Out of Context: On Axioms (Definitions)

"An axiom is proposition more general than the propositions or the science in which it employed as an axiom; or, an axiom is a proposition which is true of more subjects than the subject or the science in which it is quoted as an axiom. Hence. Geometry ought to admit as axioms all Algebraic truths. The simple truths of this kind, which are commonly called axioms, ore corollaries from the definitions of such terms as equal, whole, part, sum, etc." (The Pennsylvania School Journal, 1856)

"The logical axioms are the principle of all truth." (Otto Weininger, "Sex and Character", 1903)

"An axiom is a self-evident truth, the statement of which is superfluous to the conclusiveness of the reasoning, and which only serves to show a principle involved in the reasoning. It is generally a truth of observation; such as the assertion that something is true." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"The mathematical axioms are therefore neither synthetic nor analytic, but definitions. [...] Hence the question of whether axioms are a priori becomes pointless since they are arbitrary." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophy of Space and Time", 1928)

"Axioms are instruments which are used in every department of science, and in every department there are purists who are inclined to oppose with all their might any expansion of the accepted axioms beyond the boundary of their logical application." (Max Planck, "Where Is Science Going?", 1932)

"An axiom is common to all sciences, whereas a postulate is related to a particular science; an axiom is selfevident, whereas a postulate is not; an axiom cannot be regarded as a subject for demonstration, whereas a postulate is properly such a subject; an axiom is assumed with the ready assent of the learner, whereas a postulate is assumed without, perhaps, the assent of the learner." (Howard Eves, "Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics", 1958)

"Whenever we write an axiom, a critic can say that the axiom is true only in a certain context." (John McCarthy, "Generality in Artificial Intelligence", 1987)

Axioms: Axiom of Choice

"[...] hence upon the principle that even for an infinite totality of sets there are always mappings that associate with every set one of its elements, or, expressed formally, that the product of an infinite totality of sets, each containing at least one element, itself differs from zero. This logical principle cannot, to be sure, be reduced to a still simpler one, but it is applied without hesitation everywhere in mathematical deduction." Ernst Zermelo, 1904)

"Zermelo regards the axiom as an unquestionable truth. It must be confessed that, until he made it explicit, mathematicians had used it without a qualm; but it would seem that they had done so unconsciously. And the credit due to Zermelo for having made it explicit is entirely independent of the question whether it is true or false." (Bertrand Russel, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy", 1919)

"The axiom of choice has many important consequences in set theory. It is used in the proof that every infinite set has a denumerable subset, and in the proof that every set has at least one well-ordering. From the latter, it follows that the power of every set is an aleph. Since any two alephs are comparable, so are any two transfinite powers of sets. The axiom of choice is also essential in the arithmetic of transfinite numbers." (R Bunn, "Developments in the Foundations of Mathematics, 1870-1910", 1980)

"Today, most mathematicians have embraced the axiom of choice because of the order and simplicity it brings to mathematics in general. For example, the theorems that every vector space has a basis and every field has an algebraic closure hold only by virtue of the axiom of choice. Likewise, for the theorem that every sequentially continuous function is continuous. However, there are special places where the axiom of choice actually brings disorder. One is the theory of measure." (John Stillwell, "Roads to Infinity: The mathematics of truth and proof", 2010)

"Given any collection of infinite sets the Axiom of Choice tells us that there exists a set which has one element in common with each of the sets in the collection. Choice, which seems to be an intuitively sound principle, is equivalent to the much less plausible statement that every set has a well-ordering. Although many tried to prove Choice, they only seemed to be able to find equivalent statements which were just as difficult to prove." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)

"Since the membership relation is well-founded, well-founded relations can be defined on any class, however, the existence of a well-ordering of every set cannot be proved without appealing to the Axiom of Choice. Indeed, the assumption that every set has a well-ordering is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)

"Objections to the Axiom of Choice, either the strong or the weak version, are typically either philosophical, based on the intuitive temporal implausibility of making an infinite number of choices, or on the non-constructive nature of the axiom, or are based on a peculiar identification of continuum-based models of physics with the physical objects being modelled; properties of the model which are implied by the Axiom of Choice are deemed to be counterintuitive because the physical objects they model don’t have these properties. Motivated by these objections, or just for curiosity, several alternatives to Choice have been explored." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)

"The most obvious variations of the Axiom of Choice are those that restrict the cardinality of the sets in question. Other variations impose relational restrictions between the sets. When the early set theorists tried to prove the Axiom of Choice they invariably ended up showing it is equivalent to some other statement that they were unable to prove. This collection of equivalent statements has grown to an enormous size. One of its striking features is that some of the statements seem intuitively obvious while others are either wildly counterintuitive or evade any kind of evaluation." (Barnaby Sheppard, "The Logic of Infinity", 2014)

"The Axiom of Choice says that it is possible to make an infinite number of arbitrary choices. […] Mathematicians don’t exactly care whether or not the Axiom of Choice holds over all, but they do care whether you have to use it in any given situation or not." (Eugenia Cheng, "Beyond Infinity: An Expedition to the Outer Limits of Mathematics", 2017)

"Many mathematicians continue to reject the axiom of choice. The growing realization that there are questions in mathematics that cannot be decided without this principle is likely to result in the gradual disappearance of the resistance to it." (Ernst Steinitz) 

On Axioms (1975-1999)

"Mathematics has been trivialized, derived from indubitable, trivial axioms in which only absolutely clear trivial terms figure, and from which truth pours down in clear channels." (Imre Lakatos, "Mathematics, Science and Epistemology", 1980)

"The axiom of choice has many important consequences in set theory. It is used in the proof that every infinite set has a denumerable subset, and in the proof that every set has at least one well-ordering. From the latter, it follows that the power of every set is an aleph. Since any two alephs are comparable, so are any two transfinite powers of sets. The axiom of choice is also essential in the arithmetic of transfinite numbers." (R Bunn, "Developments in the Foundations of Mathematics, 1870-1910", 1980)

"If the proof starts from axioms, distinguishes several cases, and takes thirteen lines in the text book […] it may give the youngsters the impression that mathematics consists in proving the most obvious things in the least obvious way." (George Pólya, "Mathematical Discovery: on Understanding, Learning, and Teaching Problem Solving", 1981)

"A slight variation in the axioms at the foundation of a theory can result in huge changes at the frontier." (Stanley P Gudder, "Quantum Probability", 1988)

"The mathematical theories generally called 'mathematical theories of chance' actually ignore chance, uncertainty and probability. The models they consider are purely deterministic, and the quantities they study are, in the final analysis, no more than the mathematical frequencies of particular configurations, among all equally possible configurations, the calculation of which is based on combinatorial analysis. In reality, no axiomatic definition of chance is conceivable." (Maurice Allais, "An Outline of My Main Contributions to Economic Science", [Noble lecture] 1988)

"Whenever we axiomitize a real-world system, we always, of necessity, oversimplify. Frequently, the oversimplification will adequately describe the system for the purposes at hand. In many other cases, the oversimplification may seem deceptively close to reality, when in fact it is far wide of the mark. The best hope, of course, is the use of a model adequate to explain observation. However, when we are unable to develop an adequate model, we would generally be well advised to stick with empiricism and axiomatic imprecision." (James R Thompson, "Empirical Model Building", 1989)

"It is not surprising to find many mathematical ideas interconnected or linked. The expansion of mathematics depends on previously developed ideas. The formation of any mathematical system begins with some undefined terms and axioms (assumptions) and proceeds from there to definitions, theorems, more axioms and so on. But history points out this is not necessarily the route that creativity" (Theoni Pappas, "More Joy of Mathematics: Exploring mathematical insights & concepts", 1991)

"This absolutist view of mathematical knowledge is based on two types of assumptions: those of mathematics, concerning the assumption of axioms and definitions, and those of logic concerning the assumption of axioms, rules of inference and the formal language and its syntax. These are local or micro-assumptions. There is also the possibility of global or macro-assumptions, such as whether logical deduction suffices to establish all mathematical truths." (Paul Ernest, "The Philosophy of Mathematics Education", 1991)

"A mathematical proof is a chain of logical deductions, all stemming from a small number of initial assumptions ('axioms') and subject to the strict rules of mathematical logic. Only such a chain of deductions can establish the validity of a mathematical law, a theorem. And unless this process has been satisfactorily carried out, no relation - regardless of how often it may have been confirmed by observation - is allowed to become a law. It may be given the status of a hypothesis or a conjecture, and all kinds of tentative results may be drawn from it, but no mathematician would ever base definitive conclusions on it." (Eli Maor, "e: The Story of a Number", 1994)

