] given so far are equivalent to the one given here." (Ernst Zermelo, "Ueber die Grundlagen der Arithmetik", Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale dei Matematici, 1908)

"We shall call this universal organizational science the 'Tektology'. The literal translation of this word from the Greek is 'the theory of construction'. 'Construction' is the most generaI and suitable synonym for the modern concept of 'organization'. [...] The aim of tektology is to systematize organizational experience; this science is clearly empirical and should draw its conclusions by way of induction." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"The great difference between induction and hypothesis is that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly." (Charles S Peirce, "Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays, Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis", 1914)

"We know that the probability of well-established induction is great, but, when we are asked to name its degree we cannot. Common sense tells us that some inductive arguments are stronger than others, and that some are very strong. But how much stronger or how strong we cannot express." (John M Keynes, "A Treatise on Probability", 1921)

"The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience. This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the  simplest course of events will really happen." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 1922)

"The so-called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is obviously a proposition with a sense. - Nor, therefore, can it be an a priori law." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", 1922)

"There is a tradition of opposition between adherents of induction and of deduction. In my view it would be just as sensible for the two ends of a worm to quarrel. (Alfred N Whitehead, "The Aims of Education & Other Essays", 1929)

"When an induction, based on observations, is made, it is not intended that it shall be accepted as a universal truth, but it is advanced as a hypothesis for further study. Additional observations are then made and the results compared with the results expected from the hypothesis. If there is more deviation between the experimental results and the computed results than can be expected from the inaccuracies of observation and measurement, the scientist discards the' hypothesis and tries to formulate another." (Mayme I Logsdon, "A Mathematician Explains", 1935)

"It is time, therefore, to abandon the superstition that natural science cannot be regarded as logically respectable until philosophers have solved the problem of induction. The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future." (Alfred J Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic", 1936)

"Given any domain of thought in which the fundamental objective is a knowledge that transcends mere induction or mere empiricism, it seems quite inevitable that its processes should be made to conform closely to the pattern of a system free of ambiguous terms, symbols, operations, deductions; a system whose implications and assumptions are unique and consistent; a system whose logic confounds not the necessary with the sufficient where these are distinct; a system whose materials are abstract elements interpretable as reality or unreality in any forms whatsoever provided only that these forms mirror a thought that is pure. To such a system is universally given the name Mathematics." (Samuel T. Sanders, "Mathematics", National Mathematics Magazine, 1937)

"It is essential to the possibility of induction that we shall be prepared for occasional wrong decisions." (Harold Jeffreys, "Theory of Probability", 1939)

"The question of the origin of the hypothesis belongs to a domain in which no very general rules can be given; experiment, analogy and constructive intuition play their part here. But once the correct hypothesis is formulated, the principle of mathematical induction is often sufficient to provide the proof." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?: An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods" , 1941)

"In mathematics as in the physical sciences we may use observation and induction to discover general laws. But there is a difference. In the physical sciences, there is no higher authority than observation and induction but In mathematics there is such an authority: rigorous proof." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"Induction is the process of discovering general laws by the observation and combination of particular instances. […] Induction tries to find regularity and coherence behind the observations. Its most conspicuous instruments are generalization, specialization, analogy. Tentative generalization starts from an effort to understand the observed facts; it is based on analogy, and tested by further special cases." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

On Induction (1975-1999)

"Mathematical induction […] is an entirely different procedure. Although it, too, leaps from the knowledge of particular cases to knowledge about an infinite sequence of cases, the leap is purely deductive. It is as certain as any proof in mathematics, and an indispensable tool in almost every branch of mathematics." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)

"The word ‘induction’ has two essentially different meanings. Scientific induction is a process by which scientists make observations of particular cases, such as noticing that some crows are black, then leap to the universal conclusion that all crows are black. The conclusion is never certain. There is always the possibility that at least one unobserved crow is not black." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)

"Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also strongly cultural." (Stephen J Gould, "The Mismeasure of Man", 1980)

"Deduction is typically distinguished from induction by the fact that only for the former is the truth of an inference guaranteed by the truth of the premises on which it is based. The fact that an inference is a valid deduction, however, is no guarantee that it is of the slightest interest." (John H Holland et al, "Induction: Processes Of Inference, Learning, And Discovery", 1986)

"Our approach assumes that the central problem of induction is to specify processing constraints that will ensure that the inferences drawn by a cognitive system will tend to be plausible and relevant to the system's goals. Which inductions should be characterized as plausible can be determined only with reference to the current knowledge of the system. Induction is thus highly context dependent, being guided by prior knowledge activated in particular situations that confront the system as it seeks to achieve its goals. The study of induction, then, is the study of how knowledge is modified through its use." (John H Holland et al, "Induction: Processes Of Inference, Learning, And Discovery", 1986)

"All great theories are expansive, and all notions so rich in scope and implication are underpinned by visions about the nature of things. You may call these visions ‘philosophy’, or ‘metaphor’, or ‘organizing principle’, but one thing they are surely not - they are not simple inductions from observed facts of the natural world." (Stephen J Gould, "Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle", 1987)

"Nature is not ‘given’ to us - our minds are never virgin in front of reality. Whatever we say we see or observe is biased by what we already know, think, believe, or wish to see. Some of these thoughts, beliefs and knowledge can function as an obstacle to our understanding of the phenomena. […] mathematics is not a natural science. It is not about the phenomena of the real world, it is not about observation and induction. Mathematical induction is not a method for making generalizations." (Anna Sierpinska, "Understanding in Mathematics", 1994)

"Model building is the art of selecting those aspects of a process that are relevant to the question being asked. As with any art, this selection is guided by taste, elegance, and metaphor; it is a matter of induction, rather than deduction. High science depends on this art." (John H Holland," Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity", 1995)

On Induction (1850-1874)

"The Laws of Nature are merely truths or generalized facts, in regard to matter, derived by induction from experience, observation, arid experiment. The laws of mathematical science are generalized truths derived from the consideration of Number and Space." (Charles Davies, "The Logic and Utility of Mathematics", 1850)

"However logical our induction, the end of the thread is fastened upon the assurance of faith." (Edwin H Chapin, "Characters in the Gospels: Illustrating Phases of Character at the Present Day", 1852)

"Hypotheses, treated as mere poetic fancies in one age, scouted as scientific absurdities in the next - preparatory only to their being altogether forgotten - have often, when least expected, received confirmation from indirect channels, and, at length, become finally adopted as tenets, deducible from the sober exercise of induction." (Michael Faraday, "The Subject Matter of a Course of Six Lectures on the Non-Metallic Elements", 1853)

"The principle of deduction is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of induction is, that in the same circumstances and in the same substances, from the same causes the same effects will follow. The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on deduction; the physical sciences rest on induction." (William Fleming, "A vocabulary of the philosophical sciences", 1857)