"In view of the developments of abstract mathematics, the first thing mathematicians studied was how to extract the property of 'nearness' from the set of numbers. If the property of nearness could be extracted using a few axioms, and if it was possible to associate the extracted property with a set, then the resulting set would provide an abstract scene to study 'nearness'." (Kenji Ueno & Toshikazu Sunada, "A Mathematical Gift, III: The Interplay Between Topology, Functions, Geometry, and Algebra", Mathematical World Vol. 23, 1996)

"Let us regard a proof of an assertion as a purely mechanical procedure using precise rules of inference starting with a few unassailable axioms. This means that an algorithm can be devised for testing the validity of an alleged proof simply by checking the successive steps of the argument; the rules of inference constitute an algorithm for generating all the statements that can be deduced in a finite number of steps from the axioms." (Edward Beltrami, "What is Random?: Chaos and Order in Mathematics and Life", 1999)

On Algorithms I

"Mathematics is an aspect of culture as well as a collection of algorithms." (Carl B Boyer, "The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development", 1959)

"An algorithm must be seen to be believed, and the best way to learn what an algorithm is all about is to try it." (Donald E Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming Vol. I, 1968)

"Scientific laws give algorithms, or procedures, for determining how systems behave. The computer program is a medium in which the algorithms can be expressed and applied. Physical objects and mathematical structures can be represented as numbers and symbols in a computer, and a program can be written to manipulate them according to the algorithms. When the computer program is executed, it causes the numbers and symbols to be modified in the way specified by the scientific laws. It thereby allows the consequences of the laws to be deduced." (Stephen Wolfram, "Computer Software in Science and Mathematics", 1984)

"Algorithmic complexity theory and nonlinear dynamics together establish the fact that determinism reigns only over a quite finite domain; outside this small haven of order lies a largely uncharted, vast wasteland of chaos." (Joseph Ford, "Progress in Chaotic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Joseph Ford's 60th Birthday", 1988)

"On this view, we recognize science to be the search for algorithmic compressions. We list sequences of observed data. We try to formulate algorithms that compactly represent the information content of those sequences. Then we test the correctness of our hypothetical abbreviations by using them to predict the next terms in the string. These predictions can then be compared with the future direction of the data sequence. Without the development of algorithmic compressions of data all science would be replaced by mindless stamp collecting - the indiscriminate accumulation of every available fact. Science is predicated upon the belief that the Universe is algorithmically compressible and the modern search for a Theory of Everything is the ultimate expression of that belief, a belief that there is an abbreviated representation of the logic behind the Universe's properties that can be written down in finite form by human beings." (John D Barrow, New Theories of Everything", 1991)

"Algorithms are a set of procedures to generate the answer to a problem." (Stuart Kauffman, "At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Complexity", 1995)

"Let us regard a proof of an assertion as a purely mechanical procedure using precise rules of inference starting with a few unassailable axioms. This means that an algorithm can be devised for testing the validity of an alleged proof simply by checking the successive steps of the argument; the rules of inference constitute an algorithm for generating all the statements that can be deduced in a finite number of steps from the axioms." (Edward Beltrami, "What is Random?: Chaos and Order in Mathematics and Life", 1999)

"Heuristics are rules of thumb that help constrain the problem in certain ways (in other words they help you to avoid falling back on blind trial and error), but they don't guarantee that you will find a solution. Heuristics are often contrasted with algorithms that will guarantee that you find a solution - it may take forever, but if the problem is algorithmic you will get there. However, heuristics are also algorithms." (S Ian Robertson, "Problem Solving", 2001)

"An algorithm is a simple rule, or elementary task, that is repeated over and over again. In this way algorithms can produce structures of astounding complexity." (F David Peat, "From Certainty to Uncertainty", 2002)

"Many people have strong intuitions about whether they would rather have a vital decision about them made by algorithms or humans. Some people are touchingly impressed by the capabilities of the algorithms; others have far too much faith in human judgment. The truth is that sometimes the algorithms will do better than the humans, and sometimes they won’t. If we want to avoid the problems and unlock the promise of big data, we’re going to need to assess the performance of the algorithms on a case-by-case basis. All too often, this is much harder than it should be. […] So the problem is not the algorithms, or the big datasets. The problem is a lack of scrutiny, transparency, and debate." (Tim Harford, "The Data Detective: Ten easy rules to make sense of statistics", 2020)

On Axioms (2010-2019)

"A proof in mathematics is a compelling argument that a proposition holds without exception; a disproof requires only the demonstration of an exception. A mathematical proof does not, in general, establish the empirical truth of whatever is proved. What it establishes is that whatever is proved - usually a theorem - follows logically from the givens, or axioms." (Raymond S Nickerson, "Mathematical Reasoning", 2010)

"Another feature of Bourbaki is that it rejects intuition of any kind. Bourbaki books tend not to contain explanations, examples, or heuristics. One of the main messages of the present book is that we record mathematics for posterity in a strictly rigorous, axiomatic fashion. This is the mathematician’s version of the reproducible experiment with control used by physicists and biologists and chemists. But we learn mathematics, we discover mathematics, we create mathematics using intuition and trial and error. We draw pictures. Certainly, we try things and twist things around and bend things to try to make them work. Unfortunately, Bourbaki does not teach any part of this latter process." (Steven G Krantz, "The Proof is in the Pudding: The Changing Nature of Mathematical Proof", 2010)

"Quantum theory may be formulated using Hilbert spaces over any of the three associative normed division algebras: the real numbers, the complex numbers and the quaternions. Indeed, these three choices appear naturally in a number of axiomatic approaches. However, there are internal problems with real or quaternionic quantum theory. Here we argue that these problems can be resolved if we treat real, complex and quaternionic quantum theory as part of a unified structure. Dyson called this structure the ‘three-fold way’ […] This three-fold classification sheds light on the physics of time reversal symmetry, and it already plays an important role in particle physics." (John C Baez, "Division Algebras and Quantum Theory", 2011)

"While mathematicians now recognize that there is some freedom in the choice of the axioms one uses, not any set of statements can serve as a set of axioms. In particular, every set of axioms must be logically consistent, which is another way of saying that it should not be possible to prove a particular statement simultaneously true and false using the given set of axioms. Also, axioms should always be logically independent - that is, no axiom should be a logical consequence of the others. A statement that is a logical consequence of some of the axioms is a theorem, not an axiom." (John Tabak, "Beyond Geometry: A new mathematics of space and form", 2011)

"Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the 'religious' fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are completely fictional, i. e. those that involve the so-called infinity." (Doron Zeilberger, "Doron Zeilberger's 126th Opinion", 2012)

"System meaning is informed by the circumstances and factors that surround the system. The contextual axiom's propositions are those which bound the system by providing guidance that enables an investigator to understand the set of external circumstances or factors that enable or constrain a particular system. The contextual axiom has three principles: (1) holism, (2) darkness, and (3) complementarity." (Patrick Hester & Kevin Adams," Systemic Thinking: Fundamentals for Understanding Problems and Messes", 2014)

"Mathematicians usually think not in terms of concrete realizations but in terms of rules that are given axiomatically. Mathematics is the art of arguing with some chosen logic and some chosen axioms. As such, it is simply one of the oldest games with symbols and words." (Alfred S Posamentier & Bernd Thaller, "Numbers: Their tales, types, and treasures", 2015)

On Axioms (1950-1974)

"All followers of the axiomatic method and most mathematicians think that there is some such thing as an absolute ‘mathematical rigor’ which has to be satisfied by any deduction if it is to be valid. The history of mathematics shows that this is not the case, that, on the contrary, every generation is surpassed in rigor again and again by its successors." (Richard von Mises, "Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding", 1951)

"Automata have begun to invade certain parts of mathematics too, particularly but not exclusively mathematical physics or applied mathematics. The natural systems (e.g., central nervous system) are of enormous complexity and it is clearly necessary first to subdivide what they represent into several parts that to a certain extent are independent, elementary units. The problem then consists of understanding how these elements are organized as a whole. It is the latter problem which is likely to attract those who have the background and tastes of the mathematician or a logician. With this attitude, he will be inclined to forget the origins and then, after the process of axiomatization is complete, concentrate on the mathematical aspects." (John Von Neumann, "The General and Logical Theory of Automata", 1951)

"One states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually determine the solution uniquely. The two approaches to the problem, via the negotiation model or via the axioms, are complementary; each helps to justify and clarify the other." (John Nash, "Non-cooperative Games", Annals of Mathematics Vol. 54 (2), 1951)

"The constructions of the mathematical mind are at the same time free and necessary. The individual mathematician feels free to define his notions and set up his axioms as he pleases. But the question is will he get his fellow-mathematician interested in the constructs of his imagination. We cannot help the feeling that certain mathematical structures which have evolved through the combined efforts of the mathematical community bear the stamp of a necessity not affected by the accidents of their historical birth. Everybody who looks at the spectacle of modern algebra will be struck by this complementarity of freedom and necessity." (Hermann Weyl, "A Half-Century of Mathematics", The American Mathematical Monthly, 1951)