"The distinction of Fact and Theory is only relative. Events and phenomena, considered as particulars which may be colligated by Induction, are Facts; considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other Facts, they are Theories." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences: Founded Upon Their History" Vol. 2, 1858)

"It is possible to express the laws of thermodynamics in the form of independent principles, deduced by induction from the facts of observation and experiment, without reference to any hypothesis as to the occult molecular operations with which the sensible phenomena may be conceived to be connected; and that course will be followed in the body of the present treatise. But, in giving a brief historical sketch of the progress of thermodynamics, the progress of the hypothesis of thermic molecular motions cannot be wholly separated from that of the purely inductive theory." (William J M Rankine, "A Manual of the Steam Engine and Other Prime Movers", 1859)

"And first, it is necessary to distinguish from true inductions, certain operations which are often improperly called by that name. A true induction is a process of inference - it proceeds from the known to the  unknown; and whenever any operation contains no inference, it is not  really an induction. And yet most of the examples given in the common  works on logic, as examples of induction, are of this character." (George R Drysdale, "Logic and Utility: The tests of truth and falsehood, and of right and wrong", 1866)

"Induction and analogy are the special characteristics of modern mathematics, in which theorems have given place to theories and no truth is regarded otherwise than as a link in an infinite chain." (James J Sylvester, "A Plea for the Mathematician", Nature Vol. 1, 1870)

"[Mathematics] is that [subject] which knows nothing of observation, nothing of experiment, nothing of induction, nothing of causation." (Thomas H Huxley, "Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews", 1870)

"The Mathematician deals with two properties of objects only, number and extension, and all the inductions he wants have been formed and finished ages ago. He is now occupied with nothing but deductions and verification." (Thomas H Huxley, "Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews", 1870)

"An inductive science of nature presupposes a science of induction, and a science of induction presupposes a science of man." (Noah Porter, "The Sciences of Nature Versus the Science of Man", 1871)

"It is difficult, however, for the mind which has once recognised the analogy between the phenomena of self-induction and those of the motion of material bodies, to abandon altogether the help of this analogy, or to admit that it is entirely superficial and misleading. The fundamental dynamical idea of matter, as capable by its motion of becoming the recipient of momentum and of energy, is so interwoven with our forms of thought that, when ever we catch a glimpse of it in any part of nature, we feel that a path is before us leading, sooner or later, to the complete understanding of the subject." (James C Maxwell, "A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism" Vol. II, 1873)

"Experience gives us the materials of knowledge: induction digests those materials, and yields us general knowledge." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"I am convinced that it is impossible to expound the methods of induction in a sound manner, without resting them on the theory of probability. Perfect knowledge alone can give certainty, and in nature perfect knowledge would be infinite knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities. We have, therefore, to content ourselves with partial knowledge, - knowledge mingled with ignorance, producing doubt." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Mathematics is a science of Observation, dealing with reals, precisely as all other sciences deal with reals. It would be easy to show that its Method is the same: that, like other sciences, having observed or discovered properties, which it classifies, generalises, co-ordinates and subordinates, it proceeds to extend discoveries by means of Hypothesis, Induction, Experiment and Deduction." (George H Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind: The Method of Science and its Application", 1874)

"By induction we gain no certain knowledge; but by observation, and the inverse use of deductive reasoning, we estimate the probability that an event which has occurred was preceded by conditions of specified character, or that such conditions will be followed by the event. [...] I have no objection to use the words cause and causation, provided they are never allowed to lead us to imagine that our knowledge of nature can attain to certainty. [...] We can never recur too often to the truth that our knowledge of the laws and future events of the external world are only probable." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Our ultimate object in induction must be to obtain the complete relation between the conditions and the effect, but this relation will generally be so complex that we can only attack it in detail." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

On Induction (-1849)

"The only possible way to conceive universal is by induction, since we come to know abstractions by induction. But unless we have sense experience, we cannot make inductions. Even though sense perception relates to particular things, scientific knowledge concerning such can only be constructed by the successive steps of sense perception, induction, and formulation of universals." (Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics", cca. 350 BC)

"The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction." (Francis Bacon, "The New Organon", 1620)

"In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions." (Isaac Newton, "The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy", 1687)

"As in Mathematics, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths." (Sir Isaac Newton, "Opticks", 1704)

"It is often in our Power to obtain an Analogy where we cannot have an Induction." (David Hartley, "Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations", 1749)

"Especially when we investigate the general laws of Nature, induction has very great power; & there is scarcely any other method beside it for the discovery of these laws. By its assistance, even the ancient philosophers attributed to all bodies extension, figurability, mobility, & impenetrability; & to these properties, by the use of the same method of reasoning, most of the later philosophers add inertia & universal gravitation. Now, induction should take account of every single case that can possibly happen, before it can have the force of demonstration; such induction as this has no place in establishing the laws of Nature. But use is made of an induction of a less rigorous type ; in order that this kind of induction may be employed, it must be of such a nature that in all those cases particularly, which can be examined in a manner that is bound to lead to a definite conclusion as to whether or no the law in question is followed, in all of them the same result is arrived at; & that these cases are not merely a few. Moreover, in the other cases, if those which at first sight appeared to be contradictory, on further & more accurate investigation, can all of them be made to agree with the law; although, whether they can be made to agree in this way better than in any Other whatever, it is impossible to know directly anyhow. If such conditions obtain, then it must be considered that the induction is adapted to establishing the law." (Roger J Boscovich, "De Lege Continuitatis" ["On the law of continuity"], 1754)

"A discovery in mathematics, or a successful induction of facts, when once completed, cannot be too soon given to the world. But […] an hypothesis is a work of fancy, useless in science, and fit only for the amusement of a vacant hour." (Henry Brougham, Edinburgh Review 1, 1803)

"The most important questions of life are, for the most part, really only problems of probability. Strictly speaking one may even say that nearly all our knowledge is problematical; and in the small number of things which we are able to know with certainty, even in the mathematical sciences themselves, induction and analogy, the principal means for discovering truth, are based on probabilities, so that the entire system of human knowledge is connected with this theory." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Theorie Analytique des Probabilités", 1812)

"Analysis and natural philosophy owe their most important discoveries to this fruitful means, which is called induction. Newton was indebted to it for his theorem of the binomial and the principle of universal gravity." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities”, 1814)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"One may even say, strictly speaking, that almost all our knowledge is only probable; and in the small number of things that we are able to know with certainty, in the mathematical sciences themselves, the principal means of arriving at the truth - induction and analogy - are based on probabilities, so that the whole system of human knowledge is tied up with the theory set out in this essay." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"It is characteristic of higher arithmetic that many of its most beautiful theorems can be discovered by induction with the greatest of ease but have proofs that lie anywhere but near at hand and are often found only after many fruitless investigations with the aid of deep analysis and lucky combinations." (Carl Friedrich Gauss, 1817)

"Such is the tendency of the human mind to speculation, that on the least idea of an analogy between a few phenomena, it leaps forward, as it were, to a cause or law, to the temporary neglect of all the rest; so that, in fact, almost all our principal inductions must be regarded as a series of ascents and descents, and of conclusions from a few cases, verified by trial on many." (Sir John Herschel, "A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy" , 1830)

"We have here spoken of the prediction of facts of the same kind as those from which our rule was collected. But the evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis. The instances in which this has occurred, indeed, impress us with a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis is certain. No accident could give rise to such an extraordinary coincidence. No false supposition could, after being adjusted to one class of phenomena, so exactly represent a different class, when the agreement was unforeseen and contemplated. That rules springing from remote and unconnected quarters should thus leap to the same point, can only arise from that being where truth resides." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences" Vol. 2, 1840)

"There is in every step of an arithmetical or algebraical calculation a real induction, a real inference from facts to facts, and what disguises the induction is simply its comprehensive nature, and the consequent extreme generality of its language." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"The Higher Arithmetic presents us with an inexhaustible storehouse of interesting truths - of truths, too, which are not isolated but stand in the closest relation to one another, and between which, with each successive advance of the science, we continually discover new and sometimes wholly unexpected points of contact. A great part of the theories of Arithmetic derive an additional charm from the peculiarity that we easily arrive by induction at important propositions which have the stamp of simplicity upon them but the demonstration of which lies so deep as not to be discovered until after many fruitless efforts; and even then it is obtained by some tedious and artificial process while the simpler methods of proof long remain hidden from us." (Carl F Gauss, [introduction to Gotthold Eisenstein’s "Mathematische Abhandlungen"] 1847)

On Facts (1800-1824)

"Isolated facts, those that can only be obtained by rough estimate and that require development, can only be presented in memoires; but those that can be presented in a body, with details, and on whose accuracy one can rely, may be expounded in tables." (Emmanuel Duvillard, "Memoire sur le travail du Bureau de statistique", 1806)

"The foundations of chemical philosophy are observation, experiment, and analogy. By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, lends to experiment, and analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Elements of Chemical Philosophy" Vol. 4, 1812)

"The theory of which we have just given an overview may be considered from a point of view apt to set aside the obscure in what it presents, and which seems to be the primary aim, namely: to establish new notions on imaginary quantities. Indeed, putting to one side the question of whether these notions are true or false, we may restrict ourselves to viewing this theory as a means of research, to adopt the lines in direction only as signs of the real or imaginary quantities, and to see, in the usage to which we have put them, only the simple employment of a particular notation. For that, it suffices to start by demonstrating, through the first theorems of trigonometry, the rules of multiplication and addition given above; the applications will follow, and all that will remain is to examine the question of didactics. And if the employment of this notation were to be advantageous? And if it were to open up shorter and easier paths to demonstrate certain truths? That is what fact alone can decide." (Jean-Robert Argand, "Essai sur une manière de représenter les quantités imaginaires, dans les constructions géométriques", Annales Tome IV, 1813)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"The substitution of analogy for fact is the bane of chemical philosophy; the legitimate use of analogy is to connect facts together and to guide to new experiments." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Journal of Science and the Arts", 1816)

"Force is not a fact at all, but an idea embodying what is approximately the fact." (William K Clifford, "The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences", 1823)

On Facts (-1799)

"While those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations." (Aristotle, "De Caelo" ["On the Heavens"], cca. 350 BC)

"Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth." (Marcus Aurelius, "Meditations", cca. 2nd century)

"The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction." (Francis Bacon, "The New Organon", 1620)

"There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are possible." (Gottfried W Leibniz, "Monadology", 1714)

"We have three principal means: observation of nature, reflection, and experiment. Observation gathers the facts reflection combines them, experiment verifies the result of the combination. It is essential that the observation of nature be assiduous, that reflection be profound, and that experimentation be exact. Rarely does one see these abilities in combination. And so, creative geniuses are not common." (Denis Diderot, "On the Interpretation of Nature", 1753)

"Facts, observations, experiments - these are the materials of a great edifice, but in assembling them we must combine them into classes, distinguish which belongs to which order and to which part of the whole each pertains." (Antoine L Lavoisier, "Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences", 1777)

"The impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a science from the science itself is owing to this, that every branch of physical science must consist of three things: the series of facts which are the objects of the science, the ideas which represent these facts, and the words by which these ideas are expressed. Like three impressions of the same seal, the word ought to produce the idea, and the idea to be a picture of the fact." (Antoine L Lavoisier, "Elements of Chemistry in a New Systematic Order", 1790)

"We must trust to nothing but facts: These are presented to us by Nature, and cannot deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation." (Antoin-Laurent de Lavoisiere, "Elements of Chemistry", 1790)

"[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"It has never yet been supposed, that all the facts of nature, and all the means of acquiring precision in the computation and analysis of those facts, and all the connections of objects with each other, and all the possible combinations of ideas, can be exhausted by the human mind." (Nicolas de Condorcet, "Outlines Of An Historical View Of The Progress Of The Human Mind", 1795)

On Generalization (1930-1949)

"The steady progress of physics requires for its theoretical formulation a mathematics which get continually more advanced. […] it was expected that mathematics would get more and more complicated, but would rest on a permanent basis of axioms and definitions, while actually the modern physical developments have required a mathematics that continually shifts its foundation and gets more abstract. Non-Euclidean geometry and noncommutative algebra, which were at one time were considered to be purely fictions of the mind and pastimes of logical thinkers, have now been found to be very necessary for the description of general facts of the physical world. It seems likely that this process of increasing abstraction will continue in the future and the advance in physics is to be associated with continual modification and generalisation of the axioms at the base of mathematics rather than with a logical development of any one mathematical scheme on a fixed foundation." (Paul A M Dirac, "Quantities singularities in the electromagnetic field", Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 1931)

"It is time, therefore, to abandon the superstition that natural science cannot be regarded as logically respectable until philosophers have solved the problem of induction. The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future." (Alfred J Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic", 1936)

"The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future. There are only two ways of approaching this problem on the assumption that it is a genuine problem, and it is easy to see that neither of them can lead to its solution." (Alfred J Ayer, "Language, Truth, and Logic", 1936)

"The ethos of science involves the functionally necessary demand that theories or generalizations be evaluated in [terms of] their logical consistency and consonance with facts." (Robert K Merton, "Science and the Social Order", Philosophy of Science Vol 5 (3), 1938)

"The former distrust of specialization has been supplanted by its opposite, a distrust of generalization. Not only has man become a specialist in practice, he is being taught that special facts represent the highest form of knowledge." (Richard Weaver, "Ideas have Consequences", 1948)