"We could compare mathematics so formalized to a game of chess in which the symbols correspond to the chessmen; the formulae, to definite positions of the men on the board; the axioms, to the initial positions of the chessmen; the directions for drawing conclusions, to the rules of movement; a proof, to a series of moves which leads from the initial position to a definite configuration of the men." (Friedrich Waismann & Karl Menger, "Introduction to Mathematical Thinking: The Formation of Concepts in Modern Mathematics", 1951)

"We are driven to conclude that science, like mathematics, is a system of axioms, assumptions, and deductions; it may start from being, but later leaves it to itself, and ends in the formation of a hypothetical reality that has nothing to do with existence; or it is the discovery of an ideal being which is, of course, present in what we call actuality, and renders it an existence for us only by being present in it." (Poolla T Raju, "Idealistic Thought of India", 1953)

"[…] the grand aim of all science […] is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deductions from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms." (Albert Einstein, 1954)

"The theory of relativity is a fine example of the fundamental character of the modern development of theoretical science. The initial hypotheses become steadily more abstract and remote from experience. On the other hand, it gets nearer to the grand aim of all science, which is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms." (Albert Einstein, 1954)

"At present game theory has, in my opinion, two important uses, neither of them related to games nor to conflict directly. First, game theory stimulates us to think about conflict in a novel way. Second, game theory leads to some genuine impasses, that is, to situations where its axiomatic base is shown to be insufficient for dealing even theoretically with certain types of conflict situations... Thus, the impact is made on our thinking process themselves, rather than on the actual content of our knowledge. (Anatol Rapoport, "Fights, games, and debates", 1960)

"In fact, the construction of mathematical models for various fragments of the real world, which is the most essential business of the applied mathematician, is nothing but an exercise in axiomatics." (Marshall Stone, cca 1960)

"The inner circle of creative mathematicians have the well-kept trade secret that in a great many cases theorems come first and axioms second." (Carl B Allendoerfer, "The Narrow Mathematician", The American Mathematical Monthly, 1962)

"In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly the rise of the conviction that the relevant properties of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of their abstract structure rather than in terms of the elements which the objects were thought to be made of. The question thus naturally arises whether one can give a foundation for mathematics which expresses wholeheartedly this conviction concerning what mathematics is about, and in particular in which classes and membership in classes do not play any role. Here by 'foundation' we mean a single system of first-order axioms in which all usual mathematical objects can be defined and all their usual properties proved." (F William Lawvere, "The category of categories as a foundation for mathematics", 1965)

"So the first thing we have to accept is that even in mathematics you can start in different places. If all these various theorems are interconnected by reasoning there is no real way to say ‘These are the most fundamental axioms’, because if you were told something different instead you could also run the reasoning the other way. It is like a bridge with lots of members, and it is over-connected; if pieces have dropped out you can reconnect it another way." (Richard Feynman, "The Character of Physical Law", 1965)

"A mathematical proof, as usually written down, is a sequence of expressions in the state space. But we may also think of the proof as consisting of the sequence of justifications of consecutive proof steps - i.e., the references to axioms, previously-proved theorems, and rules of inference that legitimize the writing down of the proof steps. From this point of view, the proof is a sequence of actions (applications of rules of inference) that, operating initially on the axioms, transform them into the desired theorem." (Herbert A Simon, "The Logic of Heuristic Decision Making", [in "The Logic of Decision and Action"], 1966)

"Categorical algebra has developed in recent years as an effective method of organizing parts of mathematics. Typically, this sort of organization uses notions such as that of the category G of all groups. [...] This raises the problem of finding some axiomatization of set theory - or of some foundational discipline like set theory - which will be adequate and appropriate to realizing this intent. This problem may turn out to have revolutionary implications vis-`a-vis the accepted views of the role of set theory." (Saunders Mac Lane, "Categorical algebra and set-theoretic foundations", 1967)

"To the average mathematician who merely wants to know that his work is securely based, the most appealing choice is to avoid difficulties by means of Hilbert's program. Here one regards mathematics as a formal game and one is only concerned with the question of consistency." (Paul Cohen, "Axiomatic set theory, American Mathematical Society", 1971)

"For hundreds of pages the closely-reasoned arguments unroll, axioms and theorems interlock. And what remains with us in the end? A general sense that the world can be expressed in closely-reasoned arguments, in interlocking axioms and theorems." (Michael Frayn, "Constructions", 1974)

On Axioms (1925-1949)

"If we wish to express our ideas in terms of the concepts synthetic and analytic, we would have to point out that these concepts are applicable only to sentences that can be either true of false, and not to definitions. The mathematical axioms are therefore neither synthetic nor analytic, but definitions. [...] Hence the question of whether axioms are a priori becomes pointless since they are arbitrary." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophy of Space and Time", 1928)

"Research is fundamentally a state of mind involving continual re­examination of doctrines and axioms upon which current thought and action are based. It is, therefore, critical of existing practices." (Theobald Smith, "The Influence of Research in Bringing into Closer Relationship the Practice of Medicine and Public Health Activities", American Journal of Medical Sciences, 1929)

"The development of mathematics toward greater precision has led, as is well known, to the formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem using nothing but a few mechanical rules.[...] One might therefore conjecture that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide any mathematical question that can at all be formally expressed in these systems. It will be shown below that this is not the case, that on the contrary there are in the two systems mentioned relatively simple problems in the theory of integers that cannot be decided on the basis of the axioms." (Kurt Gödel, "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems", 1931)

"The steady progress of physics requires for its theoretical formulation a mathematics which get continually more advanced. […] it was expected that mathematics would get more and more complicated, but would rest on a permanent basis of axioms and definitions, while actually the modern physical developments have required a mathematics that continually shifts its foundation and gets more abstract. Non-Euclidean geometry and noncommutative algebra, which were at one time were considered to be purely fictions of the mind and pastimes of logical thinkers, have now been found to be very necessary for the description of general facts of the physical world. It seems likely that this process of increasing abstraction will continue in the future and the advance in physics is to be associated with continual modification and generalisation of the axioms at the base of mathematics rather than with a logical development of any one mathematical scheme on a fixed foundation." (Paul A M Dirac, "Quantities singularities in the electromagnetic field", Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 1931)

"Any mathematical science is a body of theorems deduced from a set of axioms. A geometry is a mathematical science. The question then arises why the name geometry is given to some mathematical sciences and not to others. It is likely that there is no definite answer to this question, but that a branch of mathematics is called a geometry because the name seems good, on emotional and  people." (John H C Whitehead, "The Foundation of Differential Geometry", 1932)

"Axioms are instruments which are used in every department of science, and in every department there are purists who are inclined to oppose with all their might any expansion of the accepted axioms beyond the boundary of their logical application." (Max Planck, "Where Is Science Going?", 1932)

"The theory of probability as a mathematical discipline can and should be developed from axioms in exactly the same way as geometry and algebra." (Andrey Kolmogorov, "Foundations of the Theory of Probability", 1933)

"Scientific Ideas can often be adequately exhibited for all the purposes of reasoning, by means of Definitions and Axioms; all attempts to reason by means of Definitions from common Notions, lead to empty forms or entire confusion." (William Whewell, "History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time", 1937)

"[…] the major mathematical research acquires an organization and orientation similar to the poetical function which, adjusting by means of metaphor disjunctive elements, displays a structure identical to the sensitive universe. Similarly, by means of its axiomatic or theoretical foundation, mathematics assimilates various doctrines and serves the instructive purpose, the one set up by the unifying moral universe of concepts. " (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

"Mathematical research can lend its organisational characteristics to poetry, whereby disjointed metaphors take on a universal sense. Similarly, the axiomatic foundations of group theory can be assimilated into a larger moral concept of a unified universe. Without this, mathematics would be a laborious Barbary." (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

"But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future sense perception will agree with them and, moreover, to believe that a question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in future." (Kurt Gödel, "What is Cantor’s Continuum problem?", American Mathematical Monthly 54, 1947)

On Axioms (1909-1924)

"Pure mathematics is a collection of hypothetical, deductive theories, each consisting of a definite system of primitive, undefined, concepts or symbols and primitive, unproved, but self-consistent assumptions (commonly called axioms) together with their logically deducible consequences following by rigidly deductive processes without appeal to intuition." (Graham D Fitch, "The Fourth Dimension simply Explained", 1910)