On Tektology

"Tectology, or the theory of structure in organisms, is the comprehensive science of individuality among living natural bodies, which usually represent an aggregate of individuals of various orders.  The task of organic tectology is therefore to identify and explain organic individuality, i.e. to identify the precise natural laws according to which organic matter individualises itself, and according to which most organisms construct a unified form-complex composed of individuals of various orders." (Ernst  Häckel, "Generelle Morphologie der Organismen" ["General Morphology of Organisms"], 1866)

"It should therewith be remembered that as mathematics studies neutral complexes, mathematical thinking is an organizational process and hence its methods, as well as the methods of all other sciences and those of any practice, fall within the province of a general tektology. Tektology is a unique science which must not only work out its own methods by itself but must study them as well; therefore it is the completion of the cycle of sciences." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"Mathematics abstracts from all the particular properties of the elements hidden behind its schemata. This is achieved by mathematics with the help of indifferent symbols, like numbers or letters. Tektology must do likewise. Its generalizations should abstract from the concreteness of elements whose organizational relationships they express, and conceal this concreteness behind indifferent symbols." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"Tektology must discover what modes of organization are observed in nature and human activities; then generalize and systemize these modes; further it should explain them, that is, elaborate abstract schemes of their tendencies and regularities; finally, based on these schemes it must determine the directions of organizational modes development and elucidate their role in the economy of world processes. This general plan is similar to the plan of any other science but the object studied differs essentially. Tektology deals with the organizational experience not of some particular branch but with that of all of them in the aggregate; to put it in other words, tektology embraces the material of all the other sciences, as well as of all the vital practices from which those sciences arose, but considers this material only in respect of methods, i.e. everywhere it takes an interest in the mode of the organization of this material."  (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"The methods of tektology, as is seen, combine the abstract symbolism of mathematics and the experimental character Of the natural sciences. Furthermore, the very formulation of its problems, the very treatment of organizedness by tektology, as has been elucidated, should stick to the social historical viewpoint. And whatever the subject matter, or the content, of tektology , it embraces the whole world of experience. So tektology is really a universal science by its methods and its content."  (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"[…] there is a special relationship, a profound affinity between mathematics and tektology. Mathematical laws do not refer to a particular area of natural phenomena, as the laws of the other, special, sciences do, but to each and all phenomena, considered merely in their quantitative aspect; mathematics is in its own way universal, like tektology."  (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"Two divisions are distinguished in all natural sciences - 'statics' which deals with forms in equilibrium, and 'dynamics' which deals with the same forms, as well as their motion, in the process of change. […] Statics always evolves earlier than dynamics, the former being then reconstructed under the influence of the latter. The relationship between mathematics and tektology is seen to be similar: one represents the standpoint of organizational statics and the other - that of organizational dynamics. The latter standpoint is the more general, for equilibrium is only a particular case of motion, and in essence, is just an ideal case resulting from changes which are completely equal but quite opposite in direction." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"We shall call this universal organizational science the 'Tektology'. The literal translation of this word from the Greek is 'the theory of construction'. 'Construction' is the most generaI and suitable synonym for the modern concept of 'organization'. [...] The aim of tektology is to systematize organizational experience; this science is clearly empirical and should draw its conclusions by way of induction." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science" Vol. I, 1913)

"For tektology the unity of experience is not 'discovered', but actively created by organizational means: ‘philosophers wanted to explain the world, but the main point is it change it’ said the greater precursor of organizational science, Karl Marx. The explanation of organizational forms and methods by tektology is directed not to a contemplation of their unity, but to a practical mastery over them." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science", 1922)

"Tektology must clarify the modes of organization that are perceived to exist in nature and human activity; then it must generalize and systematize these modes; further it must explain them, that is, propose abstract schemes of their tendencies and laws; finally, based on these schemes, determine the direction of organizational methods and their role in the universal process. This general plan is similar to the plan of any natural science; but the objective of tektology is basically different. Tektology deals with organizational experiences not of this or that specialized field, but of all these fields together. In other words, tektology embraces the subject matter of all the other sciences and of all the human experience giving rise to these sciences, but only from the aspect of method, that is, it is interested only in the modes of organization of this subject matter." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science", 1922)

"The strength of an organization lies in precise coordination of its parts, in strict correspondence of various mutually connected functions. This coordination is maintained through constant growth in tektological variety, but not without bounds […] there comes a moment when the parts of the whole become too differentiated in their organization and their resistance to the surrounding environment weakens. This leads sooner or later to disorganization." (Alexander Bogdanov, "Tektology: The Universal Organizational Science", 1922)

"Tektology was the first attempt in the history of science to arrive at a systematic formulation of the principles of organization operating in living and nonliving systems." (Fritjof Capra, "The Web of Life", 1996)

"Tektology is concerned only with activities, but activities are characterized by the fact that they produce changes. From this point of view it is out of the question to think about a simple and pure 'preservation' of forms, one that would constitute a real absence of changes. Preservation is always only a result of immediately equilibrating each of the appearing changes by another opposing change; it Is a dynamic equilibrium of changes."(Alexander Bogdanov) 

On Method I (Mathematical Method)

"Mathematics is a science of Observation, dealing with reals, precisely as all other sciences deal with reals. It would be easy to show that its Method is the same: that, like other sciences, having observed or discovered properties, which it classifies, generalises, co-ordinates and subordinates, it proceeds to extend discoveries by means of Hypothesis, Induction, Experiment and Deduction." (George H Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind: The Method of Science and its Application", 1874)

"The value of mathematical instruction as a preparation for those more difficult investigations, consists in the applicability not of its doctrines but of its methods. Mathematics will ever remain the past perfect type of the deductive method in general; and the applications of mathematics to the simpler branches of physics furnish the only school in which philosophers can effectually learn the most difficult and important of their art, the employment of the laws of simpler phenomena for explaining and predicting those of the more complex." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

“Pure mathematics proves itself a royal science both through its content and form, which contains within itself the cause of its being and its methods of proof. For in complete independence mathematics creates for itself the object of which it treats, its magnitudes and laws, its formulas and symbols.” (Christian H Dillmann, "Die Mathematik die Fackelträgerin einer neuen Zeit", 1889)

"Besides it is an error to believe that rigour is the enemy of simplicity. On the contrary we find it confirmed by numerous examples that the rigorous method is at the same time the simpler and the more easily comprehended. The very effort for rigor forces us to find out simpler methods of proof." (David Hilbert, "Mathematical Problems", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 8, 1902)

“With the extension of mathematical knowledge will it not finally become impossible for the single investigator to embrace all departments of this knowledge? In answer let me point out how thoroughly it is ingrained in mathematical science that every real advance goes hand in hand with the invention of sharper tools and simpler methods which at the same time assist in understanding earlier theories and to cast aside some more complicated developments. It is therefore possible for the individual investigator, when he makes these sharper tools and simpler methods his own, to find his way more easily in the various branches of mathematics than is possible in any other science.” (David Hilbert, “Mathematical Problems”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 8, 1902)