"The ordinary mathematical treatment of any applied science substitutes exact axioms for the approximate results of experience, and deduces from these axioms the rigid mathematical conclusions. In applying this method it must not be forgotten that the mathematical developments transcending the limits of exactness of the science are of no practical value. It follows that a large portion of abstract mathematics remains without finding any practical application, the amount of mathematics that can be usefully employed in any science being in proportion to the degree of accuracy attained in the science. Thus, while the astronomer can put to use a wide range of mathematical theory, the chemist is only just beginning to apply the first derivative, i. e. the rate of change at which certain processes are going on; for second derivatives he does not seem to have found any use as yet." (Felix Klein, "Lectures on Mathematics", 1911)

"The mathematical laws presuppose a very complex elaboration. They are not known exclusively either a priori or a posteriori, but are a creation of the mind; and this creation is not an arbitrary one, but, owing to the mind’s resources, takes place with reference to experience and in view of it. Sometimes the mind starts with intuitions which it freely creates; sometimes, by a process of elimination, it gathers up the axioms it regards as most suitable for producing a harmonious development, one that is both simple and fertile. The mathematics is a voluntary and intelligent adaptation of thought to things, it represents the forms that will allow of qualitative diversity being surmounted, the moulds into which reality must enter in order to become as intelligible as possible." (Émile Boutroux, "Natural Law in Science and Philosophy", 1914)

"Every one knows there are mathematical axioms. Mathematicians have, from the days of Euclid, very wisely laid down the axioms or first principles on which they reason. And the effect which this appears to have had upon the stability and happy progress of this science, gives no small encouragement to attempt to lay the foundation of other sciences in a similar manner, as far as we are able." (William K Clifford et al, "Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense", 1915)

"As soon as science has emerged from its initial stages, theoretical advances are no longer achieved merely by a process of arrangement. Guided by empirical data, the investigator rather develops a system of thought which, in general, is built up logically from a small number of fundamental assumptions, the so-called axioms. We call such a system of thought a theory. The theory finds the justification for its existence in the fact that it correlates a large number of single observations, and it is just here that the 'truth' of the theory lies. " (Albert Einstein: "Relativity: The Special and General Theory", 1916)

"Anything at all that can be the object of scientific thought becomes dependent on the axiomatic method, and thereby indirectly on mathematics, as soon as it is ripe for the formation of a theory. By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms [...] we become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. In the sign of the axiomatic method, mathematics is summoned to a leading role in science." (David Hilbert, "Axiomatisches Denken", 1917)

"Since the examination of consistency is a task that cannot be avoided, it appears necessary to axiomatize logic itself and to prove that number theory and set theory are only parts of logic. This method was prepared long ago (not least by Frege’s profound investigations); it has been most successfully explained by the acute mathematician and logician Russell. One could regard the completion of this magnificent Russellian enterprise of the axiomatization of logic as the crowning achievement of the work of axiomatization as a whole." (David Hilbert, "Axiomatisches Denken" ["Axiomatic Thinking"], [address] 1917)

"The physical object cannot be determined by axioms and definitions. It is a thing of the real world, not an object of the logical world of mathematics. Offhand it looks as if the method of representing physical events by mathematical equations is the same as that of mathematics. Physics has developed the method of defining one magnitude in terms of others by relating them to more and more general magnitudes and by ultimately arriving at 'axioms', that is, the fundamental equations of physics. Yet what is obtained in this fashion is just a system of mathematical relations. What is lacking in such system is a statement regarding the significance of physics, the assertion that the system of equations is true for reality." (Hans Reichenbach, "The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge", 1920) 

"The axioms and provable theorems (i.e. the formulas that arise in this alternating game [namely formal deduction and the adjunction of new axioms]) are images of the thoughts that make up the usual procedure of traditional mathematics; but they are not themselves the truths in the absolute sense. Rather, the absolute truths are the insights (Einsichten) that my proof theory furnishes into the provability and the consistency of these formal systems." (David Hilbert; "Die logischen Grundlagen der Mathematik." Mathematische Annalen 88 (1), 1923)

On Axioms (2000-2009)

"Mathematics is not placid, static and eternal. […] Most mathematicians are happy to make use of those axioms in their proofs, although others do not, exploring instead so-called intuitionist logic or constructivist mathematics. Mathematics is not a single monolithic structure of absolute truth!" (Gregory J Chaitin, "A century of controversy over the foundations of mathematics", 2000)

"We start from vague pictures or ideas […] which we encapsulate by rules, and then we discover that those rules persuade us to modify our mental images. We engage in a dialog between our mental images and our ability to justify them via equations. As we understand what we are investigating more clearly, the pictures become sharper and the equations more elaborate. Only at the end of the process does anything like a formal set of axioms followed by logical proofs" (E Brian Davies, "Science in the Looking Glass", 2003)

"A recurring concern has been whether set theory, which speaks of infinite sets, refers to an existing reality, and if so how does one ‘know’ which axioms to accept. It is here that the greatest disparity of opinion exists (and the greatest possibility of using different consistent axiom systems)." (Paul Cohen, "Skolem and pessimism about proof in mathematics". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 363 (1835), 2005)

"An axiomatic theory starts out of some primitive (undefined) concepts and out of a set of primitive propositions, the theory’s axioms or postulates. Other concepts are obtained by definition from the primitive concepts and from defined concepts; theorems of the theory are derived by proof mechanisms out of the axioms." (Cristian S Calude, "Randomness & Complexity, from Leibniz to Chaitin", 2007)

"Human language is a vehicle of truth but also of error, deception, and nonsense. Its use, as in the present discussion, thus requires great prudence. One can improve the precision of language by explicit definition of the terms used. But this approach has its limitations: the definition of one term involves other terms, which should in turn be defined, and so on. Mathematics has found a way out of this infinite regression: it bypasses the use of definitions by postulating some logical relations (called axioms) between otherwise undefined mathematical terms. Using the mathematical terms introduced with the axioms, one can then define new terms and proceed to build mathematical theories. Mathematics need, not, in principle rely on a human language. It can use, instead, a formal presentation in which the validity of a deduction can be checked mechanically and without risk of error or deception." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"If you have the rules of deduction and some initial choice of statements as sumed to be true (called axioms), then you are ready to derive many more true statements (called theorems). The rules of deduc tion constitute the logical machinery of mathematics, and the axioms comprise the basic properties of the objects you are interested in (in geometry these may be points, line segments, angles, etc.). There is some flexibility in selecting the rules of deduction, and many choices of axioms are possible. Once these have been decided you have all you need to do mathematics." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"In mathematics, the first principles are called axioms, and the rules are referred to as deduction/inference rules. A proof is a series of steps based on the (adopted) axioms and deduction rules which reaches a desired conclusion. Every step in a proof can be checked for correctness by examining it to ensure that it is logically sound." (Cristian S Calude et al, "Proving and Programming", 2007)

"Mathematics as done by mathematicians is not just heaping up statements logically deduced from the axioms. Most such statements are rubbish, even if perfectly correct. A good mathematician will look for interesting results. These interesting results, or theorems, organize themselves into meaningful and natural structures, and one may say that the object of mathematics is to find and study these structures." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Reducing theorems to a small number of axioms turns out to be deeply reminiscent of what scientists do. The mark of a good scientific theory, after all, is that it describes a large number of observations of the world while making only a small number of assumptions." (Marcus Chown, "God’s Number: Where Can We Find the Secret of the Universe? In a Single Number!", 2007)

"The fact that we have an efficient conceptualization of mathematics shows that this reflects a certain mathematical reality, even if this reality is quite invisible in the formal listing of the axioms of set theory." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"We axiomatize a theory not only to better understand its inner workings but also in order to obtain metatheorems about that theory. We will therefore be interested in, say, proving that a given axiomatic treatment for some physical theory is incomplete (that is, the system exhibits the incompleteness phenomenon), among other things." (Cristian S Calude, "Randomness & Complexity, from Leibniz to Chaitin", 2007)

"When we introduce the concept of a group, we do this by imposing certain properties that should hold: these properties are called axioms. The axioms defining a group are, however, of a somewhat different nature from the ZFC axioms of set theory. Basically, whenever we do mathematics, we accept ZFC: a current mathematical paper systematically uses well-known consequences of ZFC (and normally does not mention ZFC). The axioms of a group by contrast are used only when appropriate." (David Ruelle, "The Mathematician's Brain", 2007)

"Why are proofs so important? Suppose our task were to construct a building. We would start with the foundations. In our case these are the axioms or definitions - everything else is built upon them. Each theorem or proposition represents a new level of knowledge and must be firmly anchored to the previous level. We attach the new level to the previous one using a proof. So the theorems and propositions are the new heights of knowledge we achieve, while the proofs are essential as they are the mortar which attaches them to the level below. Without proofs the structure would collapse." (Sidney A Morris, "Topology without Tears", 2007)

Set Theory III

"One very important genus of complex ideas that we encounter everywhere are those in which the idea of collection (Inbegriff ) appears. There are many types of the latter [...] I must first determine with more precision the concept I associate with the word collection. I use this word in the same sense as it is used in the common usage and thus understand by a collection of certain things exactly the same as what one would express by the words: a combination (Verbindung) or association (Vereinigung) of these things, a gathering (Zusammensein) of the latter, a whole (Ganzes) in which they occur as parts (Teile). Hence the mere idea of a collection does not allow us to determine in which order and sequence the things that are put together appear or, indeed, whether there is or can be such an order. [...] A collection, it seems to me, is nothing other than something complex (das Zusammengesetztheit hat)." (Bernard Bolzano, "Wissenschaftslehre" ["Theory of Science"], 1837)

"The old and oft-repeated proposition 'Totum est majus sua parte' [the whole is larger than the part] may be applied without proof only in the case of entities that are based upon whole and part; then and only then is it an undeniable consequence of the concepts 'totum' and 'pars'. Unfortunately, however, this 'axiom' is used innumerably often without any basis and in neglect of the necessary distinction between 'reality' and 'quantity' , on the one hand, and 'number' and 'set', on the other, precisely in the sense in which it is generally false." (Georg Cantor, "Über unendliche, lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten", Mathematische Annalen 20, 1882)

"The foregoing account of my researches in the theory of manifolds has reached a point where further progress depends on extending the concept of true integral number beyond the previous boundaries; this extension lies in a direction which, to my knowledge, no one has yet attempted to explore.
My dependence on this extension of number concept is so great, that without it I should be unable to take freely the smallest step further in the theory of sets." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883) 

"To the thought of considering the infinitely great not merely in the form of what grows without limits - and in the closely related form of the convergent infinite series first introduced in the seventeenth century-, but also fixing it mathematically by numbers in the determinate form of the completed-infinite, I have been logically compelled in the course of scientific exertions and attempts which have lasted many years, almost against my will, for it contradicts traditions which had become precious to me; and therefore I believe that no arguments can be made good against it which I would not know how to meet." (Georg Cantor, "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre", 1883)

"Every mathematician agrees that every mathematician must know some set theory; the disagreement begins in trying to decide how much is some. [...] The student's task in learning set theory is to steep himself in unfamiliar but essentially shallow generalities till they become so familiar that they can be used with almost no conscious effort. In other words, general set theory is pretty trivial stuff really, but, if you want to be a mathematician, you need some, and here it is; read it, absorb it, and forget it [...] the language and notation are those of ordinary informal mathematics. A more important way in which the naive point of view predominates is that set theory is regarded as a body of facts, of which the axioms are a brief and convenient summary; in the orthodox axiomatic view the logical relations among various axioms are the central objects of study." (Paul R Halmos, "Naive Set Theory", 1960)

"A manifold, roughly, is a topological space in which some neighborhood of each point admits a coordinate system, consisting of real coordinate functions on the points of the neighborhood, which determine the position of points and the topology of that neighborhood; that is, the space is locally cartesian. Moreover, the passage from one coordinate system to another is smooth in the overlapping region, so that the meaning of 'differentiable' curve, function, or map is consistent when referred to either system." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"Set theory is concerned with abstract objects and their relation to various collections which contain them. We do not define what a set is but accept it as a primitive notion. We gain an intuitive feeling for the meaning of sets and, consequently, an idea of their usage from merely listing some of the synonyms: class, collection, conglomeration, bunch, aggregate. Similarly, the notion of an object is primitive, with synonyms element and point. Finally, the relation between elements and sets, the idea of an element being in a set, is primitive." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"The mathematical models for many physical systems have manifolds as the basic objects of study, upon which further structure may be defined to obtain whatever system is in question. The concept generalizes and includes the special cases of the cartesian line, plane, space, and the surfaces which are studied in advanced calculus. The theory of these spaces which generalizes to manifolds includes the ideas of differentiable functions, smooth curves, tangent vectors, and vector fields. However, the notions of distance between points and straight lines (or shortest paths) are not part of the idea of a manifold but arise as consequences of additional structure, which may or may not be assumed and in any case is not unique." (Richard L Bishop & Samuel I Goldberg, "Tensor Analysis on Manifolds", 1968)

"Does set theory, once we get beyond the integers, refer to an existing reality, or must it be regarded, as formalists would regard it, as an interesting formal game? [...] A typical argument for the objective reality of set theory is that it is obtained by extrapolation from our intuitions of finite objects, and people see no reason why this has less validity. Moreover, set theory has been studied for a long time with no hint of a contradiction. It is suggested that this cannot be an accident, and thus set theory reflects an existing reality. In particular, the Continuum Hypothesis and related statements are true or false, and our task is to resolve them." (Paul Cohen, "Skolem and pessimism about proof in mathematics", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 363 (1835), 2005)

"In each branch of mathematics it is essential to recognize when two structures are equivalent. For example two sets are equivalent, as far as set theory is concerned, if there exists a bijective function which maps one set onto the other. Two groups are equivalent, known as isomorphic, if there exists a a homomorphism of one to the other which is one-to-one and onto. Two topological spaces are equivalent, known as homeomorphic, if there exists a homeomorphism of one onto the other." (Sydney A Morris, "Topology without Tears", 2011)

On Axioms (1800-1899)

"Axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses: we read fine things but never feel them to the full until we have gone the same steps as the author." (John Keats, [Letter to John Hamilton Reynolds] 1818)

"Scientific Ideas can often be adequately exhibited for all the purposes of reasoning, by means of Definitions and Axioms; all attempts to reason by means of Definitions from common Notions, lead to empty forms or entire confusion." (William Whewell, "History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time", 1837)

"These sciences, Geometry, Theoretical Arithmetic and Algebra, have no principles besides definitions and axioms, and no process of proof but deduction; this process, however, assuming a most remarkable character; and exhibiting a combination of simplicity and complexity, of rigour and generality, quite unparalleled in other subjects." (William Whewell, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", 1840)

"The reasoning of mathematicians is founded on certain and infallible principles. Every word they use conveys a determinate idea, and by accurate definitions they excite the same ideas in the mind of the reader that were in the mind of the writer. When they have defined the terms they intend to make use of, they premise a few axioms, or self-evident principles, that every one must assent to as soon as proposed. They then take for granted certain postulates, that no one can deny them, such as, that a right line may be drawn from any given point to another, and from these plain, simple principles they have raised most astonishing speculations, and proved the extent of the human mind to be more spacious and capacious than any other science." (John Adams,"Diary", 1850)

"A physical theory, like an abstract science, consists of definitions and axioms as first principles, and of propositions, their consequences; but with these differences:—first, That in an abstract science, a definition assigns a name to a class of notions derived originally from observation, but not necessarily corresponding to any existing objects of real phenomena, and an axiom states a mutual relation amongst such notions, or the names denoting them; while in a physical science, a definition states properties common to a class of existing objects, or real phenomena, and a physical axiom states a general law as to the relations of phenomena; and, secondly,—That in an abstract science, the propositions first discovered are the most simple; whilst in a physical theory, the propositions first discovered are in general numerous and complex, being formal laws, the immediate results of observation and experiment, from which the definitions and axioms are subsequently arrived at by a process of reasoning differing from that whereby one proposition is deduced from another in an abstract science, partly in being more complex and difficult, and partly in being to a certain extent tentative, that is to say, involving the trial of conjectural principles, and their acceptance or rejection according as their consequences are found to agree or disagree with the formal laws deduced immediately from observation and experiment." (William J M Rankine, "Outlines of the Science of Energetics", Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1855)

"An axiom is proposition more general than the propositions or the science in which it employed as an axiom; or, an axiom is a proposition which is true of more subjects than the subject or the science in which it is quoted as an axiom. Hence. Geometry ought to admit as axioms all Algebraic truths. The simple truths of this kind, which are commonly called axioms, ore corollaries from the definitions of such terms as equal, whole, part, sum, etc." (The Pennsylvania School Journal, 1856)

"The maxim is, that whatever can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may be affirmed (or denied) of everything included in the class. This axiom, supposed to be the basis of the syllogistic theory, is termed by logicians the dictum de omni et nullo [the maxim of all and none]." (John S Mill, "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive", 1858)

"Induction and analogy are the special characteristics of modern mathematics, in which theorems have given place to theories and no truth is regarded otherwise than as a link in an infinite chain. 'Omne exit in infinitum' is their favorite motto and accepted axiom." (James J Sylvester, "A Plea for the Mathematician", Nature Vol. 1, 1870)