“Mathematics is merely a shorthand method of recording physical intuition and physical reasoning, but it should not be a formalism leading from nowhere to nowhere, as it is likely to be made by one who does not realize its purpose as a tool.” (Charles P Steinmetz, “Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers”, 1909)

"Mathematics is merely a shorthand method of recording physical intuition and physical reasoning, but it should not be a formalism leading from nowhere to nowhere, as it is likely to be made by one who does not realize its purpose as a tool." (Charles P Steinmetz, “Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers”, 1909)

"Mathematicians attach great importance to the elegance of their methods and their results. This is not pure dilettantism. What is it indeed that gives us the feeling of elegance in a solution, in a demonstration? It is the harmony of the diverse parts, their symmetry, their happy balance; in a word it is all that introduces order, all that gives unity, that permits us to see clearly and to comprehend at once both the ensemble and the details." (Henri Poincaré, "The Future of Mathematics", Monist Vol. 20, 1910)

“Mathematics is the science that yields the best opportunity to observe the working of the mind. Its study is the best training of our abilities as it develops both the power and the precision of our thinking. Mathematics is valuable on account of the number and variety of its applications. And it is equally valuable in another respect: By cultivating it, we acquire the habit of a method of reasoning which can be applied afterwards to the study of any subject and can guide us in life's great and little problems.” (Nicolas de Condorcet)

"The mathematical method is the essence of mathematics. He who fully comprehends the method is a mathematician." (Friederich von Hardenberg [Novalis])

John S Mill - Collected Quotes

"A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly unconceivable. We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have a power, which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over the operations of our minds; the power, when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of attending to a part only of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot conceive a line without breadth: we can form no mental picture of such a line: all the lines which we have in our minds are lines possessing breadth." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"Every theorem in geometry is a law of external nature, and might have been ascertained by generalizing from observation and experiment, which in this case resolve themselves into comparisons and measurements. But it was found practicable, and being practicable was desirable, to deduce these truths by ratiocination from a small number of general laws of nature, the certainty and universality of which was obvious to the most careless observer, and which compose the first principles and ultimate premises of the science." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"Logic does not pretend to teach the surgeon what are the symptoms which indicate a violent death. This he must learn from his own experience and observation, or from that of others, his predecessors in his peculiar science. But logic sits in judgment on the sufficiency of that observation and experience to justify his rules, and on the sufficiency of his rules to justify his conduct. It does not give him proofs, but teaches him what makes them proofs, and how he is to judge of them." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

 […] the besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking a part of the truth for the whole." (John S Mill, "Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical", 1864)

"The existence of an extensive Science of Mathematics, requiring the highest scientific genius in those who contributed to its creation, and calling for the most continued and vigorous exertion of intellect in order to appreciate it when created, etc." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"The immense part which those laws [laws of number and extension] take in giving a deductive character to the other departments of physical science, is well known; and is not surprising, when we consider that all causes operate according to mathematical laws. The effect is always dependent upon, or in mathematical language, is a function of, the quantity of the agent; and generally of its position also. We cannot, therefore, reason respecting causation, without introducing considerations of quantity and extension at every step; and if the nature of the phenomena admits of our obtaining numerical data of sufficient accuracy, the laws of quantity become the grand instruments for calculating forward to an effect, or backward to a cause." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"The value of mathematical instruction as a preparation for those more difficult investigations, consists in the applicability not of its doctrines but of its methods. Mathematics will ever remain the past perfect type of the deductive method in general; and the applications of mathematics to the simpler branches of physics furnish the only school in which philosophers can effectually learn the most difficult and important of their art, the employment of the laws of simpler phenomena for explaining and predicting those of the more complex." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"There is in every step of an arithmetical or algebraical calculation a real induction, a real inference from facts to facts, and what disguises the induction is simply its comprehensive nature, and the consequent extreme generality of its language." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"Truths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of Intuition, or Consciousness; the latter, of Inference; the latter of Inference. The truths known by Intuition are the original premises, from which all others are inferred." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1843)

"The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is that all the argument is on one side." (John S Mill, "On Liberty", 1859)

"Besides accustoming the student to demand complete proof, and to know when he has not obtained it, mathematical studies are of immense benefit to his education by habituating him to precision. It is one of the peculiar excellencies of mathematical discipline, that the mathematician is never satisfied with à peu près. He requires the exact truth." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"It has long been a complaint against mathematicians that they are hard to convince: but it is a far greater disqualification both for philosophy, and for the affairs of life, to be too easily convinced; to have too low a standard of proof. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standards of proof high. Practice in concrete affairs soon teaches them to make the necessary abatement: but they retain the consciousness, without which there is no sound practical reasoning, that in accepting inferior evidence because there is no better to be had, they do not by that acceptance raise it to completeness." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"Mathematical teaching […] trains the mind to capacities, which […] are of the closest kin to those of the greatest metaphysician and philosopher. There is some color of truth for the opposite doctrine in the case of elementary algebra. The resolution of a common equation can be reduced to almost as mechanical a process as the working of a sum in arithmetic. The reduction of the question to an equation, however, is no mechanical operation, but one which, according to the degree of its difficulty, requires nearly every possible grade of ingenuity: not to speak of the new, and in the present state of the science insoluble, equations, which start up at every fresh step  attempted in the application of mathematics to other branches of knowledge." (John S Mill, "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy", 1865)

"The character of necessity ascribed to the truths of mathematics and even the peculiar certainty attributed to them is an illusion." (John S Mill)

On Analogy (1925-1949)

"Analogies prove nothing, that is quite true, but they can make one feel more at home." (Sigmund Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse" ["New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis"], 1933)

"If the scientist has, during the whole of his life, observed carefully, trained himself to be on the look-out for analogy and possessed himself of relevant knowledge, then the ‘instrument of feeling’ […] will become a powerful divining rod leading the scientist to discover order in the midst of chaos by providing him with a clue, a hint, or an hypothesis upon which to base his experiments.' (Rosamund E M Harding, "An Anatomy of Inspiration", 1940)

"The question of the origin of the hypothesis belongs to a domain in which no very general rules can be given; experiment, analogy and constructive intuition play their part here. But once the correct hypothesis is formulated, the principle of mathematical induction is often sufficient to provide the proof." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?: An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods" , 1941) 

"Analogies are useful for analysis in unexplored fields. By means of analogies an unfamiliar system may be compared with one that is better known. The relations and actions are more easily visualized, the mathematics more readily applied, and the analytical solutions more readily obtained in the familiar system." (Harry F Olson, "Dynamical Analogies", 1943)