"When we consider that the whole of geometry rests ultimately on axioms which derive their validity from the nature of our intuitive faculty, we seem well justified in questioning the sense of imaginary forms, since we attribute to them properties which not infrequently contradict all our intuitions." (Gottlob Frege, "On a Geometrical Representation of Imaginary forms in the Plane", 1873)

"The old and oft-repeated proposition ‘Totum est majus sua parte’ [the whole is larger than the part] may be applied without proof only in the case of entities that are based upon whole and part; then and only then is it an undeniable consequence of the concepts ‘totum’ and ‘pars’. Unfortunately, however, this ‘axiom’ is used innumerably often without any basis and in neglect of the necessary distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘quantity’, on the one hand, and ‘number’ and ‘set’, on the other, precisely in the sense in which it is generally false." (Georg Cantor, "Über unendliche, lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten", Mathematische Annalen 20, 1882)

"With our notion of the essence of intuition, an intuitive treatment of figurative representations will tend to yield a certain general guide on which mathematical laws apply and how their general proof may be structured. However, true proof will only be obtained if the given figures are replaced with figures generated by laws based on the axioms and these are then taken to carry through the general train of thought in an explicit case. Dealing with sensate objects gives the mathematician an impetus and an idea of the problems to be tackled, but it does not pre-empt the mathematical process itself. (Felix Klein, "Nicht-Euklidische Geometrie I: Vorlesung gehalten während des Wintersemesters 1889–90", 1892)

" […] the naive intuition is not exact, while the refined intuition is not properly intuition at all, but arises through the logical development from axioms considered as perfectly exact." (Felix Klein, [lectures] 1893)

"Geometry, like arithmetic, requires for its logical development only a small number of simple, fundamental principles. These fundamental principles are called the axioms of geometry." (David Hilbert, "The Foundations of Geometry", 1899)

On Axioms (1600-1699)

"It cannot be that axioms established by argumentation should avail for the discovery of new works, since the subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of argument. But axioms duly and orderly formed from particulars easily discover the way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active." (Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum", 1620)

"There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried." (Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum", 1620)

"We must first, by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true axioms, and seek for experiments which may afford light rather than profit." (Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum", 1620)

"Rules for Axioms. I. Not to omit any necessary principle without asking whether it is admittied, however clear and evident it may be. II. Not to demand, in axioms, any but things that are perfectly evident in themselves." (Blaise Pascal, "The Art of Persuasion", cca. 1658)

"For it is unquestionable that it is no great error to define and clearly explain things, although very clear of themselves, nor to omit to require in advance axioms which cannot be refused in the place where they are necessary; nor lastly to prove propositions that would be admitted without proof." (Blaise Pascal, "The Art of Persuasion",  cca. 1658)

"To prove all propositions, and to employ nothing for their proof but axioms fully evident of themselves, or propositions already demonstrated or admitted; Never to take advantage of the ambiguity of terms by failing mentally to substitute definitions that restrict or explain them." (Blaise Pascal, "The Art of Persuasion", cca. 1658)

"This art, which I call the art of persuading, and which, properly speaking, is simply the process of perfect methodical proofs, consists of three essential parts: of defining the terms of which we should avail ourselves by clear definitions, of proposing principles of evident axioms to prove the thing in question; and of always mentally substituting in the demonstrations the definition in the place of the thing defined." (Blaise Pascal, "The Art of Persuasion", cca. 1658)

"Mathematicians who are only mathematicians have exact minds, provided all things are explained to them by means of definitions and axioms; otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only right when the principles are quite clear." (Blaise Pascal, "Pensées", 1670)

"Rules necessary for definitions. Not to leave any terms at all obscure or ambiguous without definition; Not to employ in definitions any but terms perfectly known or already explained. […] A few rules include all that is necessary for the perfection of the definitions, the axioms, and the demonstrations, and consequently of the entire method of the geometrical proofs of the art of persuading." (Blaise Pascal, "Pensées", 1670)

On Axioms (1900-1909)

"If geometry is to serve as a model for the treatment of physical axioms, we shall try first by a small number of axioms to include as large a class as possible of physical phenomena, and then by adjoining new axioms to arrive gradually at the more special theories. […] The mathematician will have also to take account not only of those theories coming near to reality, but also, as in geometry, of all logically possible theories. We must be always alert to obtain a complete survey of all conclusions derivable from the system of axioms assumed." (David Hilbert, 1900)

"When we are engaged in investigating the foundations of a science, we must set up a system of axioms which contains an exact and complete description of the relations subsisting between the elementary ideas of that science. The axioms so set up are at the same time the definitions of those elementary ideas; and no statement within the realm of the science... is held to be correct unless it can be derived from axioms by means of a finite number of logical steps. Upon closer consideration the question arises: Whether, in any way, certain statements of single axioms depend upon one another, and whether the axioms may not therefore contain certain parts in common, which must be isolated if one wishes to arrive at a system of axioms that shall be altogether independent of one another." (David Hilbert, "Mathematische Probleme", Gŏttinger Nachrichten, 1900)

"No theorem can be new unless a new axiom intervenes in its demonstration; reasoning can only give us immediately evident truths borrowed from direct intuition; it would only be an intermediary parasite." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Syllogistic reasoning remains incapable of adding anything to the data that are given it; the data are reduced to axioms, and that is all we should find in the conclusions." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1901)

"Like almost every subject of human interest, this one [mathematics] is just as easy or as difficult as we choose to make it. A lifetime may be spent by a philosopher in discussing the truth of the simplest axiom. The simplest fact as to our existence may fill us with such wonder that our minds will remain overwhelmed with wonder all the time." (John Perry, "Teaching of Mathematics", 1902)

"No theorem can be new unless a new axiom intervenes in its demonstration; reasoning can only give us immediately evident truths borrowed from direct intuition; it would only be an intermediary parasite." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Hypothesis", 1902)

"The requisites for the axioms are various. They should be simple, in the sense that each axiom should enumerate one and only one statement. The total number of axioms should be few. A set of axioms must be consistent, that is to say, it must not be possible to deduce the contradictory of any axiom from the other axioms. According to the logical 'Law of Contradiction,' a set of entities cannot satisfy inconsistent axioms. Thus the existence theorem for a set of axioms proves their consistency. Seemingly this is the only possible method of proof of consistency." (Alfred N Whitehead, "The axioms of projective geometry, 1906) 

"Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré," Science and Method", 1908)

"It has been argued that mathematics is not or, at least, not exclusively an end in itself; after all it should also be applied to reality. But how can this be done if mathematics consisted of definitions and analytic theorems deduced from them and we did not know whether these are valid in reality or not. One can argue here that of course one first has to convince oneself whether the axioms of a theory are valid in the area of reality to which the theory should be applied. In any case, such a statement requires a procedure which is outside logic." (Ernst Zermelo, "Mathematische Logik - Vorlesungen gehalten von Prof. Dr. E. Zermelo zu Göttingen im S. S", 1908)

"It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. [...] Every definition implies an axiom, since it asserts the existence of the object defined. The definition then will not be justified, from the purely logical point of view, until we have proved that it involves no contradiction either in its terms or with the truths previously admitted." (Henri Poincaré, "Science and Method", 1908)

"I do in no wise share this view [that the axioms are arbitrary propositions which we assume wholly at will, and that in like manner the fundamental conceptions are in the end only arbitrary symbols with which we operate] but consider it the death of all science: in my judgment the axioms of geometry are not arbitrary, but reasonable propositions which generally have the origin in space intuition and whose separate content and sequence is controlled by reasons of expediency." (Felix Klein, "Elementarmathematik vom hoheren Standpunkte aus", 1909)

On Integrals I

"I see with much pleasure that you are working on a large work on the integral Calculus [...] The reconciliation of the methods which you are planning to make, serves to clarify them mutually, and what they have in common contains very often their true metaphysics; this is why that metaphysics is almost the last thing that one discovers. The spirit arrives at the results as if by instinct; it is only on reflecting upon the route that it and others have followed that it succeeds in generalising the methods and in discovering its metaphysics." (Pierre-Simon Laplace [letter to Sylvestre F Lacroix] 1792)

"Certain authors who seem to have perceived the weakness of this method assume virtually as an axiom that an equation has indeed roots, if not possible ones, then impossible roots. What they want to be understood under possible and impossible quantities, does not seem to be set forth sufficiently clearly at all. If possible quantities are to denote the same as real quantities, impossible ones the same as imaginaries: then that axiom can on no account be admitted but needs a proof necessarily." (Carl F Gauss, "New proof of the theorem that every algebraic rational integral function in one variable can be resolved into real factors of the first or the second degree", 1799)

"The integrals which we have obtained are not only general expressions which satisfy the differential equation, they represent in the most distinct manner the natural effect which is the object of the phenomenon [...] when this condition is fulfilled, the integral is, properly speaking, the equation of the phenomenon; it expresses clearly the character and progress of it, in the same manner as the finite equation of a line or curved surface makes known all the properties of those forms." (Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, "Théorie Analytique de la Chaleur", 1822)

"If one looks at the different problems of the integral calculus which arise naturally when he wishes to go deep into the different parts of physics, it is impossible not to be struck by the analogies existing. Whether it be electrostatics or electrodynamics, the propagation of heat, optics, elasticity, or hydrodynamics, we are led always to differential equations of the same family." (Henri Poincaré, "Sur les Equations aux Dérivées Partielles de la Physique Mathématique", American Journal of Mathematics Vol. 12, 1890)

"Every one who understands the subject will agree that even the basis on which the scientific explanation of nature rests, is intelligible only to those who have learned at least the elements of the differential and integral calculus, as well as of analytical geometry." (Felix Klein, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung Vol. 11, 1902)

"The method of successive approximations is often applied to proving existence of solutions to various classes of functional equations; moreover, the proof of convergence of these approximations leans on the fact that the equation under study may be majorised by another equation of a simple kind. Similar proofs may be encountered in the theory of infinitely many simultaneous linear equations and in the theory of integral and differential equations. Consideration of the semiordered spaces and operations between them enables us to easily develop a complete theory of such functional equations in abstract form." (Leonid Kantorovich, "On one class of functional equations", 1936)

"The chief difficulty of modern theoretical physics resides not in the fact that it expresses itself almost exclusively in mathematical symbols, but in the psychological difficulty of supposing that complete nonsense can be seriously promulgated and transmitted by persons who have sufficient intelligence of some kind to perform operations in differential and integral calculus […]" (Celia Green, "The Decline and Fall of Science", 1976)

"But just as much as it is easy to find the differential of a given quantity, so it is difficult to find the integral of a given differential. Moreover, sometimes we cannot say with certainty whether the integral of a given quantity can be found or not." (Johann Bernoulli) [attributed to]

"Therefore one has taken everywhere the opposite road, and each time one encounters manifolds of several dimensions in geometry, as in the doctrine of definite integrals in the theory of imaginary quantities, one takes spatial intuition as an aid. It is well known how one gets thus a real overview over the subject and how only thus are precisely the essential points emphasized." (Bernhard Riemann)

On Method II (Mathematical Method)

"He who seeks for methods without having a definite problem in mind seeks for the most part in vain." (David Hilbert, 1902)

“Statistics may be regarded as (i) the study of populations, (ii) as the study of variation, and (iii) as the study of methods of the reduction of data.” (Sir Ronald A Fisher, “Statistical Methods for Research Worker”, 1925)

“[Statistics] is both a science and an art. It is a science in that its methods are basically systematic and have general application; and an art in that their successful application depends to a considerable degree on the skill and special experience of the statistician, and on his knowledge of the field of application, e.g. economics.” (Leonard H C Tippett, “Statistics”, 1943)

"The emphasis on mathematical methods seems to be shifted more towards combinatorics and set theory - and away from the algorithm of differential equations which dominates mathematical physics." (John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", 1944)

“We can scarcely imagine a problem absolutely new, unlike and unrelated to any formerly solved problem; but if such a problem could exist, it would be insoluble. In fact, when solving a problem, we should always profit from previously solved problems, using their result or their method, or the experience acquired in solving them.” (George Polya, 1945)

"All followers of the axiomatic method and most mathematicians think that there is some such thing as an absolute ‘mathematical rigor’ which has to be satisfied by any deduction if it is to be valid. The history of mathematics shows that this is not the case, that, on the contrary, every generation is surpassed in rigor again and again by its successors.” (Richard von Mises, “Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding”, 1951)

"Algebra reverses the relative importance of the factors in ordinary language. It is essentially a written language, and it endeavors to exemplify in its written structures the patterns which it is its purpose to convey. The pattern of the marks on paper is a particular instance of the pattern to be conveyed to thought. The algebraic method is our best approach to the expression of necessity, by reason of its reduction of accident to the ghost-like character of the real variable.” (Alfred N Whitehead, “Essays in Science and Philosophy”, 1948)

"Real-life phenomena are generally so complicated in relation to the mathematical methods at our disposal that we cannot hope to represent and account for their every characteristic. Consequently, some simplifying hypotheses must be made. The moment that we do this, we are leaving the real world and beginning to make a (mathematical) model." (Peter Lancaster, "Mathematics: Models of the Real World", 1976)

"In the long run, the methods are the important part of the course. It is not enough to know the theory; you should be able to apply it." (Richard W Hamming, "Methods of Mathematics Applied to Calculus, Probability, and Statistics", 1985)

"I regarded as quite useless the reading of large treatises of pure analysis: too large a number of methods pass at once before the eyes. It is in the works of application that one must study them; one judges their utility there and appraises the manner of making use of them." (Joseph-Louis de Lagrange)

Mathematics as Game I

"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)

"Mathematics is not like a game whose tasks are determined by arbitrarily stipulated rules. Rather, it is a conceptual system possessing internal necessity that can only be so and by no means otherwise." (David Hilbert, "Natur und Mathematisches Erkennen", 1919–20) 

"A serious threat to the very life of science is implied in the assertion that mathematics is nothing but a system of conclusions drawn from definitions and postulates that must be consistent but otherwise may be created by the free will of the mathematician. If this description were accurate, mathematics could not attract any intelligent person. It would be a game with definitions, rules and syllogisms, without motivation or goal." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?", 1941)

"Geometry, whatever others may think, is the study of different shapes, many of them very beautiful, having harmony, grace and symmetry. […] Most of us, if we can play chess at all, are content to play it on a board with wooden chess pieces; but there are some who play the game blindfolded and without touching the board. It might be a fair analogy to say that abstract geometry is like blindfold chess – it is a game played without concrete objects." (Edward Kasner & James R Newman, "New Names for Old", 1956) 

"To the average mathematician who merely wants to know that his work is securely based, the most appealing choice is to avoid difficulties by means of Hilbert's program. Here one regards mathematics as a formal game and one is only concerned with the question of consistency." (Paul Cohen, "Axiomatic set theory, American Mathematical Society", 1971)

"There is an infinite regress in proofs; therefore proofs do not prove. You should realize that proving is a game, to be played while you enjoy it and stopped when you get tired of it." (Imre Lakatos, "Proofs and Refutations", 1976)

"The way the mathematics game is played, most variations lie outside the rules, while music can insist on perfect canon or tolerate a casual accompaniment." (Marvin Minsky, "Music, Mind, and Meaning", 1981)

"If doing mathematics or science is looked upon as a game, then one might say that in mathematics you compete against yourself or other mathematicians; in physics your adversary is nature and the stakes are higher." (Mark Kac, "Enigmas Of Chance", 1985)

"Mathematicians are used to game-playing according to a set of rules they lay down in advance, despite the fact that nature always writes her own. One acquires a great deal of humility by experiencing the real wiliness of nature." (Philip W Anderson, "More and Different: Notes from a Thoughtful Curmudgeon", 2011)

"Often the key contribution of intuition is to make us aware of weak points in a problem, places where it may be vulnerable to attack. A mathematical proof is like a battle, or if you prefer a less warlike metaphor, a game of chess. Once a potential weak point has been identified, the mathematician’s technical grasp of the machinery of mathematics can be brought to bear to exploit it." (Ian Stewart, "Visions of Infinity", 2013)

On Definitions V

"The use of a mathematical definition is, to deduce from it the properties of the thing defined […]" (Robert Woodhouse," On the necessary Truth of certain Conclusions obtained by Means of imaginary Quantities", 1801)

"The language of mathematics, permitting great sharpness and accuracy of definition, conduces largely to their power of drawing necessary conclusions. Language is not only a means of recording the results of our thinking; it is an instrument of thought, and that of the highest value." (Thomas Hill, "The Imagination in Mathematics", The North American Review Vol. 85 (176), 1857)

"The most striking characteristic of the written language of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are, indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it." (Thomas Hill, "Uses of Mathesis", Bibliotheca Sacra Vol. 32, 1875)

"The apodictic quality of mathematical thought, the certainty and correctness of its conclusions, are due, not to a special mode of ratiocination, but to the character of the concepts with which it deals. What is that distinctive characteristic? I answer: precision, sharpness, completeness of definition. But how comes your mathematician by such completeness? There is no mysterious trick involved; some ideas admit of such precision, others do not; and the mathematician is one who deals with those that do." (Cassius J Keyser, "The Universe and Beyond", Hibbert Journal Vol. 3, 1904–1905)