"Of course we have still to face the question why these analogies between different mechanisms - these similarities of relation-structure - should exist. To see common principles and simple rules running through such complexity is at first perplexing though intriguing. When, however, we find that the apparently complex objects around us are combinations of a few almost indestructible units, such as electrons, it becomes less perplexing." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"This, however, is very speculative; the point of interest for our present enquiry is that physical reality is built up, apparently, from a few fundamental types of units whose properties determine many of the properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the emergence of analogies between mechanisms and similarities of relation-structure among these combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Analogy is a sort of similarity. Similar objects agree with each other in some respect, analogous objects agree in certain relations of their respective parts." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"[…] analogy [is] an important source of conjectures. In mathematics, as in the natural and physical sciences, discovery often starts from observation, analogy, and induction. These means, tastefully used in framing a plausible heuristic argument, appeal particularly to the physicist and the engineer." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945) 

"Analogy pervades all our thinking, our everyday speech and our trivial conclusions as well as artistic ways of expression and the highest scientific achievements." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"Analogy pervades all our thinking, our everyday speech and our trivial conclusions as well as artistic ways of expression and the highest scientific achievements. Analogy is used on very different levels. People often use vague, ambiguous, incomplete, or incompletely clarified analogies, but analogy may reach the level of mathematical precision. All sorts of analogy may play a role in the discovery of the solution and so we should not neglect any sort." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"Induction is the process of discovering general laws by the observation and combination of particular instances. […] Induction tries to find regularity and coherence behind the observations. Its most conspicuous instruments are generalization, specialization, analogy. Tentative generalization starts from an effort to understand the observed facts; it is based on analogy, and tested by further special cases." (George Pólya, "How to solve it", 1945)

"Inference by analogy appears to be the most common kind of conclusion, and it is possibly the most essential kind. It yields more or less plausible conjectures which may or may not be confirmed by experience and stricter reasoning." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"[…] the number of available analogies is a determining factor in the growth and progress of science." (Morris R Cohen, "The Meaning of Human History", 1947)

"A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor." (Stephen Pepper, "World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence", 1948)

"The solution of the difficulty is that the two mental pictures which experiment lead us to form - the one of the particles, the other of the waves - are both incomplete and have only the validity of analogies which are accurate only in limiting cases." (Werner Heisenberg, "The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory", 1949)

On Analogy (1850-1899)

"All perception of truth is the detection of an analogy [...]" (Henry D Thoreau, 1851)

"Reasoning from analogy is often most plausible and most deceptive." (Charles Simmons, "A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker", 1852)

"In order to obtain physical ideas without adopting a physical theory we must make ourselves familiar with the existence of physical analogies. By a physical analogy I mean that partial similarity between the laws of one science and those of another which makes each of them illustrate the other. Thus all the mathematical sciences are founded on relations between physical laws and laws of numbers, so that the aim of exact science is to reduce the problems of nature to the determination of quantities by operations with numbers." (James C Maxwell, "On Faraday's Lines of Force", 1856)

"Now there are subjects upon which the most sober and practical minds cannot help speculating a little beyond what they know. Sure and great results - yet familiar and common  and procured at will and by certain means, but in an unaccountable manner - naturally set us thinking and forming notion: how they come to pas ; and then it is safest and best to fill up the gaps of our knowledge from analogy." (Peter M Latham, "General Remarks on the Practice of Medicine", 1861)

"The process of discovery is very simple. An unwearied and systematic application of known laws to nature, causes the unknown to reveal themselves. Almost any mode of observation will be successful at last, for what is most wanted is method." (Henry Thoreau, "A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers", 1862)

"Induction and analogy are the special characteristics of modern mathematics, in which theorems have given place to theories and no truth is regarded otherwise than as a link in an infinite chain." (James J Sylvester, "A Plea for the Mathematician", Nature Vol. 1, 1870)

"[…] the world is full of hopeful analogies and handsome dubious eggs called possibilities.” (Mary A E Cross [George Eliot], “Middlemarch”, 1872)

"It would be an error to suppose that the great discoverer seizes at once upon the truth, or has any unerring method of divining it. In all probability the errors of the great mind exceed in number those of the less vigorous one. Fertility of imagination and abundance of guesses at truth are among the first requisites of discovery; but the erroneous guesses must be many times as numerous as those that prove well founded. The weakest analogies, the most whimsical notations, the most apparently absurd theories, may pass through the teeming brain, and no record remain of more than the hundredth part." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Summing up, then, it would seem as if the mind of the great discoverer must combine contradictory attributes. He must be fertile in theories and hypotheses, and yet full of facts and precise results of experience. He must entertain the feeblest analogies, and the merest guesses at truth, and yet he must hold them as worthless till they are verified in experiment. When there are any grounds of probability he must hold tenaciously to an old opinion, and yet he must be prepared at any moment to relinquish it when a clearly contradictory fact is encountered." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"The scientific discovery appears first as the hypothesis of an analogy; and science tends to become independent of the hypothesis." (William K Clifford, "Lectures and Essays", 1879)

"If one looks at the different problems of the integral calculus which arise naturally when he wishes to go deep into the different parts of physics, it is impossible not to be struck by the analogies existing. Whether it be electrostatics or electrodynamics, the propagation of heat, optics, elasticity, or hydrodynamics, we are led always to differential equations of the same family." (Henri Poincaré, "Sur les Equations aux Dérivées Partielles de la Physique Mathématique", American Journal of Mathematics Vol. 12, 1890)

"Most surprising and far-reaching analogies revealed themselves between apparently quite disparate natural processes. It seemed that nature had built the most various things on exactly the same pattern; or, in the dry words of the analyst, the same differential equations hold for the most various phenomena. (Ludwig Boltzmann, "On the methods of theoretical physics", 1892)

"How awkward is the human mind in divining the nature of things, when forsaken by the analogy of what we see and touch directly?" (Ludwig Boltzmann, Certain Questions of the Theory of Gasses", Nature Vol. 51 (1322), 1895)

"If men of science owe anything to us, we may learn much from them that is essential. For they can show how to test proof, how to secure fulness and soundness in induction, how to restrain and to employ with safety hypothesis and analogy." (Lord John Acton, [Lecture] "The Study of History", 1895)

On Analogy (1800-1824)

"In order to supply the defects of experience, we will have recourse to the probable conjectures of analogy, conclusions which we will bequeath to our posterity to be ascertained by new observations, which, if we augur rightly, will serve to establish our theory and to carry it gradually nearer to absolute certainty." (Johann H Lambert, "The System of the World", 1800)

"Simplicity and precision ought to be the characteristics of a scientific nomenclature: words should signify things, or the analogies of things, and not opinions." (Sir Humphry Davy, Elements of Chemical Philosophy", 1812)

"The foundations of chemical philosophy are observation, experiment, and analogy. By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, lends to experiment, and analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Elements of Chemical Philosophy" Vol. 4, 1812)