"[…] mathematics is a science whose concepts are too breakable, too dry, too precisely limited. The disciplines of life and society, of human thinking, are fluid disciplines, with some flexibility, with concepts that are not clearly defined, but which are able to include things less strictly delimited than a mathematical definition does it." (Grigore C Moisil, 1968)

"Because mathematical proofs are long, they are also difficult to invent. One has to construct, without making any mistakes, long chains of assertions, and see what one is doing, see where one is going. To see means to be able to guess what is true and what is false, what is useful and what is not. To see means to have a feeling for which definitions one should introduce, and what the key assertions are that will allow one to develop a theory in a natural manner." (David Ruelle, "Chance and Chaos", 1991)

"It is not surprising to find many mathematical ideas interconnected or linked. The expansion of mathematics depends on previously developed ideas. The formation of any mathematical system begins with some undefined terms and axioms (assumptions) and proceeds from there to definitions, theorems, more axioms and so on. But history points out this is not necessarily the route that creativity" (Theoni Pappas, "More Joy of Mathematics: Exploring mathematical insights & concepts", 1991)

"This absolutist view of mathematical knowledge is based on two types of assumptions: those of mathematics, concerning the assumption of axioms and definitions, and those of logic concerning the assumption of axioms, rules of inference and the formal language and its syntax. These are local or micro-assumptions. There is also the possibility of global or macro-assumptions, such as whether logical deduction suffices to establish all mathematical truths." (Paul Ernest, "The Philosophy of Mathematics Education", 1991)

"The goal of a definition is to introduce a mathematical object. The goal of a theorem is to state some of its properties, or interrelations between various objects. The goal of a proof is to make such a statement convincing by presenting a reasoning subdivided into small steps each of which is justified as an "elementary" convincing argument." (Yuri I Manin, "Mathematics as Metaphor: Selected Essays of Yuri I. Manin", 2007)

"As students, we learned mathematics from textbooks. In textbooks, mathematics is presented in a rigorous and logical way: definition, theorem, proof, example. But it is not discovered that way. It took many years for a mathematical subject to be understood well enough that a cohesive textbook could be written. Mathematics is created through slow, incremental progress, large leaps, missteps, corrections, and connections." (Richard S Richeson, "Eulers Gem: The Polyhedron Formula and the birth of Topology", 2008)

From Parts to Wholes (1850-1899)

"The world of ideas which it [mathematics] discloses or illuminates, the contemplation of divine beauty and order which it induces, the harmonious connection of its parts, the infinite hierarchy and absolute evidence of the truths with which mathematical science is concerned, these, and such like, are the surest groimds of its title of human regard, and would remain unimpaired were the plan of the universe unrolled like a map at our feet, and the mind of man qualified to take in the whole scheme of creation at a glance.” (James J Sylvester, "A Plea for the Mathematician", Nature 1, 1870)

"Nature creates unity even in the parts of a whole." (Eugène Delacroix, 1857)

"Analysis and synthesis, though commonly treated as two different methods, are, if properly understood, only the two necessary parts of the same method. Each is the relative and correlative of the other. Analysis, without a subsequent synthesis, is incomplete; it is a mean cut of from its end. Synthesis, without a previous analysis, is baseless; for synthesis receives from analysis the elements which it recomposes." (Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic: 6th Lecture on Metaphysics", 1858)

"[…] the besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking a part of the truth for the whole." (John S Mill, "Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical”, 1859)

"We have repeatedly observed that while any whole is evolving, there is always going on an evolution of the parts into which it divides itself; but we have not observed that this equally holds of the totality of things, which is made up of parts within parts from the greatest down to the smallest." (Herbert Spencer, "First Principles", 1862)

"The adaptation observed in men, animals and plants [...] one part of this adaptation is explained from a thought-process in the interior of these bodies [...] another part, however, the adaptation of the organism, by a thought-process in a greater whole." (Bernhard Riemann, Gesammelte Mathematische Werke, 1876)

"All things, man included, are parts of one great whole." (Richard M Bucke, "Man's Moral Nature", 1879)

"The old and oft-repeated proposition ‘Totum est majus sua parte’ [the whole is larger than the part] may be applied without proof only in the case of entities that are based upon whole and part; then and only then is it an undeniable consequence of the concepts ‘totum’ and ‘pars’. Unfortunately, however, this ‘axiom’ is used innumerably often without any basis and in neglect of the necessary distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘quantity’, on the one hand, and ‘nnumbe’ and ‘set’, on the other, precisely in the sense in which it is generally false." (Georg Cantor, "Über unendliche, lineare Punktmannigfaltigkeiten", Mathematische Annalen 20, 1882)

"The part always has a tendency to reunite with its whole in order to escape from its imperfection." (Leonardo Da Vinci, "The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci", 1888)

On Metaphors V

"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy." (Aristotle, "Poetics", cca. 335 BC)
 
"Mathematical research can lend its organisational characteristics to poetry, whereby disjointed metaphors take on a universal sense. Similarly, the axiomatic foundations of group theory can be assimilated into a larger moral concept of a unified universe. Without this, mathematics would be a laborious Barbary." (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

"[…] the major mathematical research acquires an organization and orientation similar to the poetical function which, adjusting by means of metaphor disjunctive elements, displays a structure identical to the sensitive universe. Similarly, by means of its axiomatic or theoretical foundation, mathematics assimilates various doctrines and serves the instructive purpose, the one set up by the unifying moral universe of concepts. " (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

"[…] theoretical science is essentially disciplined exploitation of metaphor." (Anatol Rapoport, "Operational Philosophy", 1953)

"Speaking without metaphor we have to declare that we are here faced with one of these typical antinomies caused by the fact that we have not yet succeeded in elaborating a fairly understandable outlook on the world without retiring our own mind, the producer of the world picture, from it, so that mind has no place in it. The attempt to press it into it, after all, necessarily produces some absurdities." (Erwin Schrödinger, "Mind and Matter: the Tarner Lectures", 1956)

"The symbol and the metaphor are as necessary to science as to poetry." (Jacob Bronowski, "Science and Human Values", 1956) 

"The model is only a suggestive metaphor, a fiction about the messy and unwieldy observations of the real world. In order for it to be persuasive, to convey a sense of credibility, it is important that it not be too complicated and that the assumptions that are made be clearly in evidence. In short, the model must be simple, transparent, and verifiable." (Edward Beltrami, "Mathematics for Dynamic Modeling", 1987)
 
"People have amazing facilities for sensing something without knowing where it comes from (intuition); for sensing that some phenomenon or situation or object is like something else (association); and for building and testing connections and comparisons, holding two things in mind at the same time (metaphor). These facilities are quite important for mathematics. Personally, I put a lot of effort into ‘listening’ to my intuitions and associations, and building them into metaphors and connections. This involves a kind of simultaneous quieting and focusing of my mind. Words, logic, and detailed pictures rattling around can inhibit intuitions and associations." (William P Thurston, "On proof and progress in mathematics", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 30 (2), 1994)

"If we are to have meaningful, connected experiences; ones that we can comprehend and reason about; we must be able to discern patterns to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. Underlying our vast network of interrelated literal meanings (all of those words about objects and actions) are those imaginative structures of understanding such as schema and metaphor, such as the mental imagery that allows us to extrapolate a path, or zoom in on one part of the whole, or zoom out until the trees merge into a forest." (William H Calvin, "The Cerebral Code", 1996)

"The logic of the emotional mind is associative; it takes elements that symbolize a reality, or trigger a memory of it, to be the same as that reality. That is why similes, metaphors and images speak directly to the emotional mind." (Daniel Goleman, "Emotional Intelligence", 1996)

On Discovery (until 1699)

"Reflexion is careful and laborious thought, and watchful attention directed to the agreeable effect of one's plan. Invention, on the other hand, is the solving of intricate problems and the discovery of new principles by means of brilliancy and versatility." (Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, "De architectura" ["On Architecture"], cca. 15 BC)

"Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience." (Roger Bacon, "Opus Major", 1267)

"In the discovery of hidden things and the investigation of hidden causes, stronger reasons are obtained from sure experiments and demonstrated arguments than from probable conjectures and the opinions of philosophical speculators of the common sort […]" (William Gilbert, "De Magnete", 1600)

"To invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know." (Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning", 1605)

"It cannot be that axioms established by argumentation should avail for the discovery of new works, since the subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of argument. But axioms duly and orderly formed from particulars easily discover the way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active." (Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum", 1620)

"The entire method consists in the order and arrangement of the things to which the mind's eye must turn so that we can discover some truth." (René Descartes, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind", 1628)

"We do not yet pretend to have discovered all things, or that what we have discovered can receive no addition; and therefore, pray let us agree, there are yet many things to be done in the ages to come." (Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, "Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds", 1686)

"For the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it, because it is unknown." (John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", 1689)