"The most important questions of life are, for the most part, really only problems of probability. Strictly speaking one may even say that nearly all our knowledge is problematical; and in the small number of things which we are able to know with certainty, even in the mathematical sciences themselves, induction and analogy, the principal means for discovering truth, are based on probabilities, so that the entire system of human knowledge is connected with this theory." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Theorie Analytique des Probabilités", 1812)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"One may even say, strictly speaking, that almost all our knowledge is only probable; and in the small number of things that we are able to know with certainty, in the mathematical sciences themselves, the principal means of arriving at the truth - induction and analogy - are based on probabilities, so that the whole system of human knowledge is tied up with the theory set out in this essay." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"The substitution of analogy for fact is the bane of chemical philosophy; the legitimate use of analogy is to connect facts together and to guide to new experiments." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Journal of Science and the Arts", 1816)

"Analogy, although it is not infallible, is yet that telescope of the mind by which it is marvellously assisted in the discovery of both physical and moral truth." (Charles C Colton, "Lacon", 1820)

"Mathematical analysis is as extensive as nature itself; it defines all perceptible relations, measures times, spaces, forces, temperatures; this difficult science is formed slowly, but it preserves every principle which it has once acquired; it grows and strengthens itself incessantly in the midst of the many variations and errors of the human mind. It's chief attribute is clearness; it has no marks to express confused notations. It brings together phenomena the most diverse, and discovers the hidden analogies which unite them." (J B Joseph Fourier, "The Analytical Theory of Heat", 1822)

On Certainty (1970-1979)

"Nature is a network of happenings that do not unroll like a red carpet into time, but are intertwined between every part of the world; and we are among those parts. In this nexus, we cannot reach certainty because it is not there to be reached; it goes with the wrong model, and the certain answers ironically are the wrong answers. Certainty is a demand that is made by philosophers who contemplate the world from outside; and scientific knowledge is knowledge for action, not contemplation. There is no God’s eye view of nature, in relativity, or in any science: only a man’s eye view." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Identity of Man", 1972)

"The basic proposition is that the greater the uncertainty of the task, the greater the amount of information that has to be processed between decision-makers during the execution of the task. If the task is well understood prior to performing it much of the activity can be pre-planned. If it is not understood, then during the actual task execution more knowledge is acquired which leads to changes in resource allocations, schedules, and priorities." (Jay R Galbraith, "Organization Design", 1972)

"Since small differences in probability cannot be appreciated by the human mind, there seems little point in being excessively precise about uncertainty." (George E P Box & G C Tiao, "Bayesian inference in statistical analysis", 1973)

"Statistics is a body of methods and theory applied to numerical evidence in making decisions in the face of uncertainty." (Lawrence Lapin, "Statistics for Modern Business Decisions", 1973)

"[Task uncertainty is] the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by the organisation." (Jay R Galbraith, "Designing complex organizations", 1973)

"Every judgment teeters on the brink of error. To claim absolute knowledge is to become monstrous. Knowledge is an unending adventure at the edge of uncertainty." (Frank Herbert, "Children of Dune", 1976)

"Owing to his lack of knowledge, the ordinary man cannot attempt to resolve conflicting theories of conflicting advice into a single organized structure. He is likely to assume the information available to him is on the order of what we might think of as a few pieces of an enormous jigsaw puzzle. If a given piece fails to fit, it is not because it is fraudulent; more likely the contradictions and inconsistencies within his information are due to his lack of understanding and to the fact that he possesses only a few pieces of the puzzle. Differing statements about the nature of things […] are to be collected eagerly and be made a part of the individual's collection of puzzle pieces. Ultimately, after many lifetimes, the pieces will fit together and the individual will attain clear and certain knowledge." (Alan R Beals, "Strategies of Resort to Curers in South India" [contributed in Charles M. Leslie (ed.), "Asian Medical Systems: A Comparative Study", 1976])

"The word ‘induction’ has two essentially different meanings. Scientific induction is a process by which scientists make observations of particular cases, such as noticing that some crows are black, then leap to the universal conclusion that all crows are black. The conclusion is never certain. There is always the possibility that at least one unobserved crow is not black." (Martin Gardner, "Aha! Insight", 1978)

"Certainty, simplicity, vividness originate in popular knowledge. That is where the expert obtains his faith in this triad as the ideal of knowledge. Therein lies the general epistemological significance of popular science." (Ludwik Fleck, "Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact", 1979)

"In the long run, qualitative changes always outweigh quantitative ones. Quantitative predictions of economic and social trends are made obsolete by qualitative changes in the rules of the game. Quantitative predictions of technological progress are made obsolete by unpredictable new inventions. I am interested in the long run, the remote future, where quantitative predictions are meaningless. The only certainty in that remote future is that radically new things will be happening." (Freeman J Dyson, "Disturbing the Universe", 1979)

On Certainty (1950-1959)

"To say that observations of the past are certain, whereas predictions are merely probable, is not the ultimate answer to the question of induction; it is only a sort of intermediate answer, which is incomplete unless a theory of probability is developed that explains what we should mean by ‘probable’ and on what ground we can assert probabilities." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy", 1951)

"We cannot define truth in science until we move from fact to law. And within the body of laws in turn, what impresses us as truth is the orderly coherence of the pieces. They fit together like the characters of a great novel, or like the words of a poem. Indeed, we should keep that last analogy by us always, for science is a language, and like a language it defines its parts by the way they make up a meaning. Every word in a sentence has some uncertainty of definition, and yet the sentence defines its own meaning and that of its words conclusively. It is the internal unity and coherence of science which gives it truth, and which makes it a better system of prediction than any less orderly language." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Common Sense of Science", 1953)

"[…] it is imperative in science to doubt; it is absolutely necessary, for progress of science, to have uncertainty as a fundamental part of your inner nature." (Richard P Feynman, Engineering and Science Vol. 19, 1956)

"Science does not mean an idle resting upon a body of certain knowledge; it means unresting endeavor and continually progressing development toward an end which the poetic intuition may apprehend, but which the intellect can never fully grasp." (Max Planck, "The New Science", 1959)

"With the idol of certainty (including that of degrees of imperfect certainty or probability) there falls one of the defences of obscurantism which bar the way of scientific advance. For the worship of this idol hampers not only the boldness of our questions, but also the rigor and the integrity of our tests. The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right; for it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth." (Karl R Popper, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", 1959)

"It seems to me that science has a much greater likelihood of being true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced (I do not, of course, except my own). In science there are many matters about which people are agreed; in philosophy there are none. Therefore, although each proposition in a science may be false, and it is practically certain that there are some that are false, yet we shall be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. If we could hope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be a chimerical." (Bertrand Russel, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", 1959)

"There is a logic of language and a logic of mathematics. The former is supple and lifelike, it follows our experience. The latter is abstract and rigid, more ideal. The latter is perfectly necessary, perfectly reliable: the former is only sometimes reliable and hardly ever systematic. But the logic of mathematics achieves necessity at the expense of living truth, it is less real than the other, although more certain. It achieves certainty by a flight from the concrete into abstraction." (Thomas Merton, "The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton", 1959)

"Years ago a statistician might have claimed that statistics deals with the processing of data [...]today’s statistician will be more likely to say that statistics is concerned with decision making in the face of uncertainty." (Herman Chernoff & Lincoln E Moses, "Elementary Decision Theory", 1959)

William Whewell - Collected Quotes

"Discoveries are not generally made in the order of their scientific arrangement: their connexions and relations are made out gradually; and it is only when the fermentation of invention has subsided that the whole clears into simplicity and order. " (William Whewell, "An Elementary Treatise on Mechanics" Vol. I, 1819)

"It is not easy to anatomize the constitution and the operations of a mind which makes such an advance in knowledge. Yet we may observe that there must exist in it, in an eminent degree, the elements which compose the mathematical talent. It must possess distinctness of intuition, tenacity and facility in tracing logical connection, fertility of invention, and a strong tendency to generalization." (William Whewell, "History of the Inductive Sciences" Vol. 1, 1837)

"The peculiar character of mathematical truth is that it is necessarily and inevitably true; and one of the most important lessons which we learn from our mathematical studies is a knowledge that there are such truths." (William Whewell, "Principles of English University Education", 1838)

"Every stage of science has its train of practical applications and systematic inferences, arising both from the demands of convenience and curiosity, and from the pleasure which, as we have already said, ingenious and active-minded men feel in exercising the process of deduction." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded Upon Their History", 1840)

"These sciences have no principles besides definitions and axioms, and no process of proof but deduction; this process, however, assuming a most remarkable character; and exhibiting a combination of simplicity and complexity, of rigor and generality, quite unparalleled in other subjects." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded Upon Their History", 1840)

"Every detection of what is false directs us towards what is true: every trial exhausts some tempting form of error. Not only so; but scarcely any attempt is entirely a failure; scarcely any theory, the result of steady thought, is altogether false; no tempting form of error is without some latent charm derived from truth." (William Whewell, "Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England", 1852)

"Scarcely any attempt is entirely a failure; scarcely any theory, the result of steady thought, is altogether false; no tempting form of Error is without some latent charm derived from Truth." (William Whewell, "Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England", 1852)

"Geometry in every proposition speaks a language which experience never dares to utter; and indeed of which she but half comprehends the meaning. Experience sees that the assertions are true, but she sees not how profound and absolute is their truth. She unhesitatingly assents to the laws which geometry delivers, but she does not pretend to see the origin of their obligation. She is always ready to acknowledge the sway of pure scientific principles as a matter of fact, but she does not dream of offering her opinion on their authority as a matter of right; still less can she justly claim to herself the source of that authority." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1858)

"The distinction of Fact and Theory is only relative. Events and phenomena, considered as particulars which may be colligated by Induction, are Facts; considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other Facts, they are Theories." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences: Founded Upon Their History" Vol. 2, 1858)

“The ideas which these sciences, Geometry, Theoretical Arithmetic and Algebra involve extend to all objects and changes which we observe in the external world; and hence the consideration of mathematical relations forms a large portion of many of the sciences which treat of the phenomena and laws of external nature, as Astronomy, Optics, and Mechanics. Such sciences are hence often termed Mixed Mathematics, the relations of space and number being, in these branches of knowledge, combined with principles collected from special observation; while Geometry, Algebra, and the like subjects, which involve no result of experience, are called Pure Mathematics.” (Whewell, William, “The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences”, 1858)

"This science, Geometry, is one of indispensable use and constant reference, for every student of the laws of nature; for the relations of space and number are the alphabet in which those laws are written. But besides the interest and importance of this kind which geometry possesses, it has a great and peculiar value for all who wish to understand the foundations of human knowledge, and the methods by which it is acquired. For the student of geometry acquires, with a degree of insight and clearness which the unmathematical reader can but feebly imagine, a conviction that there are necessary truths, many of them of a very complex and striking character; and that a few of the most simple and self-evident truths which it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend, may, by systematic deduction, lead to the most remote and unexpected results." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1858)

On Theories VI (1950-1959)

”[…] the chief reason in favor of any theory on the principles of mathematics must always be inductive, i.e., it must lie in the fact that the theory in question enables us to deduce ordinary mathematics. In mathematics, the greatest degree of self-evidence is usually not to be found quite at the beginning, but at some later point; hence the early deductions, until they reach this point, give reasons rather from them, than for believing the premises because true consequences follow from them, than for believing the consequences because they follow from the premises.” (Alfred N Whitehead, “Principia Mathematica”, 1950)

“People prefer theory to practice because it involves them in no more real responsibility than a game of checkers, while it permits them to feel they're doing something serious and important.” (Leo Stein, “Journey into the Self”, 1950)

“The scientist who discovers a theory is usually guided to his discovery by guesses; he cannot name a method by means of which he found the theory and can only say that it appeared plausible to him, that he had the right hunch or that he saw intuitively which assumption would fit the facts.” (Hans Reichenbach, “The Rise of Scientific Philosophy”, 1951)

”Without facts we have no science. Facts are to the scientist what words are to the poet. The scientist has a love of facts, even isolated facts, similar to a poet’s love of words. But a collection of facts is not a science any more than a dictionary is poetry. Around his facts the scientist weaves a logical pattern or theory which gives the facts meaning, order and significance.” (Isidor Isaac Rabi, “Faith in Science”, Atlantic Monthly , Vol. 187, 1951)

“ […] one of the main functions of an analogy or model is to suggest extensions of the theory by considering extensions of the analogy, since more is known about the analogy than is known about the subject matter of the theory itself [...]" (Mary B Hesse, “Operational Definition and Analogy in Physical Theories”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (8), 1952) 

“Scarcely any attempt is entirely a failure; scarcely any theory, the result of steady thought, is altogether false; no tempting form of Error is without some latent charm derived from Truth.” (William Whewell, “Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England”, 1852)

“The true aim of science is to discover a simple theory which is necessary and sufficient to cover the facts, when they have been purified of traditional prejudices.” (Lancelot L Whyte, “Accent on Form”, 1954)

“Science does not begin with facts; one of its tasks is to uncover the facts by removing misconceptions.” (Lancelot L Whyte, “Accent on Form”, 1954) 

“When we meet a fact which contradicts a prevailing theory, we must accept the fact and abandon the theory, even when the theory is supported by great names and generally accepted.” (Claude Bernard, “An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine”, 1957)

“The confidence placed in physical theory owes much to its possessing the same kind of excellence from which pure geometry and pure mathematics in general derive their interest, and for the sake of which they are cultivated.” (Michael Polanyi, “Personal Knowledge”, 1958